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WHO ARE THE ACTIVISTS? 
INVESTOR CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE IMPROVEMENTS 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The conflicts of interest between owners and managers have spurred a great deal of research 
on shareholders’ potential ability to reduce agency costs in public corporations. Scholars, 
however, still disagree on which investors defy the free-rider problem and engage in value-
adding activism. We develop a novel approach to identify activist investors based on their 
past investment behaviour and study where such owners improve their target companies. We 
depart from the existing literature and produce two alternative investor groupings based on 
portfolio concentration and investment horizon to predict propensity to activism. We examine 
how the investor groups relate to improvements in corporate governance, organisation and 
payout. 
DATA 
We study the effect of different investor types on large U.S. and European publicly traded 
firms, as included in the S&P 1500 Composite and the STOXX Europe TMI indices, during 
the years 2003 to 2009. The foundation of our study lays on an extensive panel database 
comprising three unique hand-collected data sets, one for our investor universe (FactSet 
LionShares Global Ownership), one for corporate governance (RiskMetrics Corporate 
Governance Quotient) and one for organisational improvements (SDC Platinum). Further, we 
deploy standard financial databases to source dividend payout and control variables. 
RESULTS 
Investors with high portfolio concentration and long investment horizon are consistently 
associated with corporate governance and organisational improvements but not with increases 
in dividend payout. Specifically, concentrated long-term investors relate to improvements in 
overall governance and board arrangements as well as corporate diversification reductions. 
Equally importantly, we find that investors with very high portfolio concentration and very 
long investment horizon exhibit no association with the same improvements, and propose a 
private benefit explanation.  
Our findings contribute to the present-day perception of who activist investors are and how 
they improve the companies they invest in. In contrast with current research on activism, we 
show that no externally labelled investor group captures the investors that are actively 
improving governance or organisation in their target companies. Further, we provide support 
for the perception that investor activism relies primarily on individual investors with the right 
characteristics rather than the firms’ overall ownership structures. 
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KEITÄ OVAT AKTIIVISET SIJOITTAJAT? 
AIHE 
Omistajien ja yritysjohdon väliset eturistiriidat ovat synnyttäneet runsaasti tutkimuksia 
osakkeenomistajien kyvystä ja halukkuudesta vähentää agenttikustannuksia julkisesti 
noteeratuissa osakeyhtiöissä. On esitetty, että tietynlaisilla sijoittajilla olisi riittävät 
kannustimet uhmata vapaamatkustajaongelmaa ja pyrkiä aktiivisesti parantamaan 
omistusyritystensä toimintaa. Tutkimustuloksissa ei kuitenkaan tarjota yksiselitteistä kuvaa 
aktiivisten sijoittajien identiteetistä tai ominaisuuksista. Luomme uuden tavan aktiivisten 
sijoittajien tunnistamiseen ryhmittelemällä sijoittajat heidän sijoitushorisonttinsa ja 
sijoitussalkkunsa keskittyneisyyden perusteella. Lopulta tutkimme eri ryhmien 
assosioitumista parannuksiin kohdeyritysten hallintotavassa, organisaatiossa sekä 
voitonjaossa. 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tutkimme sijoittajaryhmien vaikutusta suuriin yhdysvaltalaisiin ja eurooppalaisiin julkisesti 
noteerattuihin yhtiöihin, jotka sisältyvät S&P 1500 Composite ja STOXX Europe TMI -
osakeindekseihin. Tutkimuksemme kattaa vuodet 2003 - 2009. Työmme perustana on kolme 
ainutlaatuista, itse rakennettua tietokantaa, jotka koostuvat laajasta omistajatietokannasta 
(lähteenä FactSet LionShares Global Ownership), hyvän hallintotavan tietokannasta 
(RiskMetrics Corporate Governance Quotient) sekä organisatoristen parannusten 
tietokannasta (SDC Platinum). Voitonjaon ja kontrollimuuttujien aineiston haemme yleisistä 
taloustietokannoista, kuten FactSetistä. 
TULOKSET 
Tuloksemme osoittavat, että pitkän aikavälin keskittyneet sijoittajat assosioituvat 
hallintotavan sekä organisaation parannuksiin, mutta eivät voitonjaon lisäämiseen. 
Parannukset näkyvät yleisen hallintotavan ja hallitustyöskentelyn kohennuksina sekä yritysten 
diversifikaation vähennyksinä. Tuloksemme viittaavat myös siihen, että erittäin keskittyneen 
portfolion ja erittäin pitkän sijoitushorisontin omaavat sijoittajat eivät ole liitoksissa yhtiöissä 
tapahtuviin parannuksiin, ja tarjoamme löydöksellemme sijoittajien yksityisetuihin perustuvaa 
selitystä.  
Tuloksemme täydentävät vallitsevaa käsitystä aktiivisten omistajien identiteetistä ja heidän 
ajamiensa parannusten luonteesta. Vastoin olemassa olevaa kirjallisuutta näytämme, että 
aktiivisia sijoittajia ei voida tunnistaa oikeudelliseen muotoon perustuvilla ryhmittelyillä. 
Tuloksemme tukevat myös käsitystä, että yhtiöissä tapahtuvat parannukset riippuvat 
yksittäisistä, tietyt ominaispiirteet omaavista sijoittajista, eivät yleisestä omistusrakenteesta. 
AVAINSANAT 
Aktiiviset sijoittajat, agenttikustannukset,vapaamatkustajaongelma 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
We deploy a novel approach to identify activist shareholders and study where such owners 
improve their target companies. Active owners are investors who vigorously monitor the 
companies they hold an economic interest in, and push for changes they believe increase the 
value of their holdings. Active owners are typically simultaneously present in multiple firms with 
a minority stake. Theory suggests that such actively monitoring shareholders can undermine the 
free-rider problem and reduce agency costs arising from the conflicts of interest between owners 
and managers. 
The conflicts of interest between owners and managers have spurred a great deal of research 
since Berle and Means (1932) formulated the separation of ownership and control in the 
governance of companies. According to agency theory, management is inclined to engage in non-
shareholder value maximising behaviour in pursuit of private objectives. Jensen (1986), for 
instance, shows that managers may pursue excessive growth or unrelated diversification even 
when such activity serves to destroy shareholder value. Such actions, although value-destroying 
for the residual claim holders, may be associated with increased management compensation or 
enhanced private benefits.  
A number of papers have studied individual shareholder groups as a potential solution to reduce 
agency costs by increasing management monitoring. Studies have examined institutional 
investors (Among others: Coffee 1991; Black 1992b; Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999; Connelly 
et al. 2009), large blockholders (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler 1998; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach 
2008), corporate raiders (Walsh and Kosnik 1993), venture capitalists (Bottazzi, Da Rin and 
Hellmann 2008), private equity companies and lately activist hedge funds (Becht et al. 2008; 
Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) as potential mitigators of the free-rider 
problem and prevailing agency costs. While the papers obtain contradictory results on the 
agency-cost-mitigating effect of most shareholder types, the research seems to agree on the 
positive market response to hedge fund activism.  
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We suggest that the contradictory results may, in part, rise from the common research design that 
labels investors based on the type of legal entity they represent. We argue that investors should 
not be studied as a group based on external, or legal, labelling since such a division does not 
capture the investor characteristics that determine the propensity to activism. To produce a more 
meaningful division, we identify investors based on their past investment behaviour and group 
investors based on their portfolio concentration and investment horizon. Further, we study the 
effect of entries of investors within the different investor groups on ensuing corporate 
improvements in large U.S. and European public companies.  
1.2 Research question and contribution 
We aim to shed new light on investor activism by studying who the activists are and examining 
the firm characteristics they improve. Specifically, we set out to examine whether investors with 
differing characteristics facilitate concrete corporate improvements that reduce agency costs and 
improve the shareholder position. Hence, our research question is two-fold. We seek to determine 
(1) Who are the activists: which observed investor characteristics define activist 
investors? 
(2) In which corporate characteristics do activists facilitate concrete improvements? 
Partly contradicting extant literature, we anticipate that specific investor characteristics, rather 
than plain legal types, determine investors’ propensity to engage in and succeed in improvement-
seeking activism. Further, we anticipate that activism is dependent on the presence of individual 
investors with right characteristics, rather than on the general ownership structure of publicly 
held corporations.  
We contribute to the current understanding of investor activism with three main insights. First, 
drawing on literature and practitioner interviews, we study the sources of investor activism and 
identify two main investor characteristics that explain differences in investors’ propensity to 
activism, namely portfolio concentration and investment horizon. Second, we use these 
characteristics to formulate a novel classification of investors into groups. Third, we examine 
which concrete corporate improvements the different investor groups facilitate. Contemporary 
research on activism focuses abundantly on (short-term) value creation but pays far less attention 
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to activists’ role in facilitating concrete changes in the companies they target. Furthermore, while 
most papers studying investor effects on corporate changes focus on improvements facilitated by 
externally labelled groups, such as hedge funds or institutional investors, we include all investors 
and allow for relating different types of investors to different corporate improvements.  
1.3 Research scope, methods and limitations  
We study the effect of different investor types on large U.S. and European publicly traded firms, 
as included in the S&P 1500 Composite and the STOXX Europe TMI indices. Our observation 
period runs from 2003 through 2009 covering the period for which reliable ownership data is 
available. 
To define our research question and construct related hypotheses, we draw extensively on 
existing literature. First, we explore the basic literature of the theory of the firm and cover the 
predictions for the behaviour of shareholders as the principals of publicly held corporations. We 
then focus on extant literature regarding investor effects on target firms. We cover the growing 
body of activist literature and explore adjacent topics of investor effects on public corporations, 
including studies on blockholders, institutional investors as well as individual and family 
investors. To consolidate our understanding on which types of investors are apt to engage in 
activism, we interview eight European professionals working with investor activism. Our in-
depth interviews provide an important complement to the literature since our interviewees 
include activist investors from different types of organizations, institutional investors as well as 
advisors working with shareholder activists. 
Next, we compile a unique panel dataset to test our hypotheses on investor activism. First, we 
produce an ownership database featuring 17.9 million quarterly owner-firm pairs to identify our 
owners of interest and analyse their investment behaviour over our observation period. Our 
ownership database allows us to produce two alternative investor groupings based on past 
investment behaviour. Examining the relationship between different investor groups and 
observed corporate improvements allows for studying the effect that influential individual 
investors may have on target firms. The approach is in line with our anticipation that activism 
relies primarily on individual investors with right characteristics, rather than public corporations’ 
overall ownership structures. 
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Next, we construct datasets for the corporate characteristics that we anticipate activist investors 
improve. First, we produce a unique corporate governance database comprising annual data on 14 
key governance characteristics for our sample firms. Second, we build a customized divestments 
database covering annually all divestments undertaken by our sample firms. The database 
features 2,407 related and 956 unrelated divestments. Finally, we produce a dividend payout 
database. We then deploy a range of panel data regression models to examine the relationship 
between investors with different characteristics and observed corporate improvements. We also 
seek to counter the selection problem and show that the direction of the causality runs from 
investors to corporate improvements, rather than the other way around. 
We recognize two specific limitations related to the focus and data-availability of our study. First, 
we note that our ownership data is limited to holdings exceeding the national mandatory 
disclosure limit2, available in public company filings, presented in the business press or otherwise 
included in the FactSet ownership data3. Therefore, holdings falling below the mandatory 
disclosure limit and not publicised elsewhere may not be present in our ownership data. The 
limitation may cause a downward bias in observations for certain investor groups. Specifically, 
our practitioner interviews and literature (see e.g. Becht et al. 2008) give rise to the assumption 
that unregulated investment companies are left partly below radar: hedge fund holdings are often 
recorded only in nominee registers and are not available publicly unless the investor deems 
publicity beneficial for the activist campaign.  
Second, the FactSet ownership data, while widely considered the best international data available, 
does not include comprehensive ownership data for companies that have ceased to exist. 
Specifically, we are unable to extract consistent ownership data for firms that are acquired, 
merged or for other reason cease to exist prior to year-end 2009. Consequently, all such firms and 
their corresponding ownership data are not present in our analyses. We recognize that issues 
related to survivorship bias may arise and discuss potential consequences further in Section 0. 
                                                 
2  Disclosure limits vary across markets between 2% and 5%. 
3  FactSet sources the ownership data from regulatory and press sources. 
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1.4 Structure of the study 
In Chapter 2, we present and discuss key theories and lay out preceding activism-related 
literature. In Chapter 3, we present the research question and specify related hypotheses. Chapter 
4 describes the data, specifies variables and presents key methodologies applied. In Chapter 5, we 
show our results for each hypothesis. In Chapter 6, we test the persistence of our results and 
explore alternative approaches to capture the investor characteristics that drive activism. Chapter 
7 discusses the results and concludes. 
2 Literature review 
This section provides an introduction to the theoretical framework of shareholder activism. First, 
we lay out the concept of shareholder activism and define activist investors. Second, we discuss 
the theory of the firm and investor passivity, presenting the agency costs, the failure of control 
mechanisms and the free-rider problem. Third, we discuss the investor characteristics that make 
some investors more likely to be active than others. We then present these reasons in terms of 
two key dimensions: (1) portfolio concentration and (2) investment horizon. Finally, we discuss 
how literature views the corporate characteristics that activist investors are likely to improve.  
2.1 Shareholder activism 
In this section, we define shareholder activism and discuss its roots. 
2.1.1 Basis for shareholder activism  
The basis for shareholder activism is in the dissatisfaction of stakeholders towards the state of the 
company they hold an economic interest in. In this study, we only consider activist shareholders 
and exclude debt holders from our analysis. As Hirschman (1970) describes, dissatisfied 
shareholders have three different ways of acting: (1) exit, (2) loyalty and (3) voice. Exiting stands 
for the selling of shares, often referred to as the “Wall Street Walk” or “voting with one’s feet”. If 
loyal, the shareholders keep the shares and do nothing. The third alternative is to hold on to the 
shares and “voice” the dissatisfaction by engaging in activism. 
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2.1.2 Definition of an activist investor 
Although a number of definitions for activism exist in related literature, the fundamental pursuit 
of influencing firm policies to unlock shareholder value is common to all definitions. Jensen 
(1993) views activist investors as individuals or institutions “holding large debt or equity 
positions in a company and actively participating in its strategic direction.” In line with this, 
Gillan (2007) notes that shareholder activists are traditionally defined as investors who, being 
”dissatisfied with some aspect of a company’s management or operations, try to bring about 
change within the company without a change in control.” 
Tirole (2006), however, complements this view by noting that activism can also stem from 
outside the company’s existing shareholders. In such a case an investor gains favourable 
information on the company and buys into its equity with the intention of actively pursuing 
value-creating changes. In an important addition to the activist definitions above, Clifford (2008) 
notes that an essential aspect of activist behaviour is the possibility to threaten a target with a 
takeover. In contrast with Gillan (2007), this includes the threat of a change in control. 
Most recent U.S. studies classify activist engagements based on the mandatory Schedule 13D 
filings4 submitted to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and consider them to 
be a signal of investor’s intentions to actively participate in the target firm’s governance. This 
definition is, however, mostly applied in studies examining the returns and operational 
improvements resulting from engagements by “outside” activists as described by Tirole (2006). 
Klein and Zur (2009), for example, define hedge fund activism as “a strategy in which a hedge 
fund purchases a 5 percent or greater stake in a publicly-traded firm with the stated intent of 
influencing the firm’s policies” (see also Brav et al. 2008).  
In this study we include both existing (old) and new shareholders in our definition of an activist 
shareholder. More precisely, we define activist investors as minority shareholders actively 
seeking to change company policies in order to unlock embedded shareholder value. Further, we 
use “active shareholders” and “activist shareholders” interchangeably. 
                                                 
4  Schedule 13D, a beneficial ownership report, must be filed with the SEC by any investor exceeding the 
  ownership threshold of 5% of common stock with intentions to influence target firm policies. The 13D disclosure 
  document must be filed within ten days from exceeding the 5% threshold. 
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We also stress that shareholder activism should not only be studied on the basis of public filings 
or announcements since activist campaigns are often kept private. Carleton et al. (1998) show 
how a major financial institution, the Teachers Insurance Annuity Association-College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) tends to approach the companies they attempt to 
influence through private negotiations. A similar observation is made by Becht et al. (2008) who 
find that in the case of Hermes UK Focus Funds, activism is predominantly executed through 
private negotiations. Further, the wide utilisation of non-public negotiations in conveying 
requests for change to target company board and management is corroborated by our practitioner 
interviews.  
2.2 Theory framework 
In this section, we discuss the theory of the firm and relate its basic concepts to shareholder 
passivity and the role of activist shareholders. 
2.2.1 Market for corporate control 
Financial theory approaches shareholder activism as one of the mechanisms of the market for 
corporate control. Manne’s (1965) early description of the market for corporate control presents 
that rewards to both managers and shareholders from enhanced utilisation of badly managed firm 
resources motivate the existence of a system where managers and investors compete over the 
control of corporate resources. Manne (1965) also notes that in a world of separated ownership 
and control (Berle and Means 1932), the existence of such a market protects especially small 
minority shareholders who lack means to exercise direct control over the management.  
In line with Manne (1965), Fama and Jensen (1983) define the market for corporate control as a 
system where investors buy control of companies and fire and hire managements in pursuit of 
highest possible utilisation of firm resources and resultant value gains. Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
add to this by offering a slightly redefined perspective on the market for corporate control. They 
propose that management teams competing for rights to manage firm resources are, in fact, the 
primary subjects of the market. Jensen and Ruback (1983) view investors who execute 
transactions (including corporate raiders) as mere facilitators of changes in resource control - 
their role is to simply choose the competing management team that offers the highest-value 
alternative. 
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2.2.2 Agency theory  
The fundamental need for the market for corporate control arises from the costs of non-aligned 
interests of management and shareholders, as laid out by Jensen and Meckling (1976). Drawing 
from early financial theorists, including Adam Smith (1937) and Berle and Means (1932), Jensen 
and Meckling attest that in a principal-agent relationship, the actions taken by a utility-
maximising agent (manager) are never fully aligned with the value-maximisation of a principal 
(shareholder). Such misalignment of interests generates costs to both parties. Costs from non-
alignment, or agency costs, can be broken down into three components: 1) residual loss, 2) 
monitoring costs and 3) bonding costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Monitoring costs are incurred when the shareholder attempts to discipline the management and 
reduce unfavourable actions. Owner resources spent on contracting and auditing are typical 
monitoring costs. Managers, on the other hand, incur bonding costs in an attempt to enhance 
alignment with shareholder interests, when such enhanced alignment increases their utility. 
Finally, residual loss arises from the inevitable non-alignment of interests despite efforts to 
reduce it (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
The setting and implications of the agency theory are, of course, general in nature and do not 
apply to corporate governance-related subjects exclusively (see e.g. Alchian and Demsetz 1972). 
In the governance of corporations, however, the separation of ownership and control between 
shareholders (or to debt holders, for that matter) and management, leads to a pure-play agency 
relationship and the role of agency costs becomes highly relevant.  
In studying investor activism, the agency costs incurred to shareholders are pivotal. These costs 
are derived from the non-shareholder value maximising behaviour of management and may be 
caused by a range of manager misbehaviour. For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
find that managers’ personal benefits drive bad acquisitions, while Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
show that managers often waste shareholder wealth in excessive perks. Further, Jensen (1986) 
shows that managers tend to embark their companies on paths of excessive growth and value-
destructive diversification (see also Black 1992b). Also, Black (1992b) notes that CEOs tend to 
weaken shareholder position and monitoring opportunities by choosing or presenting inside or 
affiliated board members.  
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2.2.3 Internal control mechanisms 
The non-aligned interests between owners and management, resulting agency costs and value 
losses naturally give rise to dissatisfaction amongst shareholders. To mitigate the agency costs, 
shareholders have a range or remedies at their disposal. These tools are broken down into internal 
and external control mechanisms (Jensen 1993). 
Internal control mechanisms include a range of tools with which existing shareholders can 
discipline the management and ensure better alignment of the management interests to those of 
their own. The key internal control mechanisms include 1) increased monitoring of management 
by the board of directors and 2) enhanced management incentives. 
Management monitoring 
Fama and Jensen (1983) present monitoring of management by shareholders as a significant 
control mechanism in mitigating agency costs. In particular, they argue that clear, contract-based 
ratification and monitoring of decision-makers (management) by the risk-bearers (shareholders) 
subdues part of agency costs and in general, facilitates the survival of large corporate 
organisations. Evidence suggesting that management monitoring, especially by large 
shareholders, is an important control mechanism and does add shareholder value, is also 
presented by Demsetz (1983), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990) and 
Black (1992b). In practice, increased management monitoring may include disciplinary actions 
such as voting against management-proposed antitakeover charter amendments (“shark 
repellents”) (Agrawal and Gershon 1990) or placing more independent directors to the board of 
directors (Black 1992b). 
Management incentives: stock ownership, pay and dismissal 
Management incentives as an internal control mechanism refer to management compensation or 
management turnover being tied to the owner interest. Owner interest is generally equalled to 
shareholder wealth for which share price (Jensen and Murphy 1990) or earnings (Kaplan 1994) 
are generally used as proxies. 
Management compensation is perhaps most prominently discussed by Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), who study the incentive effects of management compensation policies with a U.S. data in 
three samples over the 20th century. Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that stock ownership creates 
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substantial incentives for managers to act in line with shareholder interests, whereas performance 
bonuses and dismissal-related wealth consequences are only weakly associated with fluctuations 
in shareholder wealth. Moreover, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) find that management stock 
ownership creates significant incentives to align interests. More precisely, they show that 
management stock ownership is positively related to the Tobin’s q of U.S. firms on relatively 
small stock holdings. This implies that incentivising management with stock holdings serves to 
increase shareholder value. Partly contradicting his predecessors, Kaplan (1994) finds that in 
addition to stock holdings, also management cash compensation is positively correlated with 
share price development and earnings in both the U.S. and Japan. Kaplan’s results are well in line 
with Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) findings on U.S. data, showing that boards do succeed in 
establishing manager-incentivizing compensation arrangements. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) sum 
up the evidence from key literature on management compensation as an incentive tool. They 
highlight that while compensation is widely used as an internal control mechanism to mitigate 
agency costs, it does not entirely fulfil the task. In accordance with Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) hypothesise that legal and political factors restrict the pay-
performance sensitivity and thus strain the efficiency with which management compensation can 
be utilized in mitigating agency costs. 
Regarding disciplinary management turnover, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) find that based 
on U.S. data in 1981-1985, boards of directors tend to change managements when companies 
underperform compared to the surrounding industry, implying that management dismissal is 
actively applied as an internal control. They also find, however, that when an entire industry 
suffers, boards fail to engage in disciplinary management turnover. Kaplan (1994)5 shows that in 
the U.S. and Japan, management turnover is negatively related to share price performance and 
earnings. Also Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach 
(1988) find evidence that CEO dismissals are indeed used as an internal control mechanism. 
Jointly, they find a significant relationship between poor stock price performance and ensuing 
CEO dismissal. Further, the findings of Murphy and Zimmermann (1993) seem to corroborate 
that, based on U.S. data, CEO departure is preceded by poor earnings and weak stock price 
performance. Denis and Denis (1995) further corroborate the significance of management 
                                                 
5  Kaplan (1994) finds similar results also in the German market. 
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dismissal as an internal control by showing that forced CEO resignations are preceded by poor 
operating performance and ensued by significant operating performance improvements. The 
authors also clarify the picture by attesting that amongst normal CEO retirements, similar effects 
are not observed. Interestingly, however, Denis and Denis (1995) do not give credit to the boards 
for successful CEO dismissals, but rather claim that direct blockholder influence or threat of a 
takeover is often behind the dismissal of inefficient managers. This implies significant interplay 
between internal and external control mechanisms in large corporations.  
More recently, the application of management incentives in controlling the management has been 
discussed by Huson, Parrino and Starks (2001), who study CEO removals and firm performance 
with U.S. data for 1971-1994. They find that CEO dismissal was applied as an internal control 
mechanism throughout the observation period, but the relationship did not change significantly 
over time. This implies that, despite changes in external control mechanisms, such as takeover 
market intensity or regulation, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance did not 
change. In slight contrast, however, Dahya et al. (2002), find that when a regulatory code in 
favour of more independent directors was introduced in the U.K. market, the negative 
relationship between CEO turnover and performance became stronger. In line with these 
findings, Huson, Malatesta and Parrino (2004) find that relative accounting measures of 
performance deteriorated prior to CEO turnover and improved thereafter. In their study, based on 
the U.S. market in 1971-2004, they also found that the level of ex-post performance 
improvements was positively related to the level of institutional shareholdings and to the 
presence of an outsider-dominated board. Finally, partly contradicting the findings of Huson, 
Parrino and Starks (2001), Cremers and Nair (2005) find evidence of the interplay between 
internal and external control mechanisms. They show, based on U.S. data in 1990 – 2001, that a 
portfolio of companies with strong internal controls6 enjoyed abnormal returns of 8% over a 
portfolio with low internal controls but only in the presence of high takeover vulnerability7. This 
implies that internal and external control mechanisms are interrelated and their effect in 
mitigating agency costs is dependent on one another. 
                                                 
6  Public pension fund ownership is used as a proxy for internal control mechanisms. 
7  High takeover vulnerability is equated with high level of external controls and proxied with an index 
  of antitakeover measures, in line with Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). 
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2.2.4 External control mechanisms 
According to Jensen (1993), the external control mechanisms to mitigate agency costs can be 
divided in into 
1) Capital markets, or market for corporate control,  
2) Product market competition and  
3) Regulatory/legal forces.  
Although we do not expect shareholders to exercise power over regulatory issues, we recognise 
the importance of such issues in determining the costs from non-alignment of managerial and 
shareholder interests. The three external control mechanisms are discussed in more detail below. 
Capital markets and the market for corporate control 
When managerial action diverges from shareholder interest, the surrounding capital markets have 
incentives to intervene. The intervention is incentivized through decreased shareholder value, or 
value of the firm, deriving from inefficient use of corporate resources (Jensen 1991). The 
decreases in value then motivate outside investors to attempt taking over such under-utilized 
assets and employ them more efficiently. The surrounding capital markets are able to exercise 
such control over inefficient managers through firms’ need to obtain capital from the markets 
(Jensen 1986). Traditionally, market for corporate control transactions are materialized in 
takeover bids, as laid out by (Jensen and Ruback 1983). They further show empirically, based on 
U.S. data, that corporate governance-motivated takeovers are indeed value-adding: target 
shareholders benefit from them and bidder shareholders do not lose. Thus, large shareholders, by 
facilitating takeovers, may work in tandem with the market for corporate control. 
Product market competition 
In addition to the capital markets, the products markets on which firms operate also serve to 
discipline inefficient managements and mitigate agency costs. As formulated by Jensen (1986), 
the product (and factor) markets tend to drive prices towards minimum average cost, thus forcing 
managements to increase efficiency in order to ensure survival. Jensen highlights that the 
disciplinary effect of product markets is significant especially in mature industries or industries 
where excess returns (rents or quasi-rents) are small. Also Hart (1983) previously showed in an 
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analytical paper that product market competition reduces managerial inefficiency, or slack, in a 
state of correlated firm environments.  
Regulatory and legislative changes 
The regulation and legal environment carries a significant potential impact on the agency costs 
and the extent of diverging interests between management and shareholders. Regulation, as 
Jensen (1983) suggests, is especially significant when it changes the rules of the takeover market. 
Further, Jarrell et al. (1988) notify that, based on U.S. data in the 1980s, less potent antitakeover 
regulations serve to increase takeover activity and strengthen the market for corporate control as 
a means to mitigate agency costs. 
2.2.5 Failure of control mechanisms and the free-rider problem 
Despite the availability of internal and external control mechanisms, the success and significance 
of different control mechanisms is often questioned in the contemporary literature. Perhaps most 
prominently, Jensen (1993) discusses evidence of the partial failure of internal and external 
control mechanisms. The potential failure of different control mechanisms is pivotal to our 
research, since shareholder activism is often considered an option to the traditional means for 
controlling the non-alignment between management and shareholder interests. 
Failure of internal control mechanisms 
Shareholders’ choice not to utilise internal control mechanisms, especially increased management 
monitoring, is largely dependent on the ownership structure of the firm, as shown by Grossman 
and Hart (1980). In an analytic paper, they show how minority investors refrain from undertaking 
increased monitoring due to related costs. Any costs incurred would be carried solely by the 
owner seeking improvements, whereas potential value increases would be allocated to all 
shareholders in proportion to their holdings. In case of a single shareholder incurring monitoring-
related costs, all other shareholders simply free-ride and reap the benefits of enhanced 
management discipline. Such a setting often leads to a situation where none of the shareholders 
monitor the management (Greenwood and Schor 2009). Further, the smaller the stake, the smaller 
the incentive to carry incremental monitoring-related costs alone. Noe (2002) additionally argues 
that an investor with a small stake and the skills required to monitor cannot gain from monitoring 
by increasing her holding because the expected gains are priced into the stock price by passive 
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owners. The phenomenon, commonly referred to as the free-rider problem, is therefore 
accentuated for companies with atomistic ownership structures. 
In reality, the costs incurred to a shareholder seeking to increase management discipline by pro-
active measures include costs from monitoring the management, fighting potential legal 
challenges against other firm stakeholders and mounting proxy contests, as well as cost from 
potential loss of diversification through the purchase of a significant stake in the company 
(Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler 1998). These costs are in some form incurred to both existing 
shareholders pursuing change to status-quo and to new shareholders buying into a company in 
pursuit of value-creating changes.  
In addition to the free-rider problem, the literature also suggests other reasons for the failure of 
internal control mechanisms. Jensen (1993) discusses these reasons widely, attesting that given 
the board of director’s key role in all internal controls, malfunctioning boards bears much of the 
blame. He states that while boards do seem to dismiss CEOs after poor financial performance; 
they do so too late and too seldom. Based on exemplary U.S. corporate cases, Jensen (1993) 
points out that although pre-emptive management control is the board’s most vital task, they 
seem to fail in acting before companies end up in a crisis. As potential reasons for board failures, 
Jensen (1993) highlights, among others, low levels of management and board equity holdings 
(see e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988 for discussion; Jensen and Murphy 1990), oversized 
boards and the convention of CEOs heading the boards.  
Moreover, the findings of Jensen and Murphy (1990) on low pay-performance sensitivity imply 
that apart from stock ownership, boards may not succeed in building strong performance pay 
incentives enhancing management alignment to shareholder interests. Also the conclusion of 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) that boards of firms in suffering industries largely fail to 
control managements when solutions would require painful restructuring or sell-off of assets, 
adds to the view that internal control mechanisms function only partially to discipline inefficient 
managements and mitigate agency costs. 
Failure of external control mechanisms  
The external control mechanisms, too, are partly bound by the free-rider problem (Grossman and 
Hart 1980). Namely, they suggest that a takeover bidder is not exempt from the same externality 
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as atomistic shareholders; should she devote resources to improving the target, small 
shareholders can simply hold on to their shares instead of selling and reap the benefits of the 
takeover improvements. This balance serves to hinder takeovers and weaken the functionality of 
the market for corporate governance in correcting for inefficiencies. Grossman and Hart (1980), 
however, suggest that the negative externality can be mitigated through ex-ante provisions to 
allow for an outside bidder, for example, to sell the assets of the firm to a holding company at a 
reduced price. All in all, the free-rider problem combined with legislation limiting the ex-ante 
implementation of bidder-friendly clauses in company charters8 may have a significant effect in 
decreasing the efficiency of market for corporate control. 
Literature suggests that external control mechanisms are also often prone to failure outside the 
implications of the free-rider problem. Jensen (1993) suggests that despite the flourishing 
takeover market in the 1980s, the subsequent rise in regulation, state antitakeover amendments 
and prohibitive court rulings largely subdued the activity of the market for corporate control 
beginning early 1990s. U.S.-based analysis by Comment and Schwert (1995), however, partly 
contradicts this, implying that the post-1980s demise of the market for corporate control and its 
lowered ability to contribute to mitigating agency costs is predominantly caused by secular 
trends, rather than legal reform. Allowing both arguements, it is evident that the market for 
corporate control is sensitive to economic or legal trends and partly fails to act as an external 
mechanism mitigating managerial inefficiency. 
Product market competition, also, is often found partly flawed in controlling management 
discretion and aligning principal-agent interests. Jensen (1993) states that, while the control force 
of the product market must be eventually considered inevitable9, it is often too slow to wield 
sufficient power over misaligned management incentives. He equals product markets with the 
manager dismissal problem: when the discipline effect kicks in, the company is often already in a 
crisis, rendering the control largely useless. In addition, Hart (1983), despite finding the product 
                                                 
8  See Grossman and Hart (1980) for discussion on the Williams Act. 
9  Jensen (1993) states that no firm can supply inferior products with inferior prices over extended periods of time. 
16 
 
market to discipline management to some extent, implies that it does not fully remove managerial 
slack and might not work in all market conditions10. 
Regulatory and legal issues, generally in place to protect shareholders from expropriation by 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997), also often fail to meet their purpose of controlling for 
management discretion. Most importantly, cross-country studies reveal that in many of the 
seemingly developed market economies the legal setting fails to protect shareholders from 
management expropriation or even direct management theft (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
2.2.6 Shareholder activism as an additional control mechanism 
Despite the free-rider problem and the failure of internal and external control mechanisms 
implied by the literature, some shareholders are observed to systematically undertake measures to 
mitigate agency costs in their portfolio companies (Jensen 1993; Ackermann, McEnally and 
Ravenscraft 1999). Such active (minority) shareholders provide for an exception to the prediction 
of the free-rider problem. Consistent with our definition in Section 2.1, we refer to them as 
activist shareholders.  
In terms of the three alternatives available for dissatisfied shareholders (Hirschman 1970), 
existing shareholders face the choice of “exit”, “loyalty” or “voice”, while for new shareholders 
“voice” and “exit” are complementary strategies (Noe 2002). Specifically, their investment 
strategy is to find mismanaged companies with an opportunity to unlock value and make an exit 
when the changes or the expectations of future changes are reflected in the company’s value. 
2.3 Reasons for shareholder activism 
The reason for the occurrence of active minority shareholders, who willingly engage in activism 
and defy the free-rider problem, has been subject to much discussion in the literature. In this 
section, we condense the potential literature-implied reasons for activism into three classes: 1) 
evolutionary reasons, 2) organisational reasons and 3) regulatory reasons. For each class, we 
discuss the underlying reasons in detail. 
                                                 
10  Namely, Hart (1983) does not draw conclusions on product market discipline in oligopolistic or monopolistic 
  markets 
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2.3.1 Evolutionary reasons – Development of investor organizations 
Evolutionary reasons for activism relate particularly to the substantial growth of institutional 
investors over the past 60 years and the consequent preference for activism instead of exiting 
investments. In the U.S., the proportion of institutionally owned equity has grown from 7 percent 
in 1950 to 50 percent in 200811. As institutional investors’ aggregate investments have grown, 
many have ended up with very sizeable stakes in their portfolio companies (Wahal 1996; Gillan 
and Starks 2000; Li et al. 2006). Such large owners often find themselves in a market position 
where reacting to dissatisfaction by exiting the investment becomes unattractive as liquidating 
large positions can have significant negative price impacts (Holthausen, Leftwich and Mayers 
1990; Brown and Brooke 1993; Chan and Lakonishok 1993; Wahal 1996). Such situations for 
institutional investors are discussed by e.g., Coffee (1991), who shows that in the 1980s the 
increased size of institutions’ shareholdings made their positions more illiquid and adverse price 
reactions from share sales made activism preferred over exit.  
2.3.2 Organisational reasons 
Organisational reasons account for some investors having higher incentives or larger flexibility to 
engage in activism than others. When institutional investors are studied as potential mitigators of 
agency problems, it is implicitly assumed that institutional investors have the same objectives as 
other shareholders (Woidtke 2002). Institutional investors, however, are often agents themselves 
(Black 1992a), managing funds that are not their own. If incentives are not aligned with the 
owners of the fund, fund managers may strive to pursue their own private agendas, thus reducing 
the probability that they undertake additional target improvement efforts to increase the value of 
the funds they manage.  
Nevertheless, strong financial incentives can motivate fund managers to counter the free-rider 
problem, enhance the value of their portfolio companies and avoid the setting where agents are 
watching agents as depicted by Black (1992a). Woidtke (2002) studies the effect of ownership 
levels of private and public pension funds on target valuation and finds a positive effect 
associated with private pension funds. She argues her findings to be consistent with the view that 
                                                 
11  Institutional holdings as reported in the US Federal Reserve Board’s Flow of Funds historical reports. 
Institutional investors include the following categories: Commercial banking, savings institutions, property-
casualty insurance companies, life insurance companies, private pension funds, state and local government 
retirement funds, federal government retirement funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded funds, 
and brokers and dealers. 
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larger and more performance-based compensation of private pension funds managers align their 
incentives with those of other shareholders. A number of contemporary studies on hedge fund 
activism (Kahan and Rock 2007; Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) further 
suggest that activist hedge funds are more prone to engage in activism than pension funds or 
mutual funds since the hedge fund managers’ compensation is typically tied more directly to the 
funds’ performance. In other words, managers in hedge funds have greater incentives to actively 
enhance target company performance, since they receive higher compensation for any increment 
in portfolio company value.  
Also, different functions inside an investor organization may give rise to internal conflicts of 
interest that may encourage institutional investors to vote with the management (Pound 1988). 
For instance, when an investor is part of a bank or an insurance company, the firm as a whole 
might have significant benefits vested in other business with the target. Since the allocation of 
business to service providers, such as insurance companies or financial advisors, is typically 
under managerial discretion, voting with the management may outweigh the possible gains from 
increased management monitoring. Business relationships can therefore compromise institutional 
investors as monitors of target firms (Brickley, Lease and Smith Jr 1988; Chen, Harford and Li 
2007; Cornett et al. 2007). Literature seems to agree that insurance companies and banks with 
business ties to their portfolio companies lack the monitoring effects of other institutional 
investors when it comes to pay-for-performance sensitivity of managerial compensation in the 
target companies (Almazan, Hartzell and Starks 2005). Further, banks with director interlock and 
business relationships with portfolio companies tend to vote in favour of management 
antitakeover proposals (Payne, Millar and William Glezen 1996). 
Finally, our practitioner interviews suggest that the organisational capacity to extend sufficient 
firm-specific attention to targets is important for investor’s ability to increase management 
monitoring and facilitate improvements. While many studies (see e.g. Smith 1996; Wahal 1996) 
suggest that also strongly diversified investors attempt to be active through a centralised 
approach such as letter-sending, findings by Black (1998) are consistent with the view that 
without significant efforts activism does not yield improvements. The perception is further 
corroborated by e.g. Becht et al. (2008) who show that firm-specific monitoring efforts, including 
private negotiations, are vital in improving target firms. 
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2.3.3 Regulatory reasons 
Regulatory reasons for the occurrence of shareholder activism relate to some investors being less 
bound by diversification, maximum stake or redemption rules than others. Bethel et al. (1998) 
find that firms targeted by corporate raiders, who are not bound by maximum stake requirements 
and who regularly threaten to buy the entire target, experience significant ex-post operating 
performance improvements. This, together with descriptive findings of Clifford (2008), suggests 
that investors not tied by diversification or maximum stake requirements have an especially 
favourable position to engage and succeed in activism. These findings are also in line with Brav 
et al. (2008), who bring forth hedge funds’ freedom to hold concentrated positions as a key 
contributor to their ability to engage in activism. 
Regarding the effects of redemption rules on activism, Clifford (2008) finds that amongst hedge 
funds, a one standard deviation increase in the lock-up period increases the probability of 
engaging in activism by 30%. This implies that investors that are by regulation required to return 
investor money within very short notices find it more difficult to pursue activism, which often 
requires locking up funds for extended periods in individual target firms.  
Regulation may also affect the occurrence of activism through the allowed use of derivatives and 
leverage (Kahan and Rock 2007). Some investors, especially mutual funds, are often by charter 
not allowed to use leverage or derivatives in investing activity (Ackermann, McEnally and 
Ravenscraft 1999). On the contrary, Hu et al. (2007) find that hedge funds frequently use equity 
derivatives to decouple votes and ownership. Brav et al. (2008) complement this finding by 
asserting that hedge funds’ use of derivatives provides them with more trading flexibility than is 
attainable for pension funds and mutual funds.  
Passively indexed funds are a target of debate in relation to activism. Kahan and Rock (2007) 
suggest a view based on the competitive environment of indexed mutual funds. Indexed funds 
replicate the performance of a given index and therefore compete with identical peers largely on 
the basis of fund expenses. If engaged in monitoring, the fund will carry all the costs but 
competitors will extract the benefits for free. Indexed funds would therefore be strongly 
discouraged to monitor, consistent with the free-rider problem, especially since they are unable to 
alter their allocation to increase the size of their holding. Alternatively, it is argued that funds 
devoted to indexing do not have the option to exit, and would therefore be constrained to “voice” 
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by engaging in value-enhancing campaigns (Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999). A survey study by 
Useem et al. (1993), however, shows that some managers of passively indexed funds are highly 
active while others are not, thus exhibiting no general trend. 
2.4 Investor characteristics and classification 
In this section we explore the different ways investors are classified in the literature when 
studying investor effects on corporate changes. We then draw on the activism-relevant investor 
characteristics presented in the previous section and identify two key dimensions that capture 
most of them: (1) portfolio concentration and (2) investment horizon. 
The bulk of research on investor activism differentiates investors based on their legal types. 
Researchers have studied the monitoring abilities of and stock price reactions to ownership of 
institutional investors in general (see e.g., Coffee 1991; Black 1992b; Kahn and Winton 1998), 
and separately for pension funds (see e.g., Romano 1993; Wahal 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins 
1999; Woidtke 2002) and activist hedge funds (see e.g., Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; Klein 
and Zur 2009). We argue, however, that a comparison of externally labelled investor types does 
not necessarily produce meaningful results as an investor’s label as such may not explain investor 
behaviour. For instance, in their study on pension fund activism, Del Guercio and Hawkins 
(1999) find significant heterogeneity across funds in activism objectives, tactics and impact on 
target firms. We argue that investors should be classified on the basis of investor characteristics 
that are shown to relate to the propensity to be active.  
Our approach on investor classification is inspired by Porter’s (1992) comparison of the U.S., 
German and Japanese public ownership systems and the division of investors into dedicated and 
transient. Dedicated owners are described as investors who remain invested in companies over 
long periods of time and hold significant ownership stakes, whereas transient owners frequently 
trade small stakes in a large number of firms. The division is further applied by Bushee (1998, 
2004) who groups investors based on investment behaviour measures describing ownership 
stability and the size of the ownership stake. We develop the classification further by dividing 
investors based on their portfolio concentration and investment horizon. 
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2.4.1 Portfolio concentration 
Portfolio concentration refers to investors’ ability and choice to hold large ownership stakes in 
few companies. We note that portfolio concentration captures many of the reasons for activism 
presented above in Section 2.3. First, high portfolio concentration implies that an investor is not 
bound by diversification or maximum stake requirements (Clifford 2008), since she is able to 
hold large stakes in a small number of targets. The investor is thus able to focus its efforts and 
resources on a limited number of firms and possesses the ability to accumulate a large stake in a 
given target. While this is contrary to the diversification principle, it is often necessary to allow 
for extending significant firm-specific monitoring efforts in individual target firms. Also, the 
apparent lack of regulation implies that focused investors are not regulated money managers 
often lacking performance-based fees (Golec 1992; Chordia 1996; Deli 2002; Khorana, Servaes 
and Tufano 2008) but rather entities with higher performance incentives (Kahan and Rock 2007; 
Brav et al. 2008) and freedom from internal agency problems (Black 1998).  
Further, while large holdings may render exiting unattractive, they also improve the outlooks of 
monitoring. Perhaps most importantly, large ownership stakes boost the incentives to monitor by 
partially mitigating the free-rider problem as a larger proportion of the benefits is channelled to 
the monitor (Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Barclay and Holderness 
1991a). Also, large stakes support investors’ monitoring efforts by providing more voting power, 
often needed to pressure the target management (Shleifer and Vishny 1986). Further, large 
holdings may reduce the total costs of monitoring through easier access to information as well as 
to the target management and board (Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach 1998; Chen, Harford and Li 
2007). 
The literature regarding the power and incentives of large owners to monitor comprises numerous 
studies on blockholders, typically defined as shareholders with ownership stakes exceeding 5% 
of common stock. The studies document a relation between blockholder stock purchases and 
value increases (Holderness and Sheehan 1985; Mikkelson and Ruback 1985; Barclay and 
Holderness 1991a; Choi 1991; Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler 1998). Importantly, the studies also 
show that blockholders affect corporate decisions (Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997a, b; Moeller 
2005) and voting outcomes (Gordon and Pound 1993).  
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We recognise, however, that the level of ownership stake only incorporates large percentage 
holdings but does not take into account the number of holdings. Large institutional investors, for 
instance, may have broadly diversified portfolios but still hold large stakes in their portfolio 
firms. We thus note that while level of ownership is important, also a low number of holdings is 
required for a concentrated portfolio supporting shareholder activism12.  
The literature also suggests that the relationship between block sizes and value-increasing 
monitoring is not linear. While we explain above that the net benefits of monitoring increase with 
the level of ownership, so does control and the incentives and opportunities to extract private 
benefits (Rock 1994). Private benefits can be extracted as pecuniary benefits in the form of 
excess salary by large inside owners or as small amenities that exploit company resources 
(Holderness 2003). Barclay and Holderness (1989) as well as Dyck and Zingales (2004) provide 
evidence of private benefits by studying the pricing of trades of large blocks of common stock. 
They find that the blocks are typically priced at substantial premiums to the post-announcement 
exchange price, which should partly reflect the private benefits from the controlling position. 
Similarly, Black (1992a) argues that the ownership of moderately large blocks (5% - 10% of 
equity) could results in better governance outcomes than ownership of even larger blocks.  
To better capture portfolio concentration in a more meaningful way than pure stake size, no 
specific metric is introduced but some alternatives can be found. For example, Bushee (1998) 
introduces four investment behaviour variables: (1) the average percentage of an institution’s 
total equity holdings invested in each portfolio firm, (2) the average size of an investor’s 
ownership position in its portfolio firms, (3) the percentage of the investor’s holdings exceeding 
five percent of the target company’s equity and (4) the Herfindahl measure of portfolio 
concentration. 
2.4.2 Investment horizon 
Investors’ investment horizon describes their ability and choice to engage in the portfolio 
companies over time. Investors possess different investment horizons for many reasons. 
Evolutionary reasons may lengthen the investment horizon of large institutional investors as 
larger stakes discourage exit and a broadly diversified portfolio narrows down the relevant 
                                                 
12  See, however, Section 2.3 for discussion on why diversified institutions with large stakes may be active 
 (evolutionary reasons for activism). 
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alternative investment opportunity set. However, for many investors the high liquidity 
requirements from their principals (ultimate investors in case of funds) may force strategies with 
short horizons (Gaspar, Massa and Matos 2005). At its simplest, the investment horizon may 
represent the investor’s choice, stemming from organisational preferences. 
We argue, nevertheless, that investment horizon captures many of the reasons for activism 
presented above in Section 2.3. Importantly, academics have argued that while short-term 
investors may advance myopic management behaviour resulting in weaker long-term 
performance (Jacobs 1991; Porter 1992), large shareholders with long investment horizons may 
invest in monitoring and thereby reduce the information asymmetry that drives shareholder and 
manager myopia (Bhagat, Black and Blair 2004). Perhaps most importantly, investors with short 
horizons have little incentives to extend resources on monitoring and activism engagements, 
since corporate improvements typically materialise over several years. Short-term investors are 
less likely to remain shareholders of the firm long enough to profit from the improvements 
(Gaspar, Massa and Matos 2005). 
While investment horizon is difficult to observe, the literature suggests a number of possible 
proxies. In his study on activist hedge funds, Clifford (2008) uses the lock-up period of invested 
capital as a proxy for investment horizon, and he documents an increasing propensity to activism 
with a longer investment horizon. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005), on the other hand, build on a 
measure of investor turnover of a company. The measure is an ownership stake weighted average 
of investor churn rates, a measure for portfolio turnover. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) find 
that companies with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive an acquisition bid but 
enjoy lower premiums. Chen, Harford and Li (2007) measure investment horizon with the length 
of time an institution has been invested in the firm as a proxy. Further, they argue that the longer 
the investor has been invested in the firm, the more familiar the investor will be with its target 
and its management, which in turn lower the costs of monitoring. Similarly, Bushee (1998) 
calculates the share of holdings kept successively for two years as a proxy for an investor’s 
investment horizon. 
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2.5 Activist driven corporate improvements 
As we show, some investors, due to their characteristics, are in a strong position to actively 
monitor their target companies despite proven incentive issues such as the free-rider problem. But 
what changes do such active investors equipped with the appropriate incentives pursue in the 
companies they hold? In this section, we discuss the three principal areas of concrete corporate 
changes the literature suggests activists to pursue. These areas are tied to our hypotheses in 
Chapter 3 and the individual corporate variables we measure for target firms are specified in 
Chapter 4. 
2.5.1 Activists and agency-sensitive corporate characteristics 
Jensen (1993) suggests that active investors are unique namely in their ability and willingness to 
actively participate in the direction of the companies they hold, when other control mechanisms 
fail. In other words, activists intervene in mismanaged firms in order to mitigate agency costs to 
shareholders in circumstances where other owners lack incentives to do so (Brickley, Lease and 
Smith Jr 1988; Ackermann, McEnally and Ravenscraft 1999; Hu and Black 2007; Kahan and 
Rock 2007; Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008). Consequently, shareholder activists pursue changes 
regarding firm attributes that can be characterised either as 
(1) Symptoms of prevailing agency problems or, 
(2) Arrangements allowing agency problems to prevail. 
The literature is inconclusive about whether some firm attributes such as management pay-
performance-sensitivity (Bebchuk 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2008) are manifestations of 
agency problems (1) or whether agency problems are caused by such firm features (2). However, 
we recognise that differentiating between the two is not important for our analysis: in both 
alternatives, if activism is potent in reducing agency costs, we expect to witness improvements in 
agency-sensitive firm attributes in the presence of a significant activist shareholder. 
Drawing on literature, we identify a range of agency-sensitive firm attributes and group them into 
three categories: (1) governance, (2) organisation and (3) payout. 
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2.5.2 Governance  
Governance-related firm attributes are considered especially important to the occurrence and 
persistence of agency problems, since governance influences the extent to which managers can 
exercise power within a corporation (Jensen 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Core, Holthausen 
and Larcker 1999; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003). Boards with non-independent majorities, 
for example, often protect poorly performing CEO’s and strain shareholder value (Weisbach 
1988; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; Black 1992b; Byrd and Hickman 1992; Rosenstein and Wyatt 
1997; Boone et al. 2007). Equally, CEO duality (or plurality)13 is shown to limit shareholder 
influence over management by weakening the board’s monitoring capabilities (Fama and Jensen 
1983; Baliga, Moyer and Rao 1996; Worrell, Nemec and Davidson III 1997). Further, low 
management pay-performance sensitivity often results in management acting against shareholder 
interest and disregarding owner value maximisation (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988; Jensen 
and Murphy 1990; Murphy 1999; Bebchuk 2003; Hartzell and Starks 2003). Also, entrenched 
boards support the persistence of agency problems by protecting the incumbent management, 
limiting the threat of hostile takeovers and reducing shareholder oversight thus affecting the firm 
value (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003; Bebchuk and Cohen 2005; Faleye 2007; Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrell 2008).  
We also include control changes in the agency-related governance attributes of interest. The 
market for corporate control (the external control mechanism facilitating control changes) 
mitigates agency costs to shareholders, as it allows inefficiently managed firms to be taken over 
and their managements to be changed (Manne 1965; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Ruback 
1983; Jarrell, Brickley and Netter 1988; Jensen 1988). Agency problems and related anti-
takeover provisions, however, seem to affect shareholder wealth by weakening the functioning of 
the market for corporate control significantly (Bebchuk, Coates and Subramanian 2002; Cremers 
and Nair 2005; Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell 2008; Guo, Kruse and Nohel 2008). Overall, the 
proper functioning of the market for corporate control is integral in defending shareholder interest 
(Jensen 1993). 
                                                 
13  CEO duality implies that CEO, or the equivalent first-ranking executive, acts also as the Chairman of the Board 
 of Directors. Key executive plurality (see e.g. Worrell, Nemec and Davidson III (1997) imply that a single 
 executive holds multiple executive positions. 
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All in all, we expect shareholder activists to have a significant role in changing target firm 
governance arrangements towards weaker management discretion and stronger shareholder value 
maximisation.  
2.5.3 Organisation 
Organisation of a firm is intensely related to agency problems as well. More specifically, a 
firm’s14 organisational features often signal agency issues, given that self-serving managers often 
influence the organisational form in pursuit of private benefits regardless of shareholder value 
effects (Jensen 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1990). Such 
managerial aspirations are shown to result, among others, in unrelated diversification (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997a) with inefficient internal capital markets 
(Rajan, Servaes and Zingales 2000; Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Ahn and Denis 2004) and 
excessive firm growth (Jensen 1986). Through a more diversified organisation, managers seek to 
enhance job security (Amihud and Lev 1981; Shleifer and Vishny 1989), to reduce personal 
idiosyncratic risk from incentives (May 1995) or to gain access to a variety of pecuniary and non-
pecuniary personal benefits15 (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2001; Aggarwal and Samwick 2003)16. With excessive growth, often related to 
diversification, managers seek higher personal compensation (Baker, Jensen and Murphy 1988; 
Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Jensen and Murphy 1990) or non-pecuniary benefits such as enhanced 
social status, more power and prestige or empire building (Jensen 1986; Stultz 1990). Both 
unrelated diversification and excessive growth are shown to have an adverse effect on 
shareholder value (Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997a; 
Lamont and Polk 2002; Ahn and Denis 2004). Overall, the literature suggests that activist 
shareholders may have a significant role in improving agency-poised organisational structures.  
2.5.4 Payout 
Capital structure and payout policies are integral to the presence and mitigation of agency 
conflicts between stockholders and managers. The agency-relevance of capital structure is 
                                                 
14   We limit our analysis on organisational characteristics of publicly quoted “diffuse ownership corporations”, as 
  characterized by Jensen et al. (1976). 
15  Non-pecuniary private benefits include improving career prospects, acquiring prestige from managing a complex 
firm, getting more power, supporting social status or improving skimming opportunities, among others. 
16   Scharfstein et al. (2000) model how the seeking of private benefits by both CEOs and divisional managers 
  interacts with diversification discount. 
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fundamentally laid out by Jensen and Meckling (1976), who show that agency costs result from 
all non-managerial ownership, including both outside equity and outside debt. They contribute 
significantly to earlier theory by asserting that a firm’s optimal capital structure is dictated not 
only by tax deductibility of debt and bankruptcy costs but also by agency costs of outside equity 
and outside debt. Jensen (1986, 1989), however, shows that debt not only inflicts agency costs 
between managers and lenders but also mitigates agency costs between management and outside 
equity holders. He shows that abundant free cash flow (FCF hereafter) is a key driver of agency 
costs, since it allows managers to undertake uneconomic investment decisions in pursuit of 
private benefits (see e.g. Lang and Litzenberger 1989; Lehn and Poulsen 1989; Lang, Stulz and 
Walkling 1991; Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 1994; Harford 1999; Richardson 2006 
for empirical evidence on importance of FCF in driving agency costs). Further, in his control 
hypothesis of debt creation, Jensen (1986) presents that incremental debt creation with matching 
payout to shareholders curbs FCF and thus reduces agency costs by limiting management 
discretion over firm resources. The importance of debt creation in controlling agency costs from 
managerial overinvestment has gained wide empirical support in contemporary literature (Opler 
and Titman 1993; Lang, Ofek and Stulz 1996; Gul and L. Tsui 1997; Bates 2005). Debt creation 
is shown to mitigate agency costs even for entrenched managers, who voluntarily take on debt 
and bond to their promise to forgo bad investments through risking higher probability of 
bankruptcy and simultaneously decrease the probability of a takeover17 (Zwiebel 1996).  
To complement the FCF hypothesis, Jensen (1986) predicts that FCF-related agency costs are 
low for early-stage firms with abundant profitable investment opportunities and high for mature 
firms with strong cash flow generation and few profitable investment opportunities. The life-
cycle hypothesis, too, has been largely validated in contemporary empirical literature (Grullon 
and Michaely 2004; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 2006). 
Alongside debt creation, agency costs from free cash flow can be mitigated through payout in 
form of dividends (Rozeff 1982; Easterbrook 1984; Jensen 1986) or share repurchases (Jensen 
1986; Lie 2000). Similarly with debt creation, increased payout reduces investment funds under 
managerial discretion and exposes the firm to more intense monitoring by the external capital 
                                                 
17  Zwiebel (1996) assumes that the incumbent (entrenched) management is ousted in case of a bankruptcy or 
 takeover. 
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markets (Borokhovich et al. 2005). Empirical literature largely supports the agency cost-reducing 
function of payout18: most studies corroborate agency problems as an important determinant of 
dividend payout (La Porta et al. 2000; Fenn and Liang 2001; Denis and Osobov 2008) and 
repurchase of stock (Nohel and Tarhan 1998; Lie 2000; Fenn and Liang 2001; Grullon and 
Michaely 2004). In conclusion, we expect activist shareholders to curb agency costs of outside 
equity by increasing payout in their target firms. 
3 Hypotheses 
In this section, we present and discuss our lead hypotheses. Overall, in line with Section 2.4, we 
anticipate that propensity to activism increases in investor portfolio concentration and in 
investment horizon. While we anticipate that portfolio concentration and investment horizon 
drive activism in general, we hypothesise that propensity to activism differs not only by the 
investor characteristic but also by the targeted corporate improvement: not all active investors are 
willing or successful in improving the same corporate shortcomings. 
As presented in Section 2.5, we identify three principal areas where literature suggests corporate 
characteristics are either driven by agency problems or allow agency problems to prevail: (1) 
corporate governance, (2) organisation and (3) payout. Due to their particular agency sensitivity, 
we anticipate that activist shareholders, partially exempt from the free-rider problem, are able and 
willing to facilitate improvements especially in these areas. We develop and test three lead 
hypotheses to single out the investors who actively improve the different corporate features. 
We summarize our hypotheses in Table 14 (Chapter 4), where we show the expected associations 
between a range of corporate improvements and the entries by investors belonging to our investor 
groups separately for each of our three hypotheses. 
3.1 Corporate governance improvements 
We study the effects of different investors on two types of corporate governance improvements. 
First, we study governance improvements from a wider perspective, and second, we isolate 
                                                 
18   Limited contemporary critique does, however, exist (see e.g. Brav et al. 2005). 
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board-related improvements for further analysis. We consider altogether 14 individual corporate 
governance variables. 
Setting the division of power within a company and determining the boundaries for steering it 
(Jensen 1993; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003), corporate 
governance practices are widely deemed a natural area of pursuing change for active investors 
seeking to unlock value in their holdings (Karpoff 2001; Becht et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009). 
In our wide measure for corporate governance, an overall governance index specified later in 
Chapter 4, we include variables for (1) shareholder protection, (2) market for corporate control 
and (3) board arrangements. In our measure for board arrangements, a board index specified later 
in Section 4.4.1.1, we include solely variables depicting the board’s ability to defend and promote 
shareholder interests. 
Protecting shareholders against rent-seeking (Bebchuk, Fried and Walker 2002) or entrenched 
(Berger, Ofek and Yermack 1997) management behaviour with appropriate voting rules and 
approval requirements is considered important in mitigating agency-costs to shareholders. The 
relevance of shareholder protection is corroborated by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) who 
show that a strategy of buying high shareholder protection firms (Democracy portfolio) and 
selling low shareholder protection firms (Dictatorship portfolio) would have yielded substantial 
abnormal returns from 1990 through 199919. Specifically, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
construct a 24-variable governance index (“G-Score”) focusing on shareholder protection and 
takeover vulnerability and show that better governance is also associated with higher 
valuations20. The findings strengthen our anticipation that activist investors seek to enhance 
shareholder protection in an effort to unlock firm value. Also, Bebchuk et al. (2008) construct an 
entrenchment index and show that the level of management entrenchment is associated with 
reductions in firm valuations and negative abnormal returns. Further, using 51 underlying 
governance variables Brown and Caylor (2009) show that overall governance index (“Gov-
Score”), including numerous measures for shareholder protection, is positively related to firm 
operating performance. 
                                                 
19  On an annualized basis, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) indicate an 8.5% abnormal return for the Democracy 
 portfolio. 
20  They authors measure firm valuation through Tobin’s q. 
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Exposure to market for corporate control, as Jensen and Ruback (1983) show, is also vital for 
mitigating agency costs and increasing firm value: a credible threat of outside takeover and 
subsequent management turnover discipline management to maximise shareholder value. 
Successful control changes evoked by hostile takeover or internal shareholder pressure may also 
create value by allowing an outside party to seize company resources and utilise them more 
efficiently (Jensen 1991; Clifford 2008). In addition to Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
discussed above, Cremers and Nair (2005) further corroborate the importance of a functioning 
market for corporate control by constructing an index for takeover vulnerability including 
measures for board classification, poison pills (see Section 4.4 for a definition), allowance of 
special meetings and acting through written consent. They show that a portfolio buying firms 
with high takeover vulnerability and selling firms with low takeover vulnerability would have 
generated 10-15% annual abnormal returns, when blockholder ownership is high. Also, Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna (2007), while finding mixed results regarding the effect of antitakeover 
measures on operating performance and equity returns, include antitakeover measures in the 14 
governance dimensions they find relevant21. Further, Brown and Caylor (2009) find that anti-
takeover measures are significantly positively associated with firm valuation as measured by 
Tobin’s q. We thus anticipate that shareholder activists pursue improvements regarding the 
functioning of the market for corporate control. 
In addition to shareholder protection and market for corporate control, we anticipate that board 
arrangements are pivotal in mitigating agency costs and unlocking firm value. Perhaps most 
importantly, the board bears primary responsibility for upholding shareholder interest and 
maximising shareholder value (Fama and Jensen 1983). To efficiently deliver this, a range of 
board characteristics including board independence (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997; Faleye 2007), 
board de-classification (Bebchuk and Cohen 2005), separation of CEO and chairman (Fama and 
Jensen 1983) and equity ownership by the board of directors (Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988) 
are considered vital. Further, Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) show that board de-
classification and board independence are significantly positively associated with firm value, as 
measured by Tobin’s q. We thus hypothesise that activist shareholders pursue board 
improvements.  
                                                 
21   Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) consider 39 underlying individual governance variables and condense 
  them into 14 governance dimensions through principal component analysis. 
31 
 
Regarding the investors we anticipate to pursue board and overall governance improvements, we 
expect high portfolio concentration to be a key investor characteristic. Perhaps most importantly, 
a focused portfolio indicates freedom from diversification and maximum stake regulation 
(Clifford 2008). This allows investors greater flexibility in mounting pressure on, and shares in, a 
target (Brav et al. 2008). Also, as specified in Section 2.4.1, high concentration implicitly entails 
that the investors are likely to be entities with higher performance incentives (see e.g. Kahan and 
Rock 2007 for a discussion on mutual fund, pension fund and hedge fund incentives) and 
freedom from internal agency problems (see e.g. Black 1992a). Furthermore, the larger expected 
stake size of focused investors makes them less prone to the free-rider problem (Grossman and 
Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986). We also note that the limited number of significant 
holdings allows for firm-specific attention and effort, which are often important in mounting 
successful activist campaigns. 
We also anticipate long investment horizon to be important for investors driving governance 
improvements. Specifically, we anticipate that short-term investors do not engage in governance 
improvements since their short investment span, caused either by choice or high liquidity 
requirements (Aragon 2007; Clifford 2008), does not allow waiting for a shareholder approval 
mostly required to make suggested governance improvements a reality. 
Despite indications of attempted activism by studies exploring shareholder activism by large U.S. 
pension funds (see e.g. Smith 1996; Wahal 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999), we 
hypothesise that large diversified investors do not actively improve target firm governance. Even 
though some suggest (see e.g. Brown and Brooke 1993; Wahal 1996) that large institutions 
would be inclined to activism as exit is an unfavourable option for investors already holding large 
positions in a substantial portion of available equities, we anticipate that being typically regulated 
regarding maximum stake and diversification (Kahan and Rock 2007) does not promote activism. 
Consistent with Black (1998), who reviews the literature on U.S. institutional activism, we 
anticipate that diversified institutions are not active to a significant extent, not least because they 
lack the resources to promote activist campaigns requiring significant target-specific efforts. 
H 1 Investors with high portfolio concentration and long investment horizon 
improve corporate governance in firms they hold a significant equity 
participation in 
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3.2 Organisational improvements 
While poor corporate governance is widely seen as agency cost-fostering, value-destroying 
organisational features are often deemed symptoms of prevailing agency problems (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1989). Consequently, we expect activist shareholders to pursue reversal of organisational 
deficiencies and focus especially on efforts to overturn value-destroying diversification (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990; Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997a) and excessive firm growth (Jensen 
1986). We measure diversification and excessive growth reversal through unrelated divestments. 
We anticipate that activist shareholders seek to promote unrelated divestments because of the 
inclination of management to grow and diversify firms beyond the optimum (see e.g. Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny 1990) when allowed to do so by prevailing agency problems (see e.g. Denis, 
Denis and Sarin 1997a). We expect that activists break the shareholder passivity allowing such 
value-destroying (see e.g. Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Lins and Servaes 1999)22 
arrangements to prevail and push to reverse excessive growth and diversification through 
unrelated divestments in an effort to unlock shareholder value. Our suggestion is consistent with 
Ahn and Denis (2004), who show that spin-offs breaking up conglomerate structures, represented 
by unrelated divestments in our context, do indeed eliminate the diversification discount clearly 
detected before the spin-offs. Further, Haynes, Thompson and Wright (2003) find that for U.K. 
firms, divestment activity increases when management discretion is reduced due to increased 
leverage or better governance. This is consistent with our view that activist shareholders, by 
nature rejecting shareholder passivity and limiting management discretion, are likely to promote 
organisational improvements in form of unrelated divestments. 
We expect that focused investors with large stakes and high performance incentives are best 
suited to reverse excessive diversification and growth, in line with our expectations regarding 
governance improvements. Importantly, our practitioner interviews support the notion that 
campaigns to pursue divestments or industry exits require a substantial investor effort typically 
including repeated private negotiations, investor lobbying or representation in shareholder 
meetings. We also expect organisational issues, such as divestments, to be mostly under 
managerial discretion and thus largely beyond the reach of standardised activism seeking to 
                                                 
22   Lins and Servaes (1999) study diversification discount in an international context and show that diversification 
  discount prevails in the U.K. and partly in Japan, but not in Germany. 
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influence target decision making through letter-sending or proxy-proposals, as described by 
Smith (1996) or Black (1992b) in case of U.S. institutional activism. We thus assume that 
successful campaigns to reduce diversification through spin-offs call for significant company-
specific effort, incur material monitoring costs and take time to bear fruit. Consequently, while 
diversified investors with long investment horizons may be suited for letter-sending, we do not 
expect them to have resources to pursue such time-consuming firm-specific campaigns in 
individual target companies. What is more, highly diversified investors, typically with regulated 
maximum stakes and ban on the use of leverage and derivatives (Ackermann, McEnally and 
Ravenscraft 1999; Hu and Black 2007)23, are not able to accumulate large stakes in target 
companies often required to push through large-scale changes (Bethel, Liebeskind and Opler 
1998; Kahan and Rock 2007).  
We further hypothesise that investors facilitating organizational improvements require long-
investment horizons. Short-term investors, by choice or due to a high demand for liquidity (short 
investor lock-up) (Clifford 2008), are not willing to embark on complex activist campaigns 
potentially spanning several years. The lengthy nature of many activist engagements is 
corroborated by Becht et al. (2008) who study Hermes Focus Funds in 1998-2004 and find that 
the average duration of a confrontational activist campaign for the U.K. activist was nearly 1,300 
trading days. 
H 2 Investors with high portfolio concentration and long investment horizon 
facilitate unrelated divestments in firms they hold a significant equity 
participation in 
3.3 Payout improvements 
Alongside corporate governance and organisational issues, the extent of cash flow distribution to 
shareholders is also often influenced by agency problems. As Jensen (1986)24 shows, the inherent 
agency costs between management and outside equity (Jensen and Meckling 1976) can be 
mitigated by harnessing capital structure to curb free cash flow at management disposal. More 
specifically, increased leverage and ensuing greater payout to equity (or debt) holders serve to 
                                                 
23  Hu et al. (2007) find that hedge funds often use derivatives to decouple votes and ownership to increase 
 influence. 
24  According to Jensen (1986), the control effect from increased leverage works for mature (or low Tobin’s q) firms. 
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limit the free cash flow available for managers to invest in value-destroying ends in pursuit of 
private benefits (Harford 1999; Richardson 2006). Equally, available free cash flow can be 
curbed by simply increasing direct ordinary payout to equity holders (Lang and Litzenberger 
1989) or by launching extraordinary distributions of cash (Lie 2000), such as special dividends25. 
In line with a wide body of contemporary literature (see e.g. Richardson 2006; Brav et al. 2008; 
Klein and Zur 2009) we hypothesise that activist investors pursue changes in payout to reduce 
agency costs of free cash flow. We measure such improvements with changes in cash dividend 
payout. 
Our anticipation that activists increase payout is consistent with Easterbrook (1984) who 
fundamentally states that dividends may carry the function of reducing agency costs. Also, our 
approach is in line with Borokhovich et al. (2005), among others, who show that firms with less 
independent boards experience higher abnormal returns surrounding announcements of sizeable 
dividend increases. Further, cross-country findings by La Porta et al. (2000) indicate that, in 
general, minority shareholders do indeed exploit higher dividend payout as a means to control the 
private benefit extraction of corporate insiders when applicable law provides for minority 
shareholder protection. Overall, we hypothesise that activist shareholders increase dividend 
payout to match the agency costs of free cash flow. 
Our expectations regarding the required investor characteristics to increase dividends are in line 
with our hypotheses on corporate governance and organisational improvements. Specifically, we 
deem investors’ high portfolio concentration important for successfully pushing for higher payout 
in target firms. As with the other corporate improvements, investors with larger stakes defy the 
costs to individual firm targeting (and the free-rider problem) by taking home a larger portion of 
the upside following a successful event (Barclay and Holderness 1991a). Similarly, we anticipate 
that investors with long investment horizon can endure extended campaigns, while short-term 
investors may be bound by short fund withdrawal notifications and thus find it unattractive to 
invest monitoring costs in a campaign with expected payoff far in the future (see e.g. Chordia 
1996). 
                                                 
25  Jensen (1986) suggests that one-off distributions following increased leverage efficiently curb agency costs from 
 free cash flow. 
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We again anticipate that investors with diversified portfolios or short investment horizons do not 
actively promote payout increases in pursuit of mitigating agency costs and unlocking firm value. 
However, we find it possible that diversified institutional investors may be associated with 
dividend payout increases in their targets due to firms adapting their dividend payout to cater to 
investor demand preferring higher dividends (see e.g. Baker and Wurgler 2004 for recent findings 
supporting the catering hypothesis). 
H 3 Investors with high portfolio concentration and long investment horizon 
increase dividend payout in firms they hold a significant equity 
participation in 
4 Data and methodology 
This chapter presents our research design, data and derived variables and discusses the 
methodology applied. We begin by presenting our research design, which lays out the structural 
choices we make. We then discuss the practitioner interviews that we conducted to support the 
formulation of our research question and hypothesis construction. Next, we present our data and 
show the modifications we apply to make the raw data applicable to our research setting. We then 
specify the variables applied in the analysis and depict the variable construction process for 
dependent and independent variables separately. Finally, we present the statistical methodology 
we deploy in analysing investor effects on corporate improvements. 
4.1 Research design 
Our approach to studying investor effects on corporate improvements introduces a novel 
viewpoint on identifying activist investors and allows linking different types of investors with 
different discrete improvements in target firms. We note that our research design is influenced by 
the practitioner interviews we have undertaken prior to defining our research question and 
hypotheses. We decompose our research design into the following steps: 
(1) Drawing extensively on background literature and practitioner interviews, we define the 
key investor characteristics that make up the propensity to be active. We then condense 
them into two key dimensions: (1) portfolio concentration and (2) investment horizon. 
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(2) Next, relying on the theory of the firm (see e.g. Coase 1937; Jensen and Meckling 1976), 
we identify three areas of corporate characteristics that the literature considers most likely 
to be improved by active shareholders seeking to fight agency problems and to increase 
the value of their holdings: (1) corporate governance, (2) organisation and (3) payout. 
(3) We construct a unique panel database to measure investor effects on corporate 
improvements. Our data comprises three underlying data sets: one for our investor 
universe, one for corporate governance and one for organisational improvements. Further, 
we deploy standard financial databases to source dividend payout and control variables. 
(4) Using exploratory factor analysis and a simple grouping method, we formulate two 
alternative sets of investors, comprising altogether nine different investor groups in terms 
of portfolio concentration and investment horizon. We deploy the investor groups as our 
key explanatory variables. 
(5) We choose altogether seven outcome variables to depict discrete corporate changes in our 
three key areas of improvements and apply them as our dependent variables: two for 
corporate governance, three for organisation and two for dividend payout. 
(6) We apply a range of regression models, including linear and non-linear, panel and non-
panel, ordered and binary outcomes specifications, to test whether the entries of investors 
belonging to our investor groups are associated with following-period changes observed 
in our seven outcome variables. 
(7) We test whether associations observed in our result are robust, considering also 
endogeneity and comparing our results to alternative independent variable specifications 
suggested by extant literature. 
4.2 Practitioner interviews 
Prior to the commencement of the quantitative part of the study, we conduct a number of 
practitioner interviews to gain insights on the process of activist investing, highlight areas of 
interest and extract tacit knowledge useful in hypothesis development. As our research design is 
partly exploratory, qualitative interviews are an important means to better understand the subject 
(Blumberg, Cooper and Schindler 2005) and to be able to infer causal relationships between 
variables (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2007). The interviews form an essential addition to our 
background information gathering as we feel that academic literature may not fully capture the 
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heterogeneity of activist investors and news articles do not always cover the subject with 
sufficient rigour. In this section, we present the interviewee selection, research methodology and 
the interview themes. The interviews are, however, conducted on the condition of anonymity and 
limited disclosure and thus we do not present exhaustive results for the interviews. We make 
casual references where our choices regarding the research design or hypotheses are influenced 
by the interviews.  
4.2.1 Data and interviewee selection 
The choice of interviewees is based on the objective to gain insights on the activist investing 
process from a wide perspective. Our total of eight interviewees comprise investment 
professionals from four activist investment companies and from one private equity public market 
fund, one senior level executive of a large pension fund, one board professional and one 
management consultant. 
The interviewed activist investors represent investment companies varying from smaller 
geographically focused funds to large international hedge funds. Two of the investment 
companies are London-based; the others operate from Switzerland, Sweden, Iceland and Finland. 
Despite their differing operating settings, the investment professionals communicate a 
surprisingly coherent view on activism, which improves the reliability of the findings.  
Importantly, the practitioners highlight that investors can generally only affect the board of a 
company and therefore often pursue to appoint representatives to the board (Brav et al. 2008; 
Klein and Zur 2009). Consequently, the investment professionals also acquaint us with an 
experienced board professional that has worked closely with multiple activist investment 
companies. His insights are particularly valuable in understanding the ways of influencing 
company management and the requirements for the investors to successfully improve corporate 
characteristics. 
We also discuss activism from the viewpoint of a large, potentially active institutional investor. 
Specifically, we examine whether large institutional investors are able and willing to engage in 
activism (see e.g. Black 1992a), by interviewing a senior level executive of a large pension fund. 
The interview clarifies our view on large institutional investors as passive or reactive investors in 
line with Pozen (1994) who describes institutional investors as reluctant activists. The large 
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number of holdings and a low performance-based compensation reduce the incentives to 
proactive monitoring, but the interviewee feels strongly about acting in the face of significant 
events such as the occurrence of an aggressive and public activist engagement in a portfolio 
company.  
Finally, for an outside view of activist investing we interview a senior management consultant 
that has actively worked with investors engaging in activism. He emphasises the importance of a 
concentrated portfolio and a medium-to-long-term investment horizon for an activist to be able to 
implement time-consuming corporate improvements. 
Potential biases in the interviewee selection arise from the secretive behaviour of many activist 
investors and the limited geographical scope of our interviews. First, many of the known activist 
funds do not maintain an internet site and refrain from providing any contact information 
publicly. Further, a significant share of those contacted expressed a policy to not give out 
interviews. This may be reflective of their investment strategies; the most aggressive investors 
may not want to give out any information regarding their strategy since their operations are 
already highly flammable both politically and amongst potential targets. We therefore cautiously 
anticipate that our interviewees may not represent the views of the most aggressive activist funds. 
Another limiting factor in the interviewee selection process is that only European practitioners 
are included in the interviews, leaving out North American practitioner views on activism. As 
mentioned by the interviewees, activist investing in North America is often more aggressive and 
more public due to historical legislative differences.  
4.2.2 Interview research methods 
The discussions are conducted as semi-structured interviews. Semi-structured refers to the lack of 
a predetermined and standardised set of questions, but rather a list of themes and questions to be 
covered, which may vary from interview to interview (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2007). The 
interview design enables us to customize the interviews depending on the type of interviewee and 
allows the interview to diverge to new areas of interest that might arise during the conversation.  
We conduct six of the interviews face to face as we feel that meeting in person allows the 
interviewees to more comfortably discuss issues often sensitive to their companies. Two of the 
interviews are conducted by telephone due to scheduling difficulties and the distant location of 
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the interviewees. As anticipated, the interviewees reached by telephone appear more reserved and 
cautious of the end-use of the information they disclose.  
Further, the interviews are conducted in an inductive manner. As described by Saunders et al. 
(2007), the approach allows to start the interviews with preliminary themes and explore them to 
see which themes or issues should be followed further and focused on. After each interview the 
additional relevant information is gathered and grouped according to the corresponding theme. In 
a succeeding interview, new questions are asked based on findings in the previous interview. 
4.2.3 Interview themes and key insights 
We choose the interview themes to provide overall insight into activist investing, pursued 
improvements and investors’ target selection. We present our five preliminary interview themes 
below and then discuss each theme in detail:  
(1) Investor activism in general; what is investor activism and which investors are active? 
(2) Pursued objectives; what do activist investors pursue to change in target companies? 
(3) Target selection; what do activist investors look for in a target company? 
(4) Regional differences in activism; how do regional factors affect activism in Europe and 
the U.S.? 
(5) Effect of the economic cycle; how does the economic cycle affect the objectives and 
outcomes of investor activism? 
Investor activism in general. The first theme is central in building our understanding of investor 
activism and the characteristics that distinguish active investors from passive investors. The 
interviewees are first asked to describe in their own words, what they perceive as investor 
activism. Follow-up questions deal with who the interviewees consider likely to engage in 
activism and how activists differ from each other.  
The general theme has a strong influence on our choice of portfolio concentration and investment 
horizon as the two key investor characteristics determining investors’ propensity to activism. 
Activists are seen as minority shareholders who actively analyse their target companies, promote 
dialogue with other shareholders and company management and challenge the status quo in order 
to push for value-adding changes. Specifically, the interviewees bring forth two key arguments. 
First, they argue that in order to properly understand the target companies and their business 
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environments, activists must possess a limited number of holdings to be able to focus their 
attention. Second, the interviewees stress that to implement time-consuming corporate 
improvements and benefit from the results, activists must also have long investment horizons.  
Further, the interviewed activist investors feel that the public and many of the contemporary 
studies on activism have focused on what they see as short-term activism, where typically passive 
hedge funds engage in publicity-seeking campaigns. The interviewees are keen to differentiate 
themselves from these investors and claim that hedge funds with very short investment horizons 
are not willing or able to consistently engage in “real” activism that improves target companies. 
Their views consolidate our anticipation that activists cannot be grouped under a single 
legislative group such as hedge funds or pension funds. 
Pursued objectives. The second theme contributes to the selection of the dependent variables. The 
interviewees are shown a table of activist objectives drawn from literature and they are asked to 
discuss the relative significance of the objectives, their feasibility and whether they would add or 
take out some of the objectives on the list. 
The discussed objectives can be broadly divided into changes in (1) corporate governance, (2) 
strategy, (3) capital structure, and (4) operations. The interviewees highlight changes in corporate 
governance since they are often value-adding as such and also empower the minority 
shareholders and thus enable further changes. The interviewees do not regard any individual 
corporate governance aspect as most important, which supports the use of a governance index in 
our study. Strategic changes are considered as relating mainly to the selling of the target company 
to a third party or divesting unrelated businesses. Due to the limitations of our ownership data 
discussed in Section 1.3, we are not able to analyse companies that are sold and therefore limit 
our focus on strategic changes to divestments of unrelated businesses. The interviewees have 
mixed views on changes in capital structure. For example, many do not consider the increasing of 
dividends as a proper activist objective but rather as a quick-fix that on the long run leaves the 
fundamentals of the company unchanged. Finally, the interviewees regard operational 
improvements as possible activist objectives but do not consider any individual operational 
improvement more common than others. Examples of operational changes range from 
disciplining capital expenditures to relocating a company’s headquarters.   
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Target selection. The target selection theme deals with the corporate characteristics that activists 
look for in target companies. The topic is partly complementary to the second theme as the 
desired characteristics of a target company may often reveal the underlying objective of the 
activist. The theme also helps us to understand the nature of activist investing in general and 
provides additional help for the endogeneity discussion. 
The interviewees are unwilling to state any generic target selection criteria as more important 
than others and emphasise a case-by-case approach which starts from the detection of value 
creation opportunities. Contrary to our initial belief, however, the interviewees express a 
preference for engagements in companies with ex ante good management. Replacing 
management is seen as a last resort, not as a common activist agenda.  
Regional differences in activism. As we study investor effects on target companies in a number of 
European countries and the U.S., it is important to understand the essential regional differences in 
the context of activism. Questions are open-ended and call on the interviewees to discuss regional 
differences in governance cultures, legislative issues and shareholder rights. 
The interviewees see both the U.S. and the Western European countries as having proper 
legislative and social environments for activism. Small differences are recognised in the nature of 
activist campaigns which are generally considered more aggressive in the U.S. compared to 
Europe. The interviews do not imply a need to treat the regions in different ways in our analysis. 
Effect of the economic cycle. We further discuss the effect of the economic cycle on the activist 
objectives, the number of potential targets and the ease of influencing target company 
management. The potential differences are important to understand given that our panel data 
ranges from 2003 to 2009 including years of high economic growth and ending with two years of 
adverse market conditions.  
The main insight with regards to the economic cycle is that, although activists see many 
opportunities in an economic downturn, the investment companies may face redemptions and 
difficulties in raising funds. This further highlights the importance of a long investment horizon: 
investors with long-term capital can weather tight liquidity during the downturn and seize 
potentially attractive opportunities.  
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Overall, the interviews add greatly to our understanding of activism and influence our 
formulation of the key characteristics that drive investors’ propensity to activism. As many of the 
interviewees emphasised that activist investors cannot be grouped under a single legal type, we 
understood the need to develop measures that capture the right investor characteristics in a more 
meaningful way. 
4.3 Data 
In this section, we describe the data used to study investor effects on corporate improvements. 
First, we depict our firm sample and explain the modifications we make to ensure a clean data set 
that is appropriate for analysis. As data is gathered from multiple sources with differing 
suspected data errors, extensive efforts are made to ensure good data quality and clear outliers are 
removed in appropriate ways. We then present our corporate improvements data separately for 
(1) corporate governance, (2) organisation and (3) dividend payout. Finally, we present the 
ownership data we later use to derive our primary explanatory variables. For the ownership data, 
which we divide into two initial data sets, we also elaborate on the data items extracted to show 
how we arrive at the final data sets that serve as a basis for constructing our ownership variables.  
4.3.1 Firm sample 
In our firm sample of potential activist targets, we include two wide equity indices covering the 
vast majority of publicly quoted equity in Europe and the U.S. For Europe, we choose the 
STOXX Europe TMI Index, which comprises 1,025 constituent companies ranked according to 
free float market capitalisations. The index covers 17 developed European countries with target 
coverage of 95% of the total index universe free float market capitalisation. For the U.S., we 
choose the S&P 1500 Composite Index, which comprises three underlying indices26 each 
covering a different market capitalisation range. S&P 1500 requires constituent firms to retain a 
minimum of 50% of shares in free float and altogether represents roughly 85% of the total U.S. 
market capitalisation. The wide indices together comprise 2,525 firm-entries27 and cover a vast 
majority of European and U.S. market capitalisations. 
                                                 
26  Namely, S&P 1500 Composite Index comprises S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600. 
27  The number of individual firms is smaller than the number of entries, since in STOXX Europe TMI, some firms 
 are present in the index with multiple share classes or share types. 
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4.3.1.1 Modifications to firm sample 
For both indices, we fix the constituent list as of December 31, 2002. We then remove firms with 
more than one class of ordinary shares28, in line with Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). We 
argue that multiple share classes disconnect the relationship between voting power and economic 
interest, confound analysis on relative ownership and render extraction of ownership data 
unreliable. Finally, we remove firms that have announced to be taken over, merged, defaulted or 
de-listed for other reason prior to year-end 2002 but have not yet been de-listed or removed from 
the index as of December 31, 2002 due to the transaction not yet being consummated. 
Next, utilising the SDC Platinum database and publicly available information, we manually track 
the development of each sample firm over our observation period, spanning from January 1, 2003 
to December 31, 2009. We then remove firms after the announcement of any of the following 
events: (1) change-in-control transaction, (2) merger, (3) default or (4) de-listing for other reason 
than change-in-control transaction, merger or default. Although firms often disappear from data 
eventually following the completion of such transactions, we choose to remove firms after the 
announcement of an event that will materialise in the future29. We do not want to confound 
activist-driven changes to the numerous governance, organisational and dividend payout changes 
often taking place in companies (1) agreed to be taken over, (2) agreed to merge or (3) facing 
bankruptcy proceedings. Further, periods between announcement and closing can extend over 
multiple years, and we anticipate that including such periods in our sample would produce a 
substantial bias in the observed changes in the dependent variables.  
In change-in-control transactions, we include incidents where an outside party acquires majority 
of the shares or votes of a constituent company. We remove such firms from the sample from the 
beginning of the year following an event30. We record change-in-control transactions quarterly 
according to the date when a to-be-successful transaction was (1) in friendly transactions 
recommended by target board31 or (2) in hostile transactions approved by the target shareholders 
meeting and became unconditional32. In 2003-2009 we record 534 change-in-control transactions, 
68% of which are for our U.S. firms and 32% for our European firms. We note, as expected, that 
                                                 
28  The STOXX Europe TMI includes double entries for e.g. many Nordic firms, reflecting different share classes. 
29  In other words, we do not remove firms from our sample following announcement of events that did not transpire. 
30  In majority of change-in-control transactions, the company is subsequently taken private and de-listed.  
31  In case of a bidding war, the final target Board recommendation leading to a successful transaction is recorded. 
32  If the shareholder approval date is not available, the announcement date of a to-be-successful bid is recorded. 
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the transaction frequency is highest in 2007 despite the narrowing firm-base33 and that the 
number of transactions is clearly smallest in 2009 (although 2009 transactions do not affect our 
sample size since related firms would only be removed for 2010).  
In mergers, we include events where two firms are combined and at least one of the following 
criteria is fulfilled: (1) a new legal entity is formed and listed separately or (2) both firms 
officially refer to the combination as a merger and the combined entity is renamed34. Merged 
firms are removed from the data from the beginning of the year following the transaction and the 
transaction date is recorded according to the announcement of the merger plan approved by the 
boards of both parties. In 2003-2009, we observe 65 mergers meeting the above criteria and note 
that they are roughly equally distributed between the U.S. and European firms. We find the 
highest frequency of mergers in 2004 and only 4 mergers occurring in 2009 within our sample. 
In defaults, the firm is removed from our sample in the year following the event35 and the filing 
date of the bankruptcy is recorded as the event date. Over our observation period, we record 64 
defaults, 81% of which in the U.S. We observe 16 annual defaults in 2008 and 2009, clearly more 
than in earlier years despite the ever-narrowing firm-base.  
In de-listing for other reasons, we include firms whose public listing is removed due to the firm 
not meeting the listing criteria. Events are recorded according to announcement by a regulator or 
the firm announcement and firms are removed beginning the year following an event. We 
observe 7 de-listings for other reasons, majority of which take place in 2009. 
Table 1 presents average financials for firms in our modified sample annually over our 
observation period for companies with all financials available for all observed years. Further, 
Table 2 shows the evolution of our firm sample over our observation period 2003-2009 and 
presents a decomposition of the firms we remove from the data based on above specified reasons.  
                                                 
33  The number of firms in our sample decreases as we remove firms from the data following transactions, defaults or 
  other de-listings, as specified above. 
34   If the criteria are not filled and another of the merger parties persists, we consider the event to be a change-in- 
  control transaction. 
35   Firms under bankruptcy protection often undergo substantial changes, which we assume to be unrelated to the 
  equity holders of the insolvent company. 
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Table 1 – Firm sample – Descriptive financials 
The table shows annual averages of key financials for our sample firms over our observation period 2003 through 
2009. We include sample firms for which all financials are available for all observed years. All figures are calendar 
yearly and in millions of U.S. Dollars. 
 
USD millions 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Net sales 7,485 8,457 8,650 9,781 10,827 11,321 10,351
Growth 13.3 % 13.0 % 2.3 % 13.1 % 10.7 % 4.6 % -8.6 %
Operating profit 667 836 957 1,114 1,249 1,260 990
Operating profit margin 8.2 % 9.8 % 9.8 % 10.4 % 10.1 % 5.5 % 5.3 %
Earnings 325 484 580 667 774 595 494
Profit margin 1.5 % 4.3 % 4.8 % 5.4 % 6.0 % -2.7 % -2.5 %
Book value of total assets 9,542 10,403 10,616 11,944 13,481 13,769 14,175
Growth 11.4 % 9.0 % 2.0 % 12.5 % 12.9 % 2.1 % 2.9 %
Market capitalisation 9,528 10,708 11,121 13,005 14,101 8,421 10,726
Growth 31.4 % 12.4 % 3.9 % 16.9 % 8.4 % -40.3 % 27.4 %
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Table 2 – Firm sample – Evolution over time  
The table depicts the evolution of our firm panel data 2003 through 2009. Panel A presents country-level frequency 
of sample firms, as included in STOXX Europe TMI and in S&P 1500. The panel shows all index constituents in 
year-end 2002, firms remaining in the modified sample in year-end 2002 and year-end number of firms per country 
2003 through 2009. Panel B provides a break-down of the firms removed from our sample, decomposed by the 
reason of removal. Firms shown to be removed in year T are excluded from the sample beginning the year T+1. 
Indices depicts the full sample comprising all index STOXX Europe TMI and S&P 1500 constituent entries. Clean 
refers to the sample after the initial removal of firms with multiple classes of ordinary shares and annual removal of 
firms being acquired, merged, in default or de-listed for other reason. 
 
PANEL A - SAMPLE EVOLUTION
Country of origin 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Indices Clean Clean Clean Clean Clean Clean Clean
Austria 10 10 10 9 9 9 9 9
Belgium 28 24 24 24 21 20 20 20
Denmark 24 19 18 17 16 15 15 15
Finland 26 16 16 16 15 15 14 14
France 105 100 96 91 85 83 78 76
Germany 89 75 73 73 68 66 64 63
Greece 34 33 32 30 29 28 27 27
Ireland 18 18 16 16 15 15 14 13
Italy 84 57 55 54 52 47 44 43
Luxembourg 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3
Netherlands 60 55 52 49 45 43 36 34
Norway 20 18 17 17 15 14 14 14
Portugal 11 10 9 9 9 9 9 9
Spain 51 50 47 47 45 41 39 38
Sweden 60 38 38 36 34 31 30 30
Switzerland 80 70 67 67 65 63 60 57
U.K. 321 309 296 278 255 236 218 206
U.S. 1,500 1,424 1,384 1,329 1,257 1,179 1,085 1,033
Total 2,525 2,330 2,254 2,166 2,038 1,917 1,779 1,704
PANEL B - REMOVALS FROM SAMPLE
Reason for removal 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Sold - 63 66 111 101 120 53 20
Merged - 9 16 9 13 9 5 4
Defaulted - 4 6 8 6 8 16 16
De-listed, other - 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Multiple share classes 179 - - - - - - -
Transaction prior to 2002 16 - - - - - - -
Removed from following year 195 76 88 128 121 138 75 44
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4.3.2 Corporate governance data – Governance indices 
We source our corporate governance data from RiskMetrics36, the industry leader in governance 
data for commercial and research purposes. Specifically, we utilise RiskMetrics’ Corporate 
Governance Quotient [hereafter CGQ] database, which provides historical corporate governance 
data on an annual basis for large and mid-sized companies in the U.S. and in major European 
markets. In total, the CQG database covers in excess of 100 corporate governance variables on 
board arrangements, managerial compensation, shareholder rights and general governance 
structures. The database has been widely applied in analogous research settings (see e.g. 
Aggarwal et al. 2010). As of 2003, the database covers altogether 5,500 and 836 individual firms 
in the U.S. and Europe respectively, expanding its European coverage significantly to 1,237 
companies by 2009.  
We follow three steps to match the CGQ data to our cleaned firm sample of 906 STOXX Europe 
TMI constituents and 1,424 S&P 1500 constituents as of 2003. First, we align the U.S. and 
European CGQ datasets37. Second, we perform identifier-based matching between the now 
internally uniform RiskMetrics data and our firm sample to locate each of our sample firms in the 
CQG data. Finally, we manually check all non-matched firms in the sample to make sure that 
non-matches are actual absentees in the CGQ data and not blanks due to errors in our identifier-
based matching process. 
After matching our firm sample to the CGQ data, we extract governance data for 14 individual 
variables of interest to construct two governance indices, detailed specifications and usage of 
which is elaborated later in Section 4.4.1.1. Following data-extraction, we undertake a stringent 
audit regarding the quality of the RiskMetrics governance data. First, we break the extracted data 
down to variable-country-years and look for systematic inconsistencies both over years and 
between countries. We then take a set of individual firms from each variable, each country and 
each year and compare RiskMetrics data to corresponding data available in public company 
filings. While we find no inconsistencies in the U.S. data, we locate a number of dramatic 
movements between subsequent years in individual governance variables for a number of 
European countries. We are lead to suspect the patterns to be data errors after checking and 
                                                 
36  FactSet was formerly known as Institutional Shareholder Service, or ISS. 
37   Small, yet numerous differences in U.S. and European variable descriptions make direct comparison unreliable. 
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excluding legal or governance standard changes in European countries as an explanation for the 
anomalies. We locate altogether 13 suspected data error patterns, relating to nine out of our 14 
individual corporate governance variables and to five different European countries38. The 
country-year data for which errors are suspected covers more than 3,600 variable-firm-years. We 
submit our findings to the data provider and receive a subsequent confirmation that all the 
suspected anomalies were found to be errors in the recording process of the European governance 
data. As the detected data errors are sporadic and wide-spread, we are unable to exclude the 
possibility of a significant number of undetected errors in the remaining European data. 
Consequently, we exclude the European governance data from our analysis. In an unreported 
analysis, however, we run all governance-regressions (as shown for the U.S. data in Section 5.2) 
for the European data and find that results for governance improvements (ownership as the key 
explanatory variable) are both internally inconsistent39 and mostly statistically insignificant. We 
perform all our governance analyses only for the U.S. data. 
Given our findings on data errors and the data provider’s prior lack of awareness regarding the 
inconsistencies, we cannot exclude the possibility that erroneous data has been applied in 
previous studies exploiting the European CGQ data. Especially, we note that while Aggarwal et 
al. (2010) study the relationship between governance and institutional holdings using 41 CGQ 
variables and focusing on non-U.S. firms, they do not report any detected data inconsistencies. 
Further, they do not communicate any data manipulations targeted at removing potentially 
erroneous observations. 
4.3.3 Organisational data - Divestments 
To measure organisational improvements, namely those reversing value-destructive 
diversification or excessive growth, we study unrelated divestments as discussed in hypotheses 
construction in Section 3.2. We source our divestments data from Thomson Reuter’s SDC 
Platinum transaction database, which is widely used in transaction-related studies with both a 
U.S. focus (see e.g. Warusawitharana 2008) and in those requiring international reach (see e.g. 
Rossi and Volpin 2004). SDC provides a comprehensive tool to search for transaction data for 
different deal specifications, including mergers, IPOs as well as divestments and spin-offs. 
                                                 
38  The countries where we locate error patterns are United Kingdom, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Italy and 
 Finland. 
39  We refer to inconsistencies in results between different model specifications. 
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Hence, the data base is frequently applied in divestments related studies as in Colak and Whited 
(2007), who study the effect of spin-offs and divestitures on conglomerate investment efficiency.  
To explore unrelated divestments within our firm sample, we first utilise SDC Platinum to 
construct a comprehensive deal database covering all European and U.S. transactions that meet 
the following criteria: (1) transaction is announced during our observation period 2003 through 
2009, (2) the ultimate parent of target is based either in the U.S. or in one of our 17 European 
markets of interest, (3) the transaction value, including equity and debt40 is reported and (4) the 
reported transaction value exceeds 1 million ÚSD. We extract altogether 53,069 transactions, of 
which 28,532 in the U.S. and 24,537 in our 17 European markets of interest.  
We then narrow the all-around deal data to cover only divestments undertaken by our sample 
firms. First, we match the targets’ ultimate parents to our firm universe to find all transactions 
where one of our firms has been the ultimate parent of the acquired entity41. Next, we exclude 
transactions where the target and the target’s ultimate parent or the target’s ultimate parent and 
acquirer are same entities: we only take interest in situations where one of our firms divests a 
sub-entity to an outside party, not in arrangements where it sells its own shares or performs a 
within-group re-organisation. We then exclude all transactions where the acquirer owns more 
than 10% of the target shares prior to the transaction or owns less than 50% of the target shares 
following the transaction; we only take interest in our sample firms’ previously wholly-owned42 
subsidiaries or business units, where majority of shares are divested to an outside acquirer. 
Overall, for the entire period 2003-2009, we find 10,498 divestments, of which 6,527 in the U.S. 
and 3,971 in our 17 European markets of interest. For our sample firms and for the period 2004-
2009, the years over which we apply the divestments data in our analyses, we locate altogether 
3,363 divestments, 1,344 (40%) of which by our U.S. firms and 2,019 (60%) by our European 
firms. 
Finally, we divide the divestments to related and unrelated transactions to capture the unrelated 
divestments we take primary interest in. We define unrelated divestment as a transaction where 
all above criteria are met and the target’s primary 4-digit SIC code is different from that of the 
                                                 
40   According to SDC Platinum, debt is included in the measure for transaction value when indicated publicly in 
  conjunction with the transaction. 
41  We perform matching through a variety of identifiers and complete it with an automated name matching. 
42  As indicated above, we allow for pre-transaction ownerships of less than 10%. 
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ultimate parent’s. Over the period 2004-2009, we locate a total of 956 unrelated divestments, of 
which 487 (51%) by our U.S. sample firms and 469 (49%) by our European sample firms. 
Our transaction database is depicted in Table 5, where we show volume and frequency data for 
all and unrelated divestments where our sample firms are the ultimate parents. We show data for 
2004-2009, since 2004 is the first year included in our analysis due to ownership data being 
available from the beginning of 2003. 
Table 3 – Unrelated divestments – Description 
The table depicts the divestment data for our U.S. and European sample firms. All divestments include transactions 
exceeding USD 1 million in value, and unrelated divestments are a sub-group of all divestments where the target 4-
digit SIC code is different from the 4-digit SIC code of the target’s ultimate parent. Value of divestments is the sum 
of total values of divestments where one of our sample firms has been the ultimate parent and Number of 
divestments is the annual frequency of those divestments, depicted separately for all divestments and unrelated 
divestments. 
 
As seen in Table 3, we note that while our European firms constitute a smaller group than our 
U.S. firms, we record a higher overall number and higher total value of (all and unrelated) 
divestments for European than for U.S. firms. While the same is true for the number of all 
divestments, we record a higher number of unrelated divestments for the U.S. firms. Overall, we 
note that while year 2007 exhibits clearly the highest total divestment values, the global financial 
meltdown in 2008 and ensuing downturn are clearly visible in rapidly falling value and number 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Mean
Value of divestments - USD billion
USA 80 160 208 208 100 36 792 132
All Europe 77 108 171 302 138 131 927 154
Total 156 268 379 510 239 166 1,718 286
USA 21 32 70 61 18 12 214 36
Unrelated Europe 28 25 43 60 28 69 253 42
Total 49 57 113 121 46 82 467 78
Number of divestments
USA 259 276 277 250 158 124 1,344 224
All Europe 383 425 430 383 233 165 2,019 337
Total 642 701 707 633 391 289 3,363 561
USA 84 82 100 108 65 48 487 81
Unrelated Europe 104 94 102 74 48 47 469 78
Total 188 176 202 182 113 95 956 159
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of divestments in 2008 and 2009. We note, however, that for our firms, the overall value of 
unrelated divestments does not fall as sharply in 2007-2009 (-32%) as the overall value of all 
divestments (-67%). 
4.3.4 Dividend payout data – Cash dividends 
We source our dividend payout data through FactSet. While most U.S. focused, payout-related 
studies use the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) (see e.g. Michaely, Thaler and 
Womack 1995; Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 1997) or the Compustat database (see e.g. Baker 
and Wurgler 2004; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 2006), we note that FactSet provides for an 
apt coverage in our cross-country setting requiring coverage for both U.S. and European firms. 
As discussed in the hypotheses Section 3.3, we use cash dividends to measure payout amongst 
our sample firms, in line with Michaely et al. (1995) and Klein and Zur (2009). To provide for 
our dividend-based variables, we source the following data items for our sample firms over our 
observation period: (1) calendar-year cash dividends and (2) calendar-year dividend yield. We 
then winsorize both data items and leave out the top 1-percentile to exclude outliers. The one 
percent limit adequately eliminates clear outliers such as cash dividends close to the size of total 
assets. We depict the extracted dividend data in Table 6 in Section 4.4, where our payout 
variables are specified and discussed. 
4.3.5 Ownership data 
This section presents our ownership data, which serves a dual purpose. First, it allows us to 
identify the owners of interest in our sample firms and extract data on their entry over our 
observation period. Second, it allows us to extract the necessary investor characteristics to 
produce investor groups that serve as our key independent variables. We first describe our 
ownership data in general, and then we specify the two separate data sets that we extract: one for 
indentifying our owners of interest and the other for providing all necessary characteristics for 
them. For the latter, we also clarify the data items we extract for the variable construction process 
presented later in Section 4.4.2. 
4.3.5.1 Database description 
The foundation of our study is a comprehensive owner-firm panel data set matching our firm 
sample over the observation period 2003-2009. The ownership data is provided by FactSet 
LionShares Global Ownership database, which allows us to identify the individual owners 
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present in our sample firms, track their ownership over time and thus extract a range of 
ownership metrics over the seven-year observation period.  
The FactSet LionShares database, applied in analogous research settings and described as a 
leading information source for global institutional ownership (see e.g. Ferreira, Massa and Matos 
2009), collects global equity ownership data for institutions, mutual fund portfolios and 
insiders/stakeholders, amounting to more than 480,000 individual owners43. The database sources 
the ownership data from a comprehensive range of public filings, annual and quarterly company 
reports, stock exchange material and national regulatory agencies, reporting all data on a 
quarterly basis. 
For our analysis, we construct two separate ownership data sets:  
(1) Our primary owner-firm data set including all owners exceeding the threshold of 
1% of common equity for any of our S&P 1500 and STOXX Europe TMI firms of 
interest 
(2) A comprehensive ownership data set covering all owners for all publicly listed 
companies in the U.S. and Europe44 in 2003-2009 to serve as a basis for investor 
characterisation  
The purpose of the first data set is to provide us with our key independent variables, while the 
second data set provides investor data required to calculate investor characteristics that serve as a 
basis for investor grouping. 
4.3.5.2 Primary owner-firm data set 
We identify and extract names and identifiers for all owners present in our sample firms. To 
include only owners with substantial enough holdings to provide elementary incentives to active 
monitoring (see e.g. Grossman and Hart 1980; Shleifer and Vishny 1986), we leave out owners 
holding less than 1% of target equity and end up with 6,337 individual investors. Our choice to 
exclude holders with less than 1 percent of target shares is in line with Connelly et al. (2009), 
                                                 
43  Information on FactSet LionShares Global Ownership is available online at: 
 http://www.factset.com/data/ownership. 
44  Ownership data is included as represented in FactSet. For Europe, we include the countries present in the STOXX 
 Europe TMI Index. 
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Johnson and Greening (1999) and Tihanyi et al. (2003) and we argue that it allows us to retain a 
large and diverse pool of owners, especially compared to a five-percent-holding limit as applied 
in most activist hedge fund studies (among others: Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009). 
While we maintain that a 1% holding limit is well-founded and that FactSet LionShares provides 
best available holder data for international entities, we cannot rule out that certain types of 
ownership records are partially excluded. More precisely, based on our expert interviews, 
extensive press searches and the case study on UK Hermes Focus Funds by Becht et al. (2008) 
we suspect that activist hedge fund holdings might be somewhat under-represented in our sample 
since non-regulated investors typically keep their holdings private before punctuating a flagging 
limit so as to allow private negotiations with target Board or management (Becht et al. 2008). We 
note, however, that activist hedge funds do exhibit a strong presence in our data and that FactSet 
LionShares also sources data actively from press sources allowing us to frequently observe hedge 
fund holdings below the flagging thresholds45. 
4.3.5.3 Comprehensive holder data for investor characterisation 
After generating the primary owner-firm data set for holders of over 1% in our sample firms, we 
proceed to extract characteristics data for our 6,337 investors of interest. Since FactSet 
LionShares does not support data extraction for a large set of owners (instead, queries can only be 
made for companies), we produce all recorded shareholders for all U.S., Canadian and European 
publicly listed companies quarterly for the period January 1, 2003 through December 31, 2009. 
The data set features 17.9 million unique quarter-owner-firm combinations. From this extensive 
holder data, we calculate the portfolio features we anticipate are most important regarding the 
propensity to activism (as presented and motivated in Section 2.4) for the 6,337 investors that 
hold more than 1% of any of our sample firms: 
Churn rate – Following Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005), we calculate the churn rate to depict 
the portfolio turnover and thus the investment horizon of our owners of interest. Churn rate 
measures the relative, price-corrected quarterly portfolio movements and is defined as: 
                                                 
45   The flagging threshold is in most European countries at 5%, however with the following exceptions: Ireland 
  (3%), Italy (2%), Portugal (2%), Spain (3%), Switzerland (3%), and the U.K. (3%). 
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,  (1) 
where Nj,i,t is the number of shares held by investor i in company j in quarter t and Pj,t is the share 
price for company j in quarter t. Further we calculate the owner-specific time-invariant churn rate 
CRi as the average of company i’s quarterly churn rates. 
Share of holdings held for over six quarters – Adopting from Bushee (1998), who measures the 
share of holdings held for the past two years and in line with Chen et al. (2007), we construct a 
further measure of investment horizon. We account for our limited observation period and define 
the stability measure for each investor as the share of all holdings (held at any stage of our 
observation period) that were kept in the portfolio for six or more quarters. A minimum holding 
period of six quarters implies that the investor has been present in the company at least during 
one annual general meeting. 
Number of holdings – To measure the diversification of the portfolio of our owners, we calculate 
the maximum quarterly number of holdings for every investor during 2003-2009. We restrict the 
maximum number of quarterly holdings to twice the number of the third largest quarterly figure. 
The chosen restriction eliminates efficiently errors in data where an investor’s number of 
holdings suddenly increases significantly in one quarter. A standardised winsorising would not be 
suitable as the number of holdings varies significantly across investors. 
Herfindahl index (HHI) – In line with Bushee (1998), we measure investors’ HHI to produce 
another metric describing the diversification of the holder portfolios, taking into account the 
potentially uneven value distribution of holdings. The HHI is calculated for each owner quarterly, 
and the average quarterly HHI is reported for each owner over our observation period. We define 
the quarterly HHI for investor i in quarter t as follows: 
ܪܪܫ௜,௧ ൌ ∑ ൬ெ௏೔,ೕ,೟௉ோ೔,೟ ൰
ଶே௝ୀଵ ,  (2) 
where MVi,j is the market value of ith investor’s holding in firm j and PRi is the total market value 
of ith investor’s portfolio. 
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Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares – Adopting from Bushee (1998), who measures 
the share of investors’ holdings that exceed 5% in target equity, we produce a third measure of 
portfolio concentration. Specifically, we calculate the quarterly share of holdings (out of total 
number of holdings) that exceed 1% of the target firm equity. We then record the median of the 
quarterly figures for each investor. 
4.3.5.4 Modifications to the initial owner universe 
Having produced the above five measures for all of our 6,337 holders, we undertake the 
following procedures to produce a final set of holders: 
(1) All owners, for which data is not available to produce all five characteristics, are removed 
(372 holders removed). 
(2) All holders with a maximum quarterly number of holdings of one are removed, which is 
in line with Cronqvist et al. (2008), who show that single holding entities are typically 
employee stock trusts, managerial holdings or company founders and their families (2,535 
holders removed). 
We end up with 3,430 individual investors that qualify for our investor universe.  
4.4 Variables 
In this section, we specify the variables applied in our study. First, we specify and motivate our 
dependent variables from the three areas of corporate improvements: corporate governance, 
organisation and payout. We then present the construction process for our key dependent 
variables, the investor groups. We describe our two alternative methods of grouping investors 
based on their investment behaviour and provide descriptive statistics regarding the statistical 
process and resulting investor groups. Finally, we present and motivate the control variables 
applied. 
4.4.1 Dependent variables 
This section presents the dependent variables by the area of corporate improvement. We first 
show how our two corporate governance variables are constructed, based on a range of 14 
individual underlying governance variables. We then depict and motivate our organisational 
outcome variables, which comprise three different measures for unrelated divestments. Finally, 
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we discuss our dividend payout outcomes by specifying and motivating our two cash dividend 
variables. We construct our corporate governance variables solely for the U.S. firms in our 
sample, but we apply organisational and dividend payout variables for both U.S. and European 
firms. 
4.4.1.1 Corporate governance 
Compatible with our hypotheses on investor effects on corporate governance (see Chapter 3 for 
discussion), we extract data for 14 individual governance variables describing our sample firms’ 
(1) overall corporate governance arrangements and (2) board arrangements. Specifically, the 14 
individual variables depict the strength of shareholder protection and functionality of the board as 
an efficient corporate organ pursuing shareholder interest. Due to the data inconsistencies 
reported above, we exclude the European RiskMetrics CGQ data from the analysis and focus 
solely on the U.S. To follow our dual -focus of overall governance and board arrangements, we 
construct two governance indices and apply the changes in both indices as our dependent 
governance variables. Specifically, we apply the following two-level approach: 
(1) First, we choose 14 individual corporate governance variables we regard as most agency-
sensitive, as specified in Section 2.5 and for which data is available. We then make all 
variables binary (eight out of 14 are binary in CGQ to begin with) and condense them into 
an annual overall corporate governance index with potential values ranging from 0 to 1 
(or 0/14 to 14/14). As with the governance index by Brown and Caylor (2009), higher 
values indicate better overall governance. Finally, we extract annual changes for the 
overall index and define the variable Change in overall governance index as the overall 
index level in year T less the overall index level in year T-1. 
 
(2) Second, within the 14 agency-sensitive corporate governance variables, we isolate six that 
we consider the most important in depicting functionality, independence and strength of 
the board of directors in protecting shareholder interest. We then condense them into a 
sub-index measuring the board arrangements of our sample firms and receiving values 
from 0 to 1 (or 0/6 to 6/6), with high values indicating higher board quality. As with the 
wider index, we then extract annual changes for the board index and define the variable 
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Change in board index as the board index level in year T less the board index level in 
year T-1. 
To measure annual changes in the in the overall governance and board indices, we balance the 
individual governance variable data by filling in intermittent data gaps. We first locate all 
variable-firm-years where no data is available in any of the 14 governance variables and define 
them as no-data years. We then replace all variable-firm-years, where data is missing for an 
individual variable, but not for all 14 variables, with the first preceding value available. If no 
preceding observation is available, we replace the missing observation with the first succeeding 
value available. In other words, if an observation for variable z in firm k in year t is missing, we 
replace it with the first available preceding value (z,k,t-1...-n) or with the first available 
succeeding value (z,k,t+1...+n) when the preceding value is missing. We end up with a balanced 
governance data set where the potential maximum for the overall governance and board indices 
always equals 14 and 6, respectively. 
While we formulate our dependent governance variables as changes in our overall and board 
indices, most governance studies utilizing indices focus on studying levels. Perhaps most 
importantly, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) study the association between corporate 
governance46 and equity returns and valuation levels, showing that a strategy comprising a 
bought portfolio of high shareholder protection firms and a sold portfolio of low shareholder 
protection firms would have produced an annual 8.5% abnormal return from 1990 through 1999. 
Further, Larcker, Richardson and Tuna (2007) study the effect of corporate governance, using a 
proxy of 39 underlying governance variables and 14 condensed constructs (indices), on corporate 
performance, valuation, accruals, class action lawsuits and future returns. Also, Brown and 
Caylor (2009) study the association between level of overall governance and firm operating 
performance through their 51-variable governance index. We argue, however, that studying 
governance changes, rather than levels is well-suited for our research question: we look at the 
discrete corporate improvements that activist investors facilitate. Our approach of studying 
changes is in line with Aggarwal et al. (2010), who study the effect of institutional ownership on 
corporate governance in an analogous setting. While Aggarwal et al. (2010) study both 
governance levels and changes, they suggest that changes are better suited to mitigate the 
                                                 
46  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) apply a 24-variable governance index as their main proxy for governance. 
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endogeneity issues, discussed in detail in Chapter 5. We further argue that while Aggarwal et al. 
(2010) study the effect of level of institutional ownership on governance, our activist setting by 
nature favours studying changes. We anticipate that when an activist enters a firm, improvements 
will ensue. Consequently, we explain changes in governance with changes in ownership.  
Based on the U.S. data, we report each of the 14 individual corporate governance variables in 
Table 4, where we also show the annual positive and negative changes in each variable for our 
sample firms over our observation period. Table 4 also depicts the allocation of variables into the 
overall governance index and the board index. 
As Table 4 shows, in 12 out of 14 of our corporate governance variables, less than 90% of the 
firms in our sample are on an improved level47 as of the beginning of our observation period in 
2003. Board independence and Director stock compensation, however, seem to start from a level 
above 90%. Further, in Board amendments to bylaws and Changes in board size, only less than 
10% of the firms are on an improved-level as of 2003. All variables, however, show both 
improvements and deteriorations annually across our observation period, with Board 
classification, CEO/Chairman separation, Poison pill and Filling procedure of Board vacancies 
exhibiting the most consistent improvement trends over time. 
All 14 individual underlying corporate governance variables are defined and discussed below. 
Board independence – The CGQ data reveals the share of independent outside directors as a 
portion of all directors, defining whether the ratio is (1) below 50%, (2) 50% - 66.7%, (3) 66.7% 
- 75%, (4) 75%-90% or (5) either >90% or comprising a single non-independent and non-outside 
director. In line with RiskMetrics methodology, we define outsider directors as neither current 
firm officers/employees nor direct/indirect majority shareholders. Similarly, we require that 
independent directors are not former employees or officers or their relatives, have no significant 
business, transactional or regulatory relationship with the firm and are not founders of the firm. 
We translate the multi-level variable into binary format and define independent board as one 
where the share of independent outside directors as a portion of all directors is more than 50%. 
The dummy variable equals one if the board is independent and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
47   All variables are binary, and equal one if the specific characteristics is in a desirable state and zero otherwise, as 
  specified for each of our 14 governance variables separately below. 
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Table 4 – Corporate governance – Variables and description 
The table depicts our corporate governance variable data sourced from RiskMetrics. The data covers the US firms in 
our sample and reveals the annual positive and negative changes in all 14 individual binary corporate governance 
variables. We also show annually the portion of all firms, where the individual binary variables are improved. 
Finally, we show the allocation of individual variables into (1) the overall governance index and (2) the board index. 
 
Governance variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Overall 
index
Board 
index
Improved % 91 % 97 % 98 % 99 % 99 % 99 % 99 %
Improvements - 96 29 13 6 5 2 Yes Yes
Deteriorations - 14 6 6 5 2 5
Improved % 38 % 39 % 41 % 43 % 48 % 52 % 54 %
Improvements - 23 23 24 60 41 28 Yes Yes
Deteriorations - 6 5 2 3 7 7
Improved % 36 % 35 % 38 % 41 % 43 % 44 % 46 %
Improvements - 88 114 87 64 72 56 Yes Yes
Deteriorations - 103 61 50 47 62 38
Improved % 94 % 95 % 96 % 96 % 94 % 96 % 96 %
Improvements - 27 22 15 7 28 19 Yes Yes
Deteriorations - 17 12 9 28 13 14
Improved % 65 % 81 % 86 % 89 % 90 % 91 % 90 %
Improvements - 280 121 69 54 36 35 Yes Yes
Deteriorations - 65 56 35 35 28 45
Improved % 84 % 89 % 92 % 94 % 95 % 96 % 94 %
Improvements - 114 72 42 33 35 19 Yes Yes
Deteriorations - 50 33 28 14 24 36
Improved % 39 % 40 % 43 % 51 % 58 % 64 % 72 %
Improvements - 30 48 107 75 80 93 Yes No
Deteriorations - 13 9 5 7 8 11
Improved % 10 % 9 % 10 % 10 % 9 % 9 % 9 %
Improvements - 4 2 4 2 2 0 Yes No
Deteriorations - 8 3 3 6 9 3
Improved % 21 % 22 % 21 % 21 % 23 % 23 % 23 %
Improvements - 47 28 17 24 20 20 Yes No
Deteriorations - 49 32 18 9 20 18
Improved % 44 % 44 % 44 % 43 % 44 % 45 % 46 %
Improvements - 18 4 18 13 22 16 Yes No
Deteriorations - 30 5 21 6 9 15
Improved % 4 % 3 % 4 % 3 % 3 % 3 % 3 %
Improvements - 9 9 1 6 1 5 Yes No
Deteriorations - 20 5 6 3 6 8
Improved % 80 % 71 % 79 % 83 % 78 % 84 % 85 %
Improvements - 63 131 64 38 102 70 Yes No
Deteriorations - 186 29 13 99 46 56
Improved % 12 % 6 % 6 % 4 % 4 % 4 % 4 %
Improvements - 17 3 6 4 7 6 Yes No
Deteriorations - 100 6 29 4 9 16
Improved % 46 % 49 % 51 % 55 % 59 % 60 % 62 %
Improvements - 99 36 71 53 36 35 Yes No
Deteriorations - 56 6 32 8 20 18
CEO / Chairman separation
Board classification
Board independence
Compensation committee 
independence
Cumulative voting rights
Special meeting rules
Board amendments to 
bylaws
Changes in board size
Filling procedure of
board vacancies
Director stock 
compensation
Shareholder approval of 
stock-incentive plans
Nominating committee 
independence
Poison pill
Written consent acceptance
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Board de-classification – The CGQ data shows whether a firm’s board is re-elected entirely 
every year, or whether directors are divided into multiple (typically three) classes of which only 
one is elected annually by the shareholder meeting. We define a board as de-classified when the 
entire board is elected annually. The dummy variable takes the value of one if the firm board is 
de-classified and zero otherwise. 
CEO / Chairman separation – The CGQ data reveals whether the Chief Executive Officer (or 
corresponding first-ranking manager, CEO hereafter) also holds the position of the Chairman of 
the board. We do not differentiate between having a lead director and not having one and instead 
define CEO and Chairman to be separated when they are not the same person. We assign the 
variable the value of one if CEO and Chairman are separated and zero otherwise 
Director stock compensation – The CGQ data shows whether directors, collectively, were 
awarded with cash only or with cash and stock during the measured year. We define director 
stock compensation as an arrangement where all directors are paid in cash and stock, or in stock 
only. The dummy variable is equal to one if director stock compensation exists and zero 
otherwise. 
Nominating committee independence – The CGQ data reveals the composition of companies’ 
nominating committees and specifies whether such a committee, primarily responsible for 
identifying and approving board nominees, exists as a separate entity. We anticipate that 
independent and outside committee members are vital in ensuring the nomination of an 
independent board safeguarding the shareholder interest. We therefore define independent 
nominating committee as one separated from the board and comprising solely independent48 
outsiders. The variable obtains the value of one if the nominating committee is independent and 
zero otherwise. 
Compensation committee independence – The CGQ data also depicts the composition of firms’ 
compensation committees, primarily responsible for setting the guidelines for management pay. 
We consider compensation committee independence important in ensuring a well-incentivised 
and controlled management and define independent compensation committee as one separated 
                                                 
48   In Nominating committee and Compensation committee variables, board seat does not make a committee 
  member insider or affiliated. 
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from the board and comprising solely independent outsiders. The dummy variable equals one if 
the compensation committee is independent and zero otherwise. 
Poison pill – The CGQ data describes whether or not a firm had an active poison pill, or a 
shareholder rights plan, in the measured year. We include all poison pill types where the 
shareholders enjoy a pre-determined right to purchase shares in the old or new (in case of 
mergers) company with discounted prices at the expense of an outside party pursuing a takeover 
or a merger. We consider all such plans regardless of whether they include TIDE provision49, 
“Sunset” provision50, qualified offer clause51, shareholder approval requirements or specific 
trigger thresholds. We define a poison pill as any of the aforementioned arrangements and 
anticipate that poison pills are, in all above cases, a material inhibition to a functioning market for 
corporate control. We thus assign the dummy the value of one if no poison pill is in place and 
zero otherwise. 
Cumulative voting rights – The CGQ data shows whether or not shareholders are allowed to 
concentrate their votes to a single nominee, most importantly in board elections. We anticipate 
that the permission to concentrate votes to a single nominee instead of only being able to vote for 
the entire board significantly strengthens shareholders’ ability to ensure board independence and 
promote the owner interest by allowing for the voting of “minority directors”. The dummy thus 
takes the value of one if cumulative voting is allowed for shareholders and zero otherwise. 
Written consent acceptance – The CGQ data shows whether the shareholders of a company are 
permitted to act by written consent or not. We anticipate that allowing shareholders to deliver 
their votes through mail, without convening for a physical meeting, serves to enhance shareholder 
position since otherwise shareholders might have to wait for the next scheduled meeting to 
remove directors or initiate a shareholder resolution. We assign the dummy the value of one if 
shareholders are freely allowed to act by written consent and zero otherwise, including 
arrangements, where written consent is allowed only if they are unanimous. 
                                                 
49   Three-year independent director evaluation refers to an arrangement where an outside director committee 
  evaluates the poison pill every 2-3 years and decides whether it is continued or rescinded. 
50  In a Sunset provision, shareholders have the opportunity to ratify or reject the poison pill at a regular interval, e.g. 
 every 2-3 years. 
51  Qualified offer clause refers to a pre-determined clause restricting the use of a poison pill if an offer meets certain 
 pre-defined criteria. 
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Special meetings rules – The CGQ data reveals whether or not shareholders are permitted, 
individually or as a group passing a given ownership threshold, to convene a special meeting. We 
anticipate that shareholders’ ability to call a special meeting at their discretion is important in 
maintaining the owners’ power to initiate shareholder resolutions or influence board composition. 
Also, we anticipate that the right to call a special meeting is vital in de-insulating management in 
takeover situations; a special meeting allows shareholders to respond to a bid and makes it more 
difficult for management to turn down beneficial offers without shareholder consultation. The 
dummy therefore equals one if shareholders are permitted to call special meetings and zero 
otherwise. 
Board amendments to bylaws – The CGQ data allows us to infer whether board is permitted to 
amend the company’s bylaws without shareholder approval. We anticipate that shareholder 
approval requirement in amending firm bylaws is important in making sure the management can 
not deteriorate the shareholders’ position without their consent. The dummy takes the value of 
one if amendments to bylaws require shareholder approval and zero otherwise. 
Shareholder approval of stock-incentive plans – The CGQ data reveals whether all of a firm’s 
stock-based incentive plans were adopted with shareholder approval, or whether all or some of 
them were issued without such consent. We anticipate that shareholder approval for stock-
incentive plans is significant in maintaining shareholder oversight on structuring management 
pay in an efficient way. We therefore assign the dummy the value of one if all stock-incentive 
plans are shareholder approved and zero otherwise.  
Changes in board size – The CGQ data shows whether the shareholders of a firm have the right 
to increase or decrease the number of directors in the board. Given that changes in board size are 
often used as a takeover defence by the management, we anticipate that it is important to allow 
shareholders to decide on the changes in the board size to avoid management insulation and 
ensure shareholder discretion on potential takeover bids. The dummy variable thus equals one if 
shareholder approval is required to change board size and zero otherwise. 
Filling procedure of board vacancies – The CGQ data reveals whether the appointment of 
directors chosen to fill board vacancies is subject to shareholder approval (vote). If shareholder 
approval is not required, the board can self-select new directors to fill vacancies. Since this would 
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allow the board to replace directors removed by the shareholders, we anticipate that shareholder 
approval for filling board vacancies is important in maintaining independent boards with strong 
management oversight. In the case of classified boards, we consider the arrangement where 
proposed board candidates are subject to same approval than candidates applying for the 
regularly freeing board seats equivalent to shareholder approval requirement. We assign the 
dummy variable the value of one if all added directors are subject to shareholder approval in the 
next annual general meeting and zero otherwise. 
4.4.1.2 Organisation 
In analysing the investor effects on organisational improvements, we focus on unrelated 
divestments, as laid out in Chapter 3. Specifically, based on the deal data we extract from SDC 
Platinum, we construct three specific divestments variables comprising the (1) occurrence of 
unrelated divestments, (2) initiation of unrelated divestments and (3) magnitude of unrelated 
divestments. We exhibit all variables annually. The three variables are discussed and motivated 
individually below. Descriptive data on the three variables, showing all divestments and 
unrelated divestments for our sample firms, are presented in Table 5. 
Occurrence of unrelated divestments – We extract annual data on whether our sample firms 
undertake divestments of unrelated entities over our observation period. Drawing from Ahn and 
Denis (2004), who study spin-offs’ effect on firm valuation and investment efficiency, we 
anticipate that the occurrence of unrelated divestments signals reversal of value-destroying 
unrelated diversification and excessive growth. We assign the dummy variable the value of one if 
a firm announced unrelated divestments in a given year and zero otherwise. We only account for 
divestments that were subsequently closed or divestments announced post to January 1, 2008 and 
labelled “pending” as of year-end 200952. 
Initiation of unrelated divestments – We extract annual data on whether our firm universe 
constituents initiated unrelated divestments over our observation period. We define unrelated 
divestments initiation as one or more unrelated entities being divested in year T but no such 
divestments occurring in year T-1. As with the previous variable, we anticipate that initiation of 
unrelated divestments signals reversal of diversification and excessive growth. The dummy 
                                                 
52   Since divestments often take more than one year to close, we include divestments announced after 2008 and 
  pending in year-end 2009 so as not to exclude valid observations. 
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variable receives the value of one if unrelated divestments are initiated and zero otherwise. We 
only account for closed transactions and pending transactions for those announced in 2008 or 
later. 
Magnitude of unrelated divestments – In addition to occurrence and initiation of unrelated 
divestments, we measure the annual enterprise-value-normalised magnitude of unrelated 
divestments. We define the annual continuous variable as the sum of the values of unrelated 
divestments where our firm panel constituent was an ultimate parent divided by the average 
enterprise value over the year measured53. To exclude outliers, we leave out ratios exceeding 0.5. 
                                                 
53   In other words, for measuring Magnitude of unrelated divestments –ratio for a given firm for 2003, the 
  denominator is (EV2002 + EV2003) / 2, where the EV-measures are as of year-end. 
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Table 5 – Unrelated divestments – Variables 
The table depicts the divestment data for our U.S. and European sample firms showing our three unrelated 
divestments variables. For all three variables, we show both all divestments and unrelated divestments. All 
divestments include transactions exceeding USD 1 million in value and unrelated divestments are a sub-group of all 
divestments where the target 4-digit SIC code is different from the 4-digit SIC code of the target’s ultimate parent. 
Occurrence of divestments is the number of our sample firms where divestments were undertaken in year T. 
Initiation of divestments is the number of our sample firms where divestments were undertaken in year T, but not in 
year T-1. Magnitude of unrelated divestments is the average of sums of divestment transaction values (for firms in 
our sample) divided by the average EV of the divesting firm. 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Mean
Occurrence of divestments
USA 171 179 181 178 123 97 929 155
All Europe 200 237 234 203 129 115 1,118 186
Total 371 416 415 381 252 212 2,047 341
USA 61 59 80 82 58 42 382 64
Unrelated Europe 77 72 79 60 33 37 358 60
Total 138 131 159 142 91 79 740 123
Initiation of divestments
USA 110 121 117 119 76 67 610 102
All Europe 97 119 109 92 57 70 544 91
Total 207 240 226 211 133 137 1,154 192
USA 51 47 60 63 45 31 297 50
Unrelated Europe 60 51 60 38 29 32 270 45
Total 111 98 120 101 74 63 567 95
Magnitude of divestments
USA 4 % 5 % 6 % 6 % 5 % 3 % - 5 %
All Europe 2 % 4 % 5 % 7 % 4 % 7 % - 5 %
Total 3 % 5 % 5 % 7 % 5 % 5 % - 5 %
USA 5 % 5 % 7 % 6 % 6 % 3 % - 5 %
Unrelated Europe 1 % 5 % 4 % 10 % 3 % 8 % - 5 %
Total 3 % 5 % 6 % 8 % 4 % 6 % - 5 %
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4.4.1.3 Dividend payout 
We study dividends to measure investor effects on payout improvements (increases), as discussed 
in Chapter 3. In special, we construct two individual variables based on the data sourced from 
FactSet: (1) Change in dividend yield and (2) Initiation of cash dividends. We discuss and 
motivate the variables individually below. Description for dividends amongst our sample firms is 
presented in Table 6. 
Change in dividend yield – We measure changes in the dividend payout by observing changes in 
firms’ dividend yields. We use dividend yield to make cross-sectional comparison more 
meaningful, as with Benartzi et al. (1997), who study dividends’ signalling effect of earnings 
using both dividend yields and dividends deflated by prior-period dividends. In an analogous 
study to ours, Clifford (2008) studies changes in the dividend yield of firms targeted by activist 
blockholders. Brown and Caylor (2009) use dividend yield as a proxy for payout when studying 
the effect of corporate governance on a variety of firm performance metrics. We define dividend 
yield as the annual total cash dividend payout divided by the year-end share price. We further 
define the continuous variable Change in dividend yield as the dividend yield in T less the 
dividend yield in T-1. 
Initiation of cash dividends – We measure the occurrence of cash dividends annually and define 
the initiations of cash dividends as events when a firm pays cash dividends in year T but has not 
paid cash dividends in years T-1 and T-2. In an analogous context Klein and Zur (2009) study 
Activist hedge funds and find that they are successful in initiating cash dividends in target 
companies. Our approach is largely in line with Michaely et al. (1995), who study the price 
reactions from initiations and omissions of cash dividends. Using their longer data set covering 
25 years, Michaely et al. (1995) only account for the actual first cash dividends on CRSP54 
record, excluding cash dividend reinstitutions. We however, consider a two-year quarantine 
period appropriate for our data only spanning from 2003 (200455) to 2009. The dummy variable 
equals one if cash dividends are initiated, and zero otherwise. 
                                                 
54  Center for Research in Security Prices 
55  2004 is the first year measured for dependent variables, since ownership data is reliably available only from 2003. 
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Table 6 – Dividends – Variables and description 
The table depicts the cash dividend yields in our firm sample 2003 through 2009. Average dividend yield shows the 
average annual dividend yield for our firm sample when zero-dividend payers are included. Average dividend yield 
– Non-zero shows the same when zero-dividend payers are excluded. Initiation of dividends depicts the number of 
firms commencing dividend payments in T, who have not paid cash dividends in T-1 and T-2. 
 
We note that the average annual dividend yields are consistently somewhat higher in Europe than 
in the U.S. Further, we note that average dividend yields increase significantly in 2008, which we 
assume to be a result of rapidly decreasing market valuations but relatively more stagnant 
dividend levels (see Lintner 1956). While the average dividend yields decrease in 2009, they 
remain mostly above the seven-year average amongst both U.S. and European firms. The total 
dividend initiations are distributed between U.S. and Europe roughly in line with the number of 
constituent firms in the sample. We note, however, that the number of firms initiating cash 
dividends drops significantly more in the U.S. from 2007 to 2008 (-68%) when compared to 
Europe (-15%). 
4.4.2 Key independent variables 
We produce our key independent ownership variables by classifying the 3,430 investors into 
groups based on the two key characteristics that we hypothesise to define the propensity to 
activism, as laid out in Chapter 2: (1) portfolio concentration and (2) investment horizon. As 
neither can be described with an unambiguous single measure, we assume two different methods 
to group the investors: (1) factoring-based grouping and (2) simple grouping based on two 
individual underlying investor metrics. Specifically, our annual investor variables take a binary 
form and indicate whether investors belonging to the different investor groups have entered a 
given sample firm during the year measured or not. 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total Mean
USA 1.0 % 1.0 % 1.1 % 1.1 % 1.3 % 2.0 % 1.5 % - 1.3 %
Europe 2.3 % 2.3 % 2.3 % 2.2 % 2.7 % 3.8 % 2.6 % - 2.6 %
Total 1.5 % 1.5 % 1.6 % 1.5 % 1.9 % 2.7 % 1.9 % - 1.8 %
USA 1.8 % 1.7 % 1.9 % 1.8 % 2.2 % 3.3 % 2.4 % - 2.2 %
Europe 2.8 % 2.7 % 2.6 % 2.5 % 3.1 % 4.4 % 3.3 % - 3.1 %
Total 2.3 % 2.2 % 2.2 % 2.1 % 2.6 % 3.8 % 2.8 % - 2.6 %
USA 41 47 37 13 22 7 13 180 26
Europe 19 27 22 23 13 11 10 125 18
Total 60 74 59 36 35 18 23 305 44
Average dividend 
yield - Non-zero
Average dividend 
yield
Initiation of 
dividends
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Drawing from Bushee (1998) and related literature, we argue that the measures for portfolio 
concentration should incorporate the ability of an investor to focus its portfolio both into large 
ownership stakes and into a low number of companies. Consequently, we adapt from Bushee 
(1998) to our activism-specific purpose and argue that the following measures capture portfolio 
concentration comprehensively in our setting: (1) total number of holdings, (2) the Herfindahl 
measure of portfolio concentration and (3) the share of holdings exceeding 1% of target equity. 
We also draw on the literature to identify the relevant proxies for investment horizon in our 
activist-specific setting. As suggested by Clifford (2008), the lock-up period, although a suitable 
measure for hedge funds, is problematic with a broader investor group. Open-ended mutual funds 
can face daily redemptions whereas individual investors, government investment vehicles and the 
largest pension funds have their capital locked-up practically indefinitely. Consequently, we draw 
from Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005), Chen, Harford and Li (2007) and Bushee (1998) and 
argue that the two most relevant measures for investment horizon in our activist-setting are: (1) 
investor churn rate and (2) the share of holdings held for at least six quarters. 
The factoring division is based on factor analysis to first produce two factors describing portfolio 
concentration and investment horizon by exploiting all five underlying investor characteristics. 
The simple division uses only two of the underlying investor characteristics as proxies: the 
Herfindahl index for portfolio concentration and Churn rate for investment horizon. We first 
present both approaches and then compare them to produce a coherent view of similarities and 
differences. Finally, we present our investor group-based key independent variables describing 
entries by investors from different investor groups. 
4.4.2.1 Factoring division 
We apply factor analysis to condense the set of five above described portfolio characteristics into 
two factors, one depicting portfolio concentration and one depicting investment horizon.  
Amongst the five characteristics, we relate Churn rate and Share of holdings held for over six 
quarters to investment horizon and Number of holdings, Herfindahl index and Share of holdings 
exceeding 1% of target shares to portfolio concentration. We anticipate that while all five 
characteristics relate clearly to either portfolio concentration or investment horizon, each convey 
different, complementary information. Furthermore, the choice of one single variable to describe 
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each of the two key characteristics is difficult to justify. All in all, we anticipate that factor 
analysis condenses more relevant information from the five portfolio characteristics and results in 
more relevant portfolio concentration and investment horizon estimates for each investor than an 
approach relying on only two individual portfolio characteristics. Below, we describe the factor 
analysis procedure and present the k-means clustering used to group investors based on the factor 
scores generated from our factor analysis. 
Factor analysis is used in research to describe a large number of observable variables by a smaller 
group of unobservable, or hypothetical, factors. The analysis is based on the assumption that the 
observed variables are linear combinations of some underlying factors that are orthogonal to each 
other. The underlying model is presented in Equation (3): 
yij = zi1bij + zi2b2j + ... + ziqbqj + eij,  (3) 
where yij is the value of the ith observation on the jth variable, zik is the ith observation on the kth 
common factor, bkj are factor loadings, or the set of linear coefficients, and eij corresponds to a 
residual but, in factor analysis, it is the jth variable’s unique factor. Factor analysis can broadly be 
divided into three steps: extracting the initial factors, rotation and interpreting the factors (Sharma 
1996). 
Before extracting the initial factors, we perform a number of measures suggested by Sharma 
(1996) to check whether our investor characteristics data is appropriate for factor analysis. First, 
we examine the correlation matrix of the five portfolio characteristics variables. High correlations 
among variables indicate that the variables can be grouped under common factors (Sharma 1996). 
By examining the correlation matrix presented in Panel A of Table 7 we find sets of variables that 
are highly correlated. Variables that are a priori presumed to correlate are bolded. Our 
presumptions hold fairly well, and the correlations are logical. Number of holdings correlates 
negatively with Herfindahl index and Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares showing 
the intuitive relation that portfolio concentration decreases in number of holdings. Regarding the 
proxies for investment horizon, Churn rate and Share of holdings held for over six quarters show 
strong negative correlation, which implies, as expected, that the share of long-term holdings 
decreases in portfolio turnover. Share of holdings held for over six quarters also correlates 
positively with Herfindahl index, which can be explained by investors, such as wealthy 
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individuals, who typically concentrate their ownership into a very limited number of holdings and 
hold on to them at length. 
We also examine negative anti-image correlations that should be small for the variables to be 
appropriate for factoring. The negative anti-image correlation matrix is presented in Panel B of 
Table 7. Although “small” is a judgemental question in relation to the examination of anti-image 
correlations (Sharma 1996), it appears that the figures are sufficiently small to support 
appropriateness of factor analysis for our investor characteristics data. 
As a final check we calculate the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy 
(Kaiser 1970). Our overall measure of 0.584 implies a mediocre sampling adequacy (Kaiser and 
Rice 1974). We thus conclude that our investor characteristics data is suitable for factor analysis. 
Table 7 – Factor analysis - Correlation and anti-image correlation matrices 
Panel A shows the correlation matrix for the five portfolio features. Panel B shows the anti-image correlations, or 
partial correlations controlling for all other variables, for the portfolio features. Portfolio features are as follows: 
Number of holdings is the maximum number of quarterly holdings; Herfindahl index is the Herfindahl measure for 
portfolio concentration; Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares is the quarterly share of holdings that 
exceed 1% of the target firm equity; Churn rate, a measure for portfolio turnover, is the relative, price-corrected 
quarterly portfolio movement; Share of holdings held for over six quarters is calculated as the share of holdings 
held at any stage of our observation period for more than six quarters to all holdings.  
 
PANEL A - CORRELATION MATRIX
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Number of holdings 1
(2) Herfindahl index -0.359 1
(3) Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares -0.323 0.551 1
(4) Churn rate -0.037 -0.250 -0.186 1
(5) Share of holdings held for over six quarters 0.058 0.443 0.251 -0.702 1
PANEL B - ANTI-IMAGE CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) Number of holdings 1.000
(2) Herfindahl index 0.315 1.000
(3) Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares 0.166 -0.426 1.000
(4) Churn rate -0.039 -0.125 0.065 1.000
(5) Share of holdings held for over six quarters -0.222 -0.398 0.004 0.673 1.000
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We first perform principal factor analysis to extract the initial factors. The principal factor 
method is appropriate when the analysis is exploratory rather than confirmatory and is used in a 
similar setting by Bushee (1998) and Dechow et al. (1991). The results from the extraction of the 
initial factors are presented in Panel A of Table 8. First, potential orthogonal factors, Factor1 
through Factor5, are generated. Factors 3-5 are then left out from the analysis on the basis of 
negative eigenvalues. Eigenvalues represent the amount of variance explained by the factors 
(Kim and Mueller 1978), and factors with low eigenvalues are contributing little to the variances 
in the variables and may therefore be left out. With values of close to or over one, the two 
remaining factors are considered meaningful.  
In Panel B of Table 8, factor loadings and uniqueness are presented for the two chosen factors, 
namely Factor1 and Factor2. Factor loadings are high for Factor1 and imply a relation to the 
investment horizon. Loadings are slightly lower for Factor2, but overall, there is a clear pattern to 
the signs: if Factor2 were to be portfolio concentration as we anticipate, the sign of the loadings 
should be positive for Number of holdings and negative for Herfindahl index and Share of 
holdings exceeding 1% of target shares. Similarly, if Factor1 were to be investment horizon, a 
higher Churn rate should decrease and a higher Share of holdings held for over six quarters 
should increase the measure. 
We proceed with rotation, which is applied to achieve a clearer factor structure and make the 
factors more meaningful. Following Bushee (1998), we choose oblique rotation over an 
orthogonal rotation. Orthogonal (varimax) rotation relies on the assumption that the factors are 
independent, whereas in oblique rotation, the rotated factors are not constrained to be orthogonal 
to each other (Sharma 1996)56. An orthogonal rotation, however, produces very similar results in 
our case. The results of the oblique rotation are presented in Table 9. Interpreting the factors is a 
subjective process, but in this case, the results indicate that the factors have been successfully 
derived to represent the two desired characteristics: Factor1 depicts investment horizon and 
Factor2 depicts portfolio concentration. 
                                                 
56  An orthogonal rotation is applied as verification and yields practically identical results. 
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Table 8 – Factor analysis – Initial factors 
Panel A shows the eigenvalues of five extracted initial factor variables. The Factor# variables describe the potential 
orthogonal factors incorporating the five portfolio features. Panel B shows the Factor Loadings corresponding to the 
two factors with positive eigenvalues. 
 
Table 9 – Factor analysis – Rotated factor loadings 
The table shows the rotated factor loadings for the portfolio features. Portfolio features are as follows: Number of 
holdings is the maximum number of quarterly holdings; Herfindahl index is the Herfindahl measure for portfolio 
concentration; Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares is the quarterly share of holdings that exceed 1% 
of the target firm equity; Churn rate, a measure for portfolio turnover, is the relative, price-corrected quarterly 
portfolio movement; Share of holdings held for over six quarters is calculated as the share of holdings held at any 
stage of our observation period for more than six quarters to all holdings. The rotation is performed with the oblique 
rotation method. The Factor# variables describe the potential orthogonal factors incorporating the five investment 
behaviour measures. 
 
 
PANEL A - FACTOR ANALYSIS - EIGENVALUES
Factor
Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
Factor5
LR test: Independent vs. saturated: 
Chi2(15)
Prob > chi2
PANEL B - FACTOR LOADINGS
Variable
Number of holdings
Herfindahl index
Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares
Churn rate
Share of holdings held for over six quarters
0.718
0.747
-0.630
0.530
0.307
0.431
0.581
0.427
-0.118
-0.368
0.415
0.372
0.341
Uniqueness
1.000
1.118
1.180
1.209
0.831
Proportion CumulativeEigenvalues Difference
-0.062
-0.029
0.378
0.8311.743
0.793
-0.130
-0.061
0.117
0.069
0.854
0.950
.-0.247
-0.227 -0.480
269.07
0.000
Factor1 Factor2
0.676
Variable
Number of holdings
Herfindahl index
Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares
Churn rate
Share of holdings held for over six quarters 0.307
0.431
0.581
0.427
0.718
Factor1
0.625
0.683
-0.546
UniquenessFactor2
0.797 0.109
0.222
0.192
0.069
-0.754 -0.001
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Next, we group our 3,430 investors of interest based on the two factors identified in the factor 
analysis. More specifically, we estimate factor scores for all investors and perform k-means 
cluster analysis on the factor scores. Cluster analysis is a technique for combining observations 
into groups, such that each group is homogeneous and different from other groups (Sharma 
1996). K-means cluster analysis is a non-hierarchical clustering technique for which the number 
of clusters must be decided a priori. The choice of the number of clusters is an iterative one 
where we examine the division and its meaningfulness. After examining the number of groups 
from two to five, we result in an investor division with four groups. The groups are illustrated in 
Figure 1 and named based on their distinguishing characteristics as (1) Devoted, (2) Focused, (3) 
Diversified and (4) Traders. We use the entries by investors belonging to the four groups, which 
all differ from each other in terms of portfolio concentration and investment horizon, as our key 
independent variables in regressions studying owner effects on a range of corporate 
improvements. 
Figure 1 – Factoring division: Graphical representation 
The figure illustrates the division of investors into four groups based on the factoring division: Devoted, Focused, 
Diversified and Traders. The axes, Investment horizon and Portfolio concentration, are produced by factor 
analysis on five measures of investment behaviour. 
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4.4.2.2 Simple division 
In addition to our factoring division, we construct a simpler investor division based on two 
individual underlying investor characteristics, instead of all five. We produce the second division 
to validate our factoring division: we anticipate that any results found for factoring based owner 
groups should also be discernable for investor groups determined through two individual investor 
characteristics depicting portfolio concentration and investment horizon. As the two individual 
characteristics, we choose the Herfindahl index as a proxy for investor portfolio concentration 
and Churn rate as a proxy for investors’ investment horizon.  
We choose HHI because we expect it captures, on a stand-alone basis, portfolio concentration 
from a wider perspective than the other two of our concentration characteristics. While Number 
of holdings only accounts for the number of different target firms an investor invests in and Share 
of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares only accounts for the magnitude of individual stakes, 
HHI accounts for both. 
Similarly, we choose to use Churn rate as it captures the average holding period across the entire 
portfolio of an investor, while Share of holdings held for over six quarters might prove 
misleading on a stand-alone basis, especially when an investor applies different investment styles 
simultaneously. In addition, Churn rate has been previously used in analogous circumstances 
(Bushee 1998; Gaspar, Massa and Matos 2005). To make representation compatible with the 
factoring-based investor grouping, we use the inverse of Churn rate (ICR) as our single measure 
for investment horizon. The Inverse churn rate for investor i is calculated as follows:  
ܫܥܴ௜ ൌ 1 െ ቀ ஼ோ೔ெ஺௑ሺ஼ோሻቁ,  (4) 
where MAX(CR) is the maximum churn rate amongst our investor sample. By dividing the 
investor-specific figures with the maximum figure we adjust the range to between 0 to 1, and 
subtracting the figure from 1 turns the scale to run in a more intuitive manner; the higher the 
Inverse churn rate, the longer the investment horizon. Figure 2 plots our 3,430 investors of 
interest based on HHI and ICR. 
To produce independent variables based on our simple division, we construct a grouping 
comparable to the four-group division in our factoring approach. We group our investors into 
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quartiles through the following procedure: First, we divide the investors evenly into low-
concentration and high-concentration investors using the median Herfindahl index as a cut-off. 
Then, we further divide the investors evenly into short-horizon and long-horizon investors, using 
the median Inverse churn rate as a cut-off. As with the factoring-based division, we arrive at four 
groups with uneven numbers of investors and highest frequency of investors in the low-
concentration long-horizon group. The distribution is laid out in Figure 2. Overall, we name our 
four groups according to the combination of characteristics they represent: (1) HighHHI-
HighICR, (2) LowHHI-HighICR, (3) HighHHI-LowICR and (4) LowHHI-LowICR. As with the 
groups generated from factoring and subsequent k-means clustering, we use the entries by 
investors belonging to the simple division groups as our key independent variables in explaining 
owner effects on corporate improvements.  
Based on preliminary findings regarding the types of investors included in the factoring-based 
group Devoted, we define a fifth group constituting the investors with the highest Herfindahl 
index and highest Inverse churn rate. Namely, we note that in sharp contrast with the other 
groups, the frequency of individual investors is extremely high amongst the Devoted and we also 
choose to isolate them in our simple division. As discussed in Section 2.4, we anticipate that such 
individual shareholders with very large average stakes and very long investment horizons may 
have a unique approach towards facilitating corporate improvements due to the presence of 
potentially significant private benefits (see e.g. Denis, Denis and Sarin 1997a, who show that 
while management ownership generally decreases diversification, very high levels of managerial 
ownership actually increase it). Consequently, we further isolate the upper right quarter of the 
HighHHI-HighICR quartile, define it as TopHHI-TopICR and test it separately. The TopHHI-
TopICR is drawn in Figure 2. 
Overall, we note that for the simple division groups, the three absent metrics are largely in line 
with the two chosen as basis for grouping the investors: when HHI is high, the Number of 
holdings is low and the Share of holdings exceeding 1% of target shares is high. Similarly, when 
Churn rate is high, the Share of holdings held for over six quarters is low. 
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Figure 2 – Simple division: Graphical representation 
The figure illustrates the division of investors into five groups based on the quartile division: TopHHI-TopCR, 
HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR and LowHHI-LowICR. Inverse churn rate and the 
Herfindahl index and are used as proxies for Investment horizon and Portfolio concentration. 
 
4.4.2.3 Comparison of division methods 
We compare our two investor divisions by calculating all five underlying investor portfolio 
characteristics for each of our altogether nine investor groups, as presented in panel A of Table 
10. Further, to improve comparability we calculate the average percent stakes57 for all groups. 
We then calculate the investor overlaps between all nine groups, as shown in panel B of Table 10. 
We also show correlations among the presence and entry of the different investor groups in Table 
11. Comparison of the divisions implies that the simple division, although built on two individual 
characteristics, is largely consistent but not identical with the factoring division.  
                                                 
57   Average percent stakes are defined as the average percentage of target shares held by an investor, as calculated for 
all investors over all quarterly holdings over our observation period. 
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The Devoted -group, comprising a large portion of individual investors, exhibits investor 
characteristics well in line with those of TopHHI-TopICR. This is not surprising since 73% of 
Devoted investors are included in the TopHHI-TopICR –group. Further, the Focused investors 
seem to be relatively well in line with the HighHHI-HighICR -group, despite showing a smaller 
number of average holdings. Overlap tabulation shows that 59% of Focused investors belong to 
the HighHHI-HighICR -group. The Diversified investors, primarily comprising large institutional 
investors, seem strongly aligned with the LowHHI-HighICR -group: all portfolio characteristics 
are aligned and 90% of Diversified investors are included in the LowHHI-HighICR -group. In 
slight contrast with other factoring-division groups, Traders do not seem to be strongly 
associated with any of the individual simple division groups. Instead, their portfolio 
characteristics seem to be a hybrid of LowHHI-LowICR and HighHHI-LowICR -groups. Further, 
Traders include investors allocated to the LowHHI-HighICR -group in simple division.  
Overall, we conclude that our two investor classification approaches are internally consistent and 
relatively well in line with each other. We argue, however, that the factoring-based classification 
produces clearer and more robust groups since more portfolio data is absorbed in the grouping 
process. As the groups are aligned but not identical, we anticipate that they are well-suited to be 
run side-by-side in analysing owner effects on corporate improvements. 
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Table 10 – Comparison of division methods 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the four groups produced by factor and cluster analysis, the five groups 
produced by the simple division with Herfindahl index and Inverse churn rate and for all investors. Panel B shows 
the total amount of investors in each group and the amount of investors that overlap between the groups produced by 
the two methods. Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders are the four groups produced in the factoring 
division. TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR and LowHHI-LowICR 
are the groups produced in the simple division. Bolded figures are intersections of the groups that are expected to 
overlap. 
 
 
 
PANEL A - DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR FACTORING AND SIMPLE GROUPS
Number of 
investors
Average 
percentage 
stake in target 
equity
Average 
number of 
holdings
Average 
Herfindahl 
index
Average Share 
of Holdings 
Exceeding 1% 
of Target 
Shares
Average churn 
rate
Average share 
of holdings 
held for over 
six quarters
Factoring division
Devoted 781 7.5 % 4 0.76 66.2 % 0.14 92.7 %
Focused 566 6.9 % 13 0.55 70.5 % 0.35 53.8 %
Diversified 1,342 0.6 % 592 0.04 14.7 % 0.26 61.1 %
Traders 741 1.0 % 154 0.13 25.4 % 0.75 19.7 %
Simple division
TopHHI-TopICR 750 6.5 % 5 0.86 61.6 % 0.16 82.4 %
HighHHI-HighICR 789 6.2 % 45 0.36 60.3 % 0.32 59.8 %
LowHHI-HighICR 1,496 0.7 % 538 0.03 17.4 % 0.31 55.1 %
HighHHI-LowICR 176 2.7 % 46 0.42 41.3 % 0.98 24.4 %
LowHHI-LowICR 219 0.0 % 304 0.04 14.4 % 0.94 16.8 %
All investors 3,430 3.3 % 268 0.31 38.0 % 0.35 58.2 %
General Portfolio concentration Investment horizon
PANEL B - OVERLAP OF INVESTORS AMONG INVESTOR GROUPS
TopHHI-TopICR HighHHI-HighICR LowHHI-HighICR HighHHI-LowICR LowHHI-LowICR Total
Devoted 568 211 2 0 0 781
Focused 178 332 16 40 0 566
Diversified 0 121 1,210 1 10 1,342
Traders 4 125 268 135 209 741
Total 750 789 1,496 176 219 3,430
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Table 11 – Investor groups – Correlation matrix 
The table shows the correlations among the presence and entry of the different investor groups produced by the two 
division methods. Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders are the four groups produced in the factoring 
division. TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR and LowHHI-LowICR 
are the groups produced in the simple division. Underlined figures are correlations of over 0.5. 
 
4.4.2.4 Comparison to legal types 
One of the key contributions of our study is to show that the dominant design of studying 
investor activism through certain legal types of investors does not fully capture the investor 
characteristics pivotal to activism (for hedge funds see e.g. Boyson and Mooradian 2007 and 
Klein and Zur 2009, for pension funds Wahal 1996 and Del Guercio and Hawkins 1999 and for 
mutual funds Ashraf and Jayaraman 2007). To compare our investor divisions with legal type 
based alternatives, we tabulate the legal type composition of our investor groups in Table 12. In 
general, our investor groups comprise of a broad variety of legal types. The observation implies 
that investors belonging to a certain legal type group may be very different from each other in 
terms of portfolio concentration and investment horizon. For example, a significant number of 
hedge funds belong to groups with high concentration and long horizon, and we argue that they 
play a very different role in terms of activism than hedge funds in the groups with low 
concentration and short horizon.  
While most legal types are, to a significant extent, dispersed over our specific investor groups, 
certain generalisations can be made. As discussed, the groups with highest concentration and 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Investor entry
1 Devoted 1
2 Focused 0.08 1
3 Diversified -0.03 0.01 1
4 Traders 0.02 0.06 0.18 1
5 TopHHI-TopCR 0.49 0.09 0.00 0.02 1
6 HighHHI-HighICR 0.35 0.25 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 1
7 LowHHI-HighICR -0.04 0.03 0.70 0.20 -0.01 -0.03 1
8 HighHHI-LowICR 0.13 0.48 0.05 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.05 1
9 LowHHI-LowICR -0.03 0.07 0.48 0.39 0.00 -0.03 0.28 0.08 1
Investor presence
10 Devoted 0.34 0.05 -0.11 -0.03 0.16 0.12 -0.11 0.04 -0.11 1
11 Focused 0.05 0.50 -0.07 0.01 0.04 0.14 -0.06 0.26 -0.04 0.06 1
12 Diversified -0.06 -0.02 0.39 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 0.27 0.00 0.20 -0.09 -0.05 1
13 Traders 0.00 0.06 0.20 0.84 0.01 -0.01 0.21 0.20 0.41 -0.04 0.01 0.10 1
14 TopHHI-TopCR 0.15 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.27 0.01 -0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.65 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 1
15 HighHHI-HighICR 0.15 0.12 -0.13 -0.09 0.00 0.45 -0.14 0.03 -0.16 0.33 0.28 -0.09 -0.09 0.03 1
16 LowHHI-HighICR -0.05 -0.02 0.38 0.11 -0.02 -0.04 0.38 0.00 0.19 -0.11 -0.06 0.69 0.13 -0.05 -0.14 1
17 HighHHI-LowICR 0.09 0.36 0.02 0.22 0.01 0.06 0.03 0.72 0.08 0.08 0.37 -0.03 0.22 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 1
18 LowHHI-LowICR -0.04 0.03 0.44 0.25 0.00 -0.04 0.28 0.06 0.61 -0.12 -0.02 0.33 0.30 -0.07 -0.16 0.25 0.05 1
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longest horizon consist mainly of individuals (67% and 70% of Devoted and TopHHI-TopICR 
investors are individuals, respectively), whereas investment advisors make up the majority of 
investors in groups with low concentration and long horizon (54% and 52% of Diversified and 
LowHHI-HighICR investors are investment advisors, respectively). Further, mutual funds (85% 
and 73% belong to Diversified and LowHHI-HighICR investors, respectively) and asset managers 
(86% and 79% belong to Diversified and LowHHI-HighICR investors, respectively) are mostly 
investors with long horizon and low concentration. Conversely, government investment vehicles 
and non-governmental organizations are characterised by long horizon and high concentration, 
with 89% or more included in Devoted or Focused (factoring division) and TopHHI-TopICR or 
HighHHI-HighICR investors (simple division). 
We further explore how activist hedge funds, the focus of numerous recent activist studies (see 
e.g. Brav et al. 2008; Klein and Zur 2009) are divided amongst our investor groups. We compile 
a list of 194 activist hedge funds from news searches and SEC 13D filings. Table 13 shows the 
division of these investors amongst our investor groups. For the factoring based division, we see 
that half of the activist hedge funds are in the Traders group. This is consistent with the view of 
many of our interviewees that many of the so-called activist hedge funds generally follow a 
highly diversified and short-term investment strategy but might sometimes, in a very limited 
number of investments, turn active58. We also note that 52 (27%) of the activist hedge funds are 
included in the Focused investor group. A closer look reveals that this cross-section includes 
investors such as Cevian Capital, Governance for Owners, Cerberus Capital Management and the 
Children’s Investment Fund, all well known activist funds who invest in a very limited number of 
companies and run target-specific activist campaigns. 
                                                 
58  The matter has been largely ignored in research but is discussed in the press. See e.g. “Activists buoyed by 
 shareholder chorus”, Financial News, 29.03.2010, available online on 12.06.2010: 
 http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-03-29/activists-buoyed-by-shareholder-chorus. 
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Table 13 – Legal type comparison – Known activist hedge funds in investor groups 
The table shows the number of known activist hedge funds in each of our investor groups. The factoring division 
groups are Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders. Simple division groups include TopHHI-TopICR, 
HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR and LowHHI-LowICR. For example, 52 out of 566 
Focused investors are known activist hedge funds.  
 
4.4.2.5 Investor entry 
As key independent variables explaining the corporate improvements, we apply separately the 
nine investor groups classified in our factoring and simple divisions. Specifically, when 
measuring the determinants of corporate improvements in period T, we define our independent 
ownership variables as lagged dummy variables that take the value of one if one or more 
investors belonging to an investor group punctuate the ownership threshold of 1% of target firm 
common stock58 in T-1. In other words, we explain observed corporate improvements with the 
previous period entries by investors from each investor group. We define entry as an event where 
an investor exceeds 1% ownership, irrespective of the ownership level in the previous period. We 
choose to define our key independent ownership variables as investor entries primarily for two 
reasons.  
First, while partly analogous studies, such as Bushee (1998) who studies the effect of institutional 
owners on R&D cuts, construct ownership variables based on the concentration of certain type of 
investors across all owners, we argue that in studying activism, average measures depicting all 
owners may not be relevant. On the contrary, based on our expert interviews and a wide body of 
activist literature (see e.g. Becht et al. 2008; Brav et al. 2008), we anticipate that a single activist 
                                                 
58  We motivate our choice of the 1% ownership threshold in Section 4.3.5. 
PANEL A - FACTORING DIVISION
Total
Activist hedge funds 194
Number of investors in group 3,430
PANEL B - SIMPLE DIVISION
Total
Activist hedge funds 194
Number of investors in group 3,430
37 96
Devoted Focused Diversified
LowHHI - 
LowICR
781 566
Traders
9 52
1,342 741
750 789 1,496 176 219
6 77 77 15 19
TopHHI - 
TopICR
HighHHI - 
HighICR
LowHHI - 
HighICR
HighHHI - 
LowICR
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investor is often responsible for pursuing a campaign for corporate improvements. Such 
individual holders would likely not be discernable in average measures based on all owners, 
especially since the large diversified institutional investors (mostly captured in Diversified) 
dominate such overall figures. However, our dummy variable approach, which indicates whether 
one or more investors from each investor group entered the firm or not, captures such individual 
and potentially highly influential investors. 
Second, we choose dummies depicting investor entry instead of investor presence, since we 
anticipate, in line with Clifford (2008), that the effect of an investor willing and able to drive 
corporate improvements is best observed in the period following her entry. Since most of our 
dependent variables are binary59 and most investors hold their positions over multiple years, 
using presence-based dummies would be misleading: a binary improvement can only occur once. 
With presence dummies, individual investors would influence the dummies of the investor 
groups they belong to over all the years they act as owners. Furthermore, we note that explaining 
the corporate improvements by investor entries provides an a priori stronger setting for 
controlling endogeneity and getting the causality right (discussed in detail in Chapter 6): we 
explicitly link the entry of an investor into improvements taking place the following year.  
4.4.3 Control variables 
To control for potential time-variant and time-invariant firm-specific factors as well as industry 
and legislation-related factors, we apply a number of control variables. We extract our control 
variable data through FactSet. All control variables are lagged one year, except where specified 
otherwise. We discuss the choice of each control variable individually below. We also indicate in 
brackets with which corporate improvements each control variable has been applied60 and 
motivate the expected associations. In addition to specified controls below, we apply year-
dummies in all regressions. Table 14 summarises the applied control variables and exhibits 
expected associations to all seven outcome variables. 
Firm size [C, O, P] – We use the natural logarithm of sales to control for firm size. Since our 
sample includes a substantial number of financial firms, presence of which is elemental to the 
                                                 
59  Including all underlying individual corporate governance variables that make up our overall governance and 
 board indices. 
60   C indicates corporate governance improvements, O indicates organisational improvements and P indicates payout 
  improvements. 
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study, we do not use total assets as a measure for size but instead rely on the sales-based figure. 
For all dependent governance variables, in line with Aggarwal et al. (2010), we hypothesise that 
firm size is positively related to governance improvements: larger companies are subject to 
greater public scrutiny and investor attention and may therefore feel more pressure to improve 
governance. Similarly, for all organisational dependent variables, we hypothesise that firm size is 
positively related to unrelated divestments since diverse firms are likely to be larger (Berger and 
Ofek 1995; Chen and Ho 2000). For initiation of dividends, we hypothesise that firm size has a 
negative coefficient. Our expectation is in line with Michaely et al. (1995) who find that dividend 
initiating firms are smaller than average, and with the corporate life-cycle approach implying that 
mature firms are more likely to have already initiated dividend payments due to their limited set 
of profitable investment opportunities (Fama and French 2001; Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan 2002; DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 2006). Similarly, we hypothesise that firm 
size is positively related to changes in dividend yield.  
Tobin’s q [C, O, P] – Following Jensen (1986), who claims that mature companies are most 
prone to agency costs arising from free cash flow, we control for Tobin’s q as measured by the 
sum of market capitalisation and total debt divided by total assets at quarter end, an approach that 
is consistent with Denis and Osobov (2008). Along Jensen (1986), we anticipate that since 
nascent companies have weaker cash flow and larger set of positive net present value investment 
opportunities, mature firms with a lower Tobin’s q are more prone to agency problems. 
Consequently, we hypothesise that Tobin’s q is negatively related to all our outcome variables, 
with the exception of initiation of dividends, where we assign the control a positive expected sign 
because we expect that nascent firms are more likely to have not yet initiated dividend payments 
(Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 2002). 
Relative return [C, O, P] - Our expert interviews suggest that corporate improvements become 
easier to implement when a company’s financial performance deteriorates. Also Gillan and Starks 
(2000) point out for corporate governance that stakeholders pay more attention to governance 
practices in times of distress and may mount pressure on the board and management to improve 
them. Moreover, in meagre times, board members and managers may want to voluntarily exhibit 
their willingness for improvement (Shipilov, Greve and Rowley 2009). To control for the relative 
financial performance of the target firm, we follow Gillan and Starks (2000) and calculate the 
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relative return as the 5-year buy-and-hold return for each company less the 5-year buy-and-hold 
return on the Standard and Poor’s 1500 Index61 for U.S. firms and on the local Large Cap indices 
for the European countries. We calculate total return similarly, except on a yearly basis and 
relative to each company’s main domestic index outside the U.S. In line with expert interviews 
and related literature, we hypothesise that relative return is negatively related to all our eight 
outcome variables. 
Two-year average sales growth [C, O, P] – In line with Aggarwal et al. (2010) for corporate 
governance, Denis et al. (1997a) for reducing diversification and Denis et al. (2008) for payout, 
we anticipate that past sales growth may have an effect on the occurrence of corporate 
improvements. Along Aggarwal et al. (2010), we measure sales growth with the lagged two-year 
constant average growth rate of sales. We hypothesise that the two-year lagged sales growth is 
negatively related to all our outcome variables. Specifically, we anticipate that companies 
showing strong growth are less likely to experience significant pressure to improve governance, 
organisation or payout. 
Cash [P] – In line with a wide body of activist literature (see e.g. Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; 
Klein and Zur 2009), we anticipate that the level of cash companies hold may affect the 
occurrence of payout changes. In agreement with DeAngelo et al. (2006) we recognise that the 
expected association of previous year cash level with the following year payout is ambiguous. It 
could signal high accumulation of cash well suited for distribution, or accumulation of cash to be 
used for investments. Jensen’s (1986) discussion also indicates that high cash levels may signal 
agency problems in the previous term, perhaps implying that no payout increases take place the 
following term. We measure cash as the sum of cash and short-term investments divided by total 
assets, and due to inconclusive predictions we do not assign the control an expected sign. 
Leverage [O, P] – Jensen (1986) expects firms with higher leverage to exhibit lower agency costs 
of free cash flow due to smaller management discretion over the free cash flow generated by the 
firm. Moreover, we expect previous-year leverage to be positively associated with the unrelated 
divestments outcomes. Our expectation is also in line with Gertner, Powers and Scharfstein 
(2002), who show that parent companies of spun-off entities tend to have a significantly positive 
                                                 
61  Gillan and Starks (2000) use the S&P 500 as their relative return benchmark. 
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industry-adjusted leverage in the year prior to divestment. Regarding payout, we expect leverage 
to have a negative association to the probability of initiating or increasing dividend payout. We 
anticipate that the higher the leverage, the less there is cash to be distributed to residual claim 
holders and, in line with the agency hypothesis, the less there is pressure and need to increase 
pay-out since agency problems are at bay. We measure leverage as total debt divided by total 
assets. 
Legislative environment [C, O, P] – To control for differences in legislative environments 
concerning shareholder rights and their potential effect on the occurrence of corporate 
improvements, we apply a dummy variable for firms’ domestic legal categories. Following La 
Porta et al. (1998), we divide countries into four legislative families: (1) English-origin, (2) 
French-origin, (3) German-origin and (4) Scandinavian-origin. We do not anticipate, a priori, for 
the legislative dummies to take on specific signs and do not present them in Table 14 since the 
variables are not ordinal.  
Industry controls [C, O, P] – Corporate improvements may also relate to industry-specific 
factors. For instance, due to its vital position in the economy, the financial industry may be more 
prone to outside pressure to improve governance. To control for industry influence on corporate 
improvements we follow Shipilov (2009) and apply a one-digit Standard Industry Classification 
(SIC) code to group firms into eight broad industry categories: (1) agriculture, forestry and 
fishing, (2) mining and construction, (3) manufacturing, (4) transportation and public utilities, (5) 
wholesale and retail trade, (6) finance, insurance and real estate, (7) services and (8) public 
administration. We do not anticipate, a priori, for the industry dummies to take on specific signs 
and do not present them in Table 14 since the variables are not ordinal.  
Lagged index level [C] – In studying improvements for our overall corporate governance index, 
we anticipate that the past period index level may affect index improvements (or deteriorations). 
Specifically, we anticipate that the higher the index level, the smaller the probability for further 
improvements, especially since all underlying individual corporate governance variables are 
binary. We thus control for the overall index level in period T-1 when studying changes in overall 
index at T, and expect a negative association. 
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Lagged board index level [C] – As with overall governance index, we anticipate that past board 
index level may affect the occurrence of changes in our board index. We thus control for the 
board index level at T-1 when studying changes in board index at T, and expect a negative 
association. 
Lagged industry-adjusted dividend yield [P] – Following La Porta et al. (2000) we expect that 
the past relative dividend yield level affects changes in dividend yield. If past dividend yield has 
been poor compared to industry peers, the company may feel pressure to increase payout. We 
calculate the past relative dividend yield as the difference between a company’s dividend yield 
and its industry’s average dividend yield and expect the control to take on a negative association 
with dividend yield increases and to the probability to initiate dividends. 
4.4.4 Expected associations 
We summarise our key independent ownership variables and control variables in Table 14, where 
we link each of our seven corporate outcome variables, pertaining to our three hypotheses, to the 
two sets of investor group entries serving as our key independent variables. We also show the 
expected associations between the corporate outcome variables and the control variables.  
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4.5 Statistical methods 
In this section we introduce and describe the methodology applied in our analysis. We attempt to 
relate corporate improvements to the entry of investors that are classified based on their 
investment horizon and portfolio concentration. This is done by means of regression analysis on 
our panel data set. The regressions differ by the nature of the corporate improvements in three 
ways. Namely the measured improvements can be either: (1) continuous, (2) binary or (3) 
ordered. We first introduce the regression models employed to each type of improvements. We 
then discuss the implications of the use of panel data and motivate the choice of regression 
models for each of our explanatory variables. 
4.5.1 Continuous outcomes 
Continuous outcomes are modelled with the simple linear ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model shown in Equation (5). 
ݕ௜ ൌ ݔᇱߚ ൅ ݑ௜,  (5) 
where x are the included regressors, β are the estimated coefficients and ui the error terms. The 
OLS estimator minimizes the sum of squared errors. 
4.5.2 Binary outcomes 
Binary outcomes are present in our data when the dependent variable can obtain values of 1 or 0. 
For example, if an improvement occurs in year t, the dependent variable is given the value of one, 
and a zero otherwise. Consequently, instead of a linear model, we apply a logistic regression 
model.  
Binary outcomes are modelled by using a latent variable y* (Cameron and Trivedi 2009) as 
shown in Equation 6. 
ݕכ ൌ ݔᇱߚ ൅ ݑ  (6) 
The latent variable is not observed, but what we do observe is 
ݕ ൌ 1,   ݂݅ ݕכ ൐ 0,  (7) 
ݕ ൌ 0,  ݂݅ ݕכ ൑ 0,  (8) 
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We then have the probability 
ܲݎሺݕ ൌ 1ሻ  ൌ ܲݎሺݔᇱߚ ൅ ݑ ൐ 0ሻ  (9) 
 ൌ ܲݎሺെݑ ൏ ݔᇱߚሻ  
 ൌ ܨሺݔᇱߚሻ, 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of -u, in logistic models:  
ܨሺݔᇱߚሻ ൌ ௘ೣ
ᇲഁ
ଵା௘ೣᇲഁ ൌ Λሺݔᇱߚሻ.  (10) 
4.5.3 Ordered outcomes 
In addition to continuous and binary variables, we also observe outcomes based on categorical 
data. Specifically, categorical data relates to circumstances where the number of possible 
outcomes is above two but is not enough to allow for treating the data as continuous. Sometimes 
the data is naturally ordered, i.e. it can be ranked in order of superiority. For example, our Board 
governance index comprises six binary variables that obtain the value of 1, if improved, and 0 if 
not. Consequently the index can obtain values from 0/6 to 6/6 indicating better governance as the 
value rises to a higher level. Although the outcome is discrete, a multinomial logit or probit 
model would not account for the ordinal nature of the change and therefore an ordered logit 
model is required (Greene 2000). 
Ordered outcomes are modelled similarly to binary outcomes by using a latent variable y*. The 
outcomes are modelled to arise successively as y* crosses progressively higher outcomes 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009). For company i,  
ݕכ ൌ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ݑ௜,  (11) 
where x are the measurable independent variables and ui are unobservables. The latent variable 
remains unobserved as the observations for a J-alternative model are 
ݕ ൌ 0, ݂݅ ݕכ ൑ 0,  (12) 
ݕ ൌ 1,  ݂݅ 0 ൏ ݕכ ൑ ߤଵ, 
ݕ ൌ 2,  ݂݅ ߤଵ ൏ ݕכ ൑ ߤଶ, 
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ڭ  
ݕ ൌ ܬ,   ݂݅ ߤ௃ିଵ ൏ ݕכ ൑ ߤ௃, 
As described by Cameron (2009) we then have probabilities 
Prሺݕ௜ ൌ ܬሻ  ൌ Pr ൫ߙ௃ିଵ ൏ ݕ௜כ ൑ ߙ௃൯, (13) 
 ൌ Pr ൫ߙ௃ିଵ ൏ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ൅ ݑ௜ ൑ ߙ௃൯, 
 ൌ Pr ൫ߙ௃ିଵ െ ݔ௜ᇱߚ ൏ ݑ௜ ൑ ߙ௃െݔ௜ᇱߚ൯, 
 ൌ F൫ߙ௃ െ ݔ௜ᇱߚ൯ െ F ൫ߙ௃ିଵ െ ݔ௜ᇱߚ൯, 
where F is the cumulative distribution function of ui. For the ordered logit model, u is logistically 
distributed with ܨሺݖሻ ൌ ݁௭/ሺ1 ൅ ݁௭ሻ. The regression parameters, β, and the J-1 threshold 
parameters, α1, ... , αJ-1, are obtained by maximising the log likelihood with ݌௜௝ ൌ Pr ሺݕ௜ ൌ ܬሻ as 
defined above. The interpretation of the regression parameters is straightforward. If βj is positive, 
an increase in xij decreases the probability of falling into the lowest category and increases the 
probability of being in the highest category. 
4.5.4 Use of panel data and panel regressions 
Longitudinal, or panel, data typically refer to data sets that follow a given sample of individuals 
or, in this case, companies over time. Panel data includes at least two dimensions including a 
cross-sectional dimension and a time series dimension. Consequently, the data includes multiple 
observations for the same individual across time. Due to a more costly and time consuming data 
collection process and a requirement for abundant data availability, researchers have traditionally 
favoured cross-sectional or time series data, although the use of panel data has increased 
significantly during the past 10 years (Hsiao 2003). As described by Hsiao (2003), the use of 
panel data entails several major advantages which stem from the larger amount of data and the 
possibility to assess inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics. Panel data has 
been used in similar contexts by, among others, David, Kochar and Levitas (1998) who study the 
effect of institutional investors on CEO compensation, Short, Zhang and Keasey (2002) who 
study of the association between ownership structures and dividend policies as well as Shipilov, 
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Greve and Rowley (2009), who study board interlocks and the diffusion of corporate governance 
practices. 
The use of panel data raises a number of considerations as recited by Cameron and Trivedi 
(2009).  
1. Time interval. Panel data is usually observed at regular time intervals. Accordingly, we 
construct our data set on a yearly basis.  
2. Balanced vs. unbalanced panel data. Our panel data is unbalanced as not all individuals 
are observed in all time periods for all variables. Statistical programs are capable of 
analyzing unbalanced panel data, but the inconsistency raises a possibility for a sample-
selection bias. We note, however, that we manually balance the data for our two 
governance indices in order to calculate index changes consistently. 
3. Short and long panels. Our data set is a short panel; we document observations for a large 
number of companies over a small number of years. The short span of the panel has 
implications especially relating to binary outcomes, which are discussed further in Section 
4.5.5.  
4. Correlation of model errors. With panel data, model errors are likely to be correlated. 
Emphasis is normally on the correlation over time for a given individual, with 
independence over individuals, although e.g. in country panels there may be correlation 
across individuals. We correct ordinary least-squares with cluster-robust estimates of the 
standard errors. 
The most fundamental consideration in the use of panel data, however, arises from the 
heterogeneity across units (Greene 2000). Usually the heterogeneity is assumed to be independent 
over individuals, and there are several different regression models for panel data, all treating 
heterogeneity in different ways. Next, we briefly introduce the models most relevant to our study: 
the fixed effects, random effects and population averaged models. First, we introduce a general 
individual-specific-effects model for the dependent variable yit as shown in Equation (14): 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ݔ௜௧ᇱ ߚ ൅ ߝ௜௧,  (14) 
where xit are the regressors, and the error term uit is decomposed into individual-specific effects 
αi, and idiosyncratic error εit.  
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Fixed effects. In the fixed effects model, the time-invariant individual-specific effect αi is 
unobserved, but it is permitted to correlate with xit. The approach thus considers αi an individual-
specific constant term in the regression model while continuing to assume that xit is uncorrelated 
with the idiosyncratic error εit. Micro econometrics usually emphasises the fixed-effects model 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2009). The drawback with the fixed effects model is that, by nature, it 
cannot produce estimates of coefficients for individual time-invariant regressors. 
Random effects. With the random effects model, it is assumed that the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity αi is purely random, i.e. uncorrelated with the included variables. The advantage is 
that the random effects model produces estimates for all coefficients, but if the regressors are not 
completely exogenous, estimates are inconsistent. 
Population averaged. The population averaged, or pooled model assumes that the regressors are 
exogenous and that the individual-specific effects αi are constant. In this case, there is no 
unobserved effect at all. 
Our analysis is executed with the statistical software program Stata. Panel regression models are 
readily available in Stata for continuous and binary outcomes. The user may, in both cases, 
choose between fixed, random and population averaged models. Panel regression models, 
however, are not available for ordered outcomes. 
4.5.5 Choice of regression model 
In this section, we discuss the choice of regression models for all of our dependent variables. 
Finally, we summarise our choices in Table 15. 
The choice between linear, binary and ordered models stems from the nature of the dependent 
variable and will be considered individually for each of them. The choice of fixed, random and 
population averaged models is not as clear cut. When comparing fixed and random effects, in 
principle the random effects model is more attractive since time-invariant variables are retained 
in the model (Dougherty 2007). If, however, one of the preconditions for using random effects is 
violated, fixed effects should be used. The first precondition for random effects is that the 
observations can be described as being drawn randomly from a given population. In our case, we 
do not expect major violations of this prediction, since our sample includes the vast majority of 
the population, which comprises the constituents of the S&P 1500 and the STOXX Europe TMI 
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indices. We cannot exclude, however, the presence of violations of random sampling, given the 
systematic omission of the ceased to exist firms from our sample (see discussion in Sections 1.3 
and 0. The second precondition is that the unobserved effect is distributed independently of the xi 
variables. This can be tested with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the null hypothesis that αi are 
distributed independently of the xi. We run the test when applicable.  
In theory, the fixed effects specification should be more appropriate for our setting. Problems 
arise, however, with binary outcome data, where the fixed effects model drops out all 
observations with no variance in the dependent variable. In a similar setting, Shipilov et al. 
(2009) argue that dropping out all observations from companies where no improvements are 
documented makes it difficult to rule out a selectivity bias if the fixed effects estimator were 
applied. They end up using the population averaged estimator. 
Furthermore, with a low fixed number of time periods, in our case six years, and a high number 
of observed individuals, the fixed effects estimator of the logistic model is biased due to the 
incidental parameter problem (Lancaster 2000). As described by Greene (2004), in face of this 
problem there are three alternatives that each have a biased and an inconsistent estimator: (1) Use 
the fixed effects estimator in spite of the incidental parameters issue, (2) run the random effects 
model estimator even though it is in theory inappropriate, or (3) ignore the heterogeneity among 
individuals and use the population averaged model. Greene (2000) performs simulations with the 
three alternatives with the number of time periods (T) of 3 and 8. He concludes that the random 
effects estimator is clearly the worst of the three. For T = 8, the choice between the fixed effects 
and the population averaged estimator is unclear. For T = 3, the population averaged estimator is 
superior. Consequently we run both fixed effects and population averaged models, where 
applicable. 
4.5.5.1 Corporate governance improvements 
The corporate governance variables consist of two types of data: changes and simple changes in 
Overall and Board indices. The Overall index includes 14 variables, and therefore 14 possible 
categories, while the Board index includes 6 variables. Therefore, the change in these indices can 
obtain values between [-1, 1] with 1/14 and 1/6 intervals correspondingly. The choice between 
models for linear and ordered models is not self-evident. Ordered categorical data is often treated 
as continuous, and studies have shown that with at least five categories, the bias from treating the 
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data as continuous is small (Babakus, Ferguson and Jöreskog 1987). A similar study by Aggarwal 
et al. (2010) runs regressions on the change in a governance index with linear regressions, but the 
used governance index includes 41 underlying variables. Consequently, we choose to apply the 
linear panel regression as the primary model. We run the fixed effects and random effects model. 
We further test for the independence of αi from xi with the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. We reject 
the null hypothesis and thus use the fixed effects model. Due to the uncertainty relating to the 
nature of the dependent variable, we also document the ordered logistic regression for changes in 
both governance indices. 
Simple changes in governance indices indicate an improvement, no change or deterioration in the 
Overall index or Board index regardless of the magnitude of change. It is therefore, by nature, an 
ordered variable with values in order of superiority: -1, 0, 1. Consequently, we run the ordered 
logistic regression for simple changes in both governance indices. 
4.5.5.2 Organisational improvements 
Organisational improvements consist of three dependent variables: Occurrence of unrelated 
divestments, Initiation of unrelated divestments and Change in magnitude of unrelated 
divestments. Occurrence and Initiation of unrelated divestments are binary. In line with the 
discussion above, we apply logistic panel regression models with both the population averaged 
and the fixed effects estimators. Following with Greene (2000) and Aggarwal (2010), we regard 
the population averaged model as the primary model. Change in magnitude of unrelated 
divestments is a continuous variable, for which we run the linear panel regression model with 
fixed effects. 
4.5.5.3 Payout improvements 
Our two payout improvement variables also include a binary outcome, Initiation of cash 
dividends and a continuous outcome, Change in dividend yield. Correspondingly, and in line with 
above discussion, we apply the logistic panel regression model with the population averaged 
estimator as the primary model and with the fixed effects estimator as a secondary model for the 
Initiation of cash dividends. For Change in dividend yield, we apply the linear panel regression 
model with fixed effects.  
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Table 15 – Choice of regression models 
The table shows the choice of regression models for each of the dependent variables. To indicate the chosen model 
specifications in a condensed manner we show the corresponding STATA abbreviations. The models are as follows: 
xtreg is a linear panel regression model; xtlogit is a logistic panel regression model; ologit is an ordered logistic 
regression model. Estimator specifications are as follows: fe stands for the fixed effects estimator; pa stands for the 
population averaged, or pooled, estimator. 
 
5 Results 
This section presents our results for the effect of entries by our investor groups on corporate 
improvements observed in their target companies. We begin by measuring and discussing 
potential multicollinearity issues in our regressions. We then present results for our two corporate 
governance outcomes. Next, we present results for our three organisational improvement 
outcomes as depicted by unrelated divestments. Finally, we cover the results for our two payout 
increase outcomes, as measured by cash dividends.  
5.1 Multicollinearity analysis 
To detect potential multicollinearity among the independent variables we calculate the correlation 
matrix and the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics62. The correlation matrix for the 
independent variables is presented in Table 17. We do not observe variables with high 
correlations (absolute values of over 0.50) except for the lagged overall governance index and the 
lagged board governance index. While high correlation between the governance index controls 
was expected since board index is included in the overall governance index, we do not anticipate 
problems since the two governance controls are not applied in same regressions.  
                                                 
62  The correlation matrix and VIF statistics are only used for multicollinearity analysis and should not be used to 
 draw further conclusions as they ignore the intra-group correlations present in panel data 
 
Change in 
overall index
Change in 
board index
Simple change 
in indices
Occurrence of 
unrelated 
divestments
Initiation of 
unrelated 
divestments
Magnitude of 
unrelated 
divestments
Initiation of 
cash dividend
Change in 
dividend yield
Variable type
Ordered/
Continuous
Ordered/
Continuous
Ordered Binary Binary Continuous Binary Continuous
Primary model xtreg, fe xtreg, fe xtlogit, pa xtlogit, pa xtlogit, pa xtreg, fe xtlogit, pa xtreg, fe
Secondary model ologit ologit xtlogit, fe xtlogit, fe xtlogit, fe - xtlogit, fe -
Corporate governance Organisational Dividend payout
97 
 
We further check for multicollinearity by calculating the VIF statistic. The VIF, for a given 
variable, shows the increase in the variance of its coefficient that can be attributable to the 
variable not being orthogonal to other variables in the model (Greene 2000). Table 16 shows the 
number of variables with VIF over 5 as well as the maximum and the mean VIF for all the 
outcomes in our regression models. The highest VIF among our explanatory variables is 6.64, 
and thus falls below the common threshold of 10 for high multicollinearity (Baum 2006). 
Additionally, only three variables obtain VIF-values of over 5: the industry-dummies for 
Manufacturing and Financial institutions as well as the legislative region dummy for English-
speaking regions. These analyses imply that multicollinearity should not pose a significant 
problem in our regression analysis. 
Table 16 – Variance inflation factor statistics 
The table shows the number of variables with Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) statistics over 5, the Variable 
with maximum VIF value, the Maximum VIF and the Mean VIF for all regressions applied. Panel A shows for 
regressions with investor groups from the Factoring division, Panel B for Simple division. Different regression 
specifications are not shown independently as differences in VIF-values differ only fractionally. 
 
PANEL A - FACTORING DIVISION
Dependent variable
Number of 
variables with 
VIF > 5
Variable(s) with VIF > 5
Maximum 
VIF
Mean
VIF
Change in overall index 1 Industry-dummy for manufacturing 6.35 2.27
Change in board index 1 Industry-dummy for manufacturing 6.34 2.27
Organisational Changes in unrelated divestments 1 Industry-dummy for manufacturing 6.36 2.53
Dividend 
payout
Changes in dividends 2
Industry-dummy for financial institutions, 
Industry-dummy for manufacturing
6.64 2.55
PANEL B - SIMPLE DIVISION
Dependent variable
Number of 
variables with 
VIF > 5
Variable(s) with VIF > 5
Maximum 
VIF
Mean
VIF
Change in overall index 1 Industry-dummy for manufacturing 6.35 2.22
Change in board index 1 Industry-dummy for manufacturing 6.34 2.22
Organisational Changes in unrelated divestments 2
Industry-dummy for manufacturing,
English-speaking legislative region
6.36 2.49
Dividend 
payout
Changes in dividends 2
Industry-dummy for financial institutions, 
Industry-dummy for manufacturing
6.61 2.50
Corporate 
governance
Corporate 
governance
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5.2 Corporate governance outcomes 
In this section, we present our results for the analysis of investor effects on corporate governance. 
We first discuss results for our overall governance index regressions, examining which investor 
groups are associated with changes in our wide governance index comprising 14 agency sensitive 
governance variables. We then present results for the board index comprising six board specific 
governance variables. Next, we show results for our overall and board indices in a binary 
formulation, where we only account for index improvements and deteriorations, leaving out the 
magnitude of change.  
5.2.1 Overall governance index 
We analyse the effects of our investor groups on changes in the overall governance index using 
both fixed effects (models 1 and 3) and ordered logistic (models 2 and 4) specifications. We 
apply both specifications for factoring-based groups, which we consider our primary approach 
and for simple division groups. We exhibit results for both specifications and both investor 
divisions in Table 18. 
Overall, our findings for investor effects on overall governance changes imply that investors with 
high portfolio concentration and long investment horizon are associated with governance 
improvements in their target firms, but investors with highest concentration and longest horizon 
are not. As expected, entries of investors with low concentration or short horizon are not 
consistently associated with governance improvements. 
5.2.1.1 Factoring based investor groups 
In all, the results for our factoring based, primary investor grouping are partly supportive of 
Hypothesis 1. For the fixed effects specification, coefficients for entries of all four investor 
groups are insignificant at the 10% level. Importantly, and inconsistent with our Hypothesis 1, 
the results imply that entries by Devoted or Focused investors do not have a significant 
association with changes in target firm overall governance. The lack of association between 
entries by Traders and Diversified investors overall governance changes is in line with our 
expectations. 
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For the ordered logistic specification, however, we find that entries by Focused investors are 
positively associated with target governance improvements in the following year, significant at 
Table 18 – Regression results for changes in overall corporate governance index 
The table presents results for the fixed effects panel regression and ordered logistic panel regression models for 
Changes in overall corporate governance index. The main explanatory variables include the investor group 
variables for the division by factoring (Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles 
(TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control 
variables are as follows: Lagged index level is the one-year lagged corporate governance index level; Size is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the 
book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-hold 
return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual growth 
rate over a lagging two year period. 
 
Investor entry Expected
effect Fixed effects Ordered logit Fixed effects Ordered logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Devoted + -0.005 -0.014
(-1.00) (-0.09)
Focused + 0.002 0.179**
(0.98) (2.17)
Diversified ? -0.003 -0.131
(-0.42) (-0.74)
Traders ? 0.002 -0.002
(1.18) (-0.03)
TopHHI-TopCR + 0.003 0.125
(0.39) (0.43)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.009*** 0.273**
(2.66) (2.25)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.004 0.120
(1.29) (1.08)
HighHHI-LowICR ? 0.001 0.166**
(0.38) (2.19)
LowHHI-LowICR ? -0.004 -0.183*
(-1.33) (-1.70)
Lagged index level - -0.720*** -4.362*** -0.720*** -4.368***
(-38.85) (-19.99) (-38.84) (-19.88)
Size + 0.008 0.056*** 0.007 0.052***
(1.12) (3.01) (1.06) (2.89)
Tobin's q - 0.000 -0.040 0.000 -0.038
(0.18) (-1.33) (0.22) (-1.28)
Relative return - -0.000 -0.107 -0.000 -0.096
(-0.14) (-1.06) (-0.04) (-0.95)
Two-year average sales growth - 0.003 0.255 0.003 0.268
(0.29) (1.17) (0.32) (1.24)
Industry fixed effects - Yes - Yes
Legislative region fixed effects - Yes - Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,848 4,848 4,848 4,848
Number of companies 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
R-squared 0.368 - 0.369 -
Pseudo R-squared - 0.0317 - 0.0325
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Factoring division Simple division
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the 5% level. Further confirming our expectations, we find that Diversified and Traders are not 
significantly associated with governance improvements. Interestingly, our results persistently 
imply no effect for Devoted investors. Firm size is associated with governance improvements at 
the 1% level, which is consistent with our expectations and findings by Aggarwal et al. (2010). 
5.2.1.2 Simple division investor groups 
Results for our secondary approach, the simple division investor groups, are largely in line with 
results for factoring-based investor groups and similarly offer partial support for Hypothesis 1. 
Overall, the results imply that entries by focused long-term investors are associated with overall 
governance improvements in their targets. 
For the fixed effects specification, the results show that HighHHI-HighICR investors are 
associated with ensuing governance improvements at the 1% level, which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Interestingly, however, we find that entries by TopHHI-TopICR investors are not 
associated with overall governance improvements, which is inconsistent with Hypothesis 1 but 
consistent with our findings for Devoted investors. In line with our expectations, investors with 
low portfolio concentration or short investment horizon (namely, LowHHI-HighICR, HighICR-
LowHHI and LowHHI-LowICR investors) are not associated with overall governance changes. 
For the ordered logistic specification, our results show that entries by HighHHI-HighICR 
investors are positively associated with ensuing overall governance improvements. Significant at 
the 5% level, the result supports Hypothesis 1 and is consistent with the preceding results. Also, 
consistent with preceding results, TopHHI-TopICR investors do not exhibit significant 
association with target firm governance changes. Surprisingly, we also find that HighHHI-
LowICR investors are positively associated with governance improvements following their entry. 
On the contrary, LowHHI-LowICR investors are weakly negatively associated with governance 
improvements. While the result lacks intuitive interpretation, it is not inconsistent with 
Hypothesis 1. Further in line with our expectations, we find that lagged firm size is associated 
with governance improvements at the 1 % level. 
5.2.2 Board index 
As with the overall governance index, we apply both fixed effects (models 1 and 3) and ordered 
logistic (models 2 and 4) specifications to study the effect of entries by our investor groups on 
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board improvements. Similarly, we first discuss results for our primary, factoring-based investor 
grouping and then show results for the simple division investor groups. Results are exhibited in 
Table 19.  
Overall, we find similar results with those for changes in overall governance. While our results 
provide partial support for Hypothesis 1 and imply that high concentration and long horizon 
investors are associated with board improvements, our finding of no association for very high 
concentration and very long horizon investors persists. With the exception of mixed results from 
the ordered logistic specification for simple division investor groups, we find support for our 
expectation that entries by low concentration or short horizon investors are not associated year 
board improvements in the following year. 
Regarding the model specifications in estimating investor effects on changes in board index, we 
anticipate that the linear fixed effects specification does not work optimally due to the semi-
continuous nature of changes in the board index. Specifically, since six is the largest value the 
board index takes, the annual positive or negative changes in board index are clustered to one, 
two or three levels. As the linear specification is generally considered to require a dependent 
variable to take no less than five different values (Babakus, Ferguson and Jöreskog 1987), we 
anticipate that the ordered logistical specification is better suited to measure investor effects on 
changes in the board index. Although considering ordered logistic model to be the primary 
specification, we present results also for the fixed effects specification. 
5.2.2.1 Factoring based investor groups 
For the fixed effects specification, our results do not imply significant association with changes 
in board arrangements for any of the four investor groups, which is in line with results for overall 
governance changes. Importantly and contrary to Hypothesis 1, Focused and Devoted investors 
are not associated with board improvements, significant at the 10% level. Supporting our 
expectations, investors with low portfolio concentration or short investment horizon, namely 
Diversified investors and Traders, are not associated with board improvements. Further, firm size 
is weakly positively associated with board improvements as expected. 
For the ordered logistic specification, our results are also fully in line with those for the overall 
governance changes. Specifically, we find that entries by Focused investors are associated with 
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board improvements in the following year, significant at the 5% level. Diversified investors and 
Traders show no association with changes in board arrangements following their entry. Perhaps 
most interestingly, our finding that Devoted investors do not exhibit any association with 
governance improvements persists. As expected, relative stock returns are negatively associated 
with board improvements, implying that poorly performing firms are more likely to undergo 
board improvements in the following year. 
5.2.2.2 Simple division investor groups 
For the fixed effects specification, we find that none of the five investor group is positively 
associated with following year board improvements at the 10% level. We note, however, that 
LowHHI-LowICR investors seem to be negatively associated with board improvements at the 5% 
level. While we struggle to find an intuitive reason for the result, it is not contrary to Hypothesis 
1. We also find in line with our expectations that firm size is weakly positively associated with 
board improvements. 
Results from the ordered logistical model are mixed, and do not provide support for Hypothesis 
1. We find that entries by HighHHI-HighICR investors are not associated with board 
improvements in target firms at the 10% level, despite exhibiting a clearly positive coefficient. 
Results are, however, consistent with all prior findings on TopHHI-TopICR investors exhibiting 
no association with board improvements. We also find that LowHHI-HighICR investors, mostly 
diversified institutions, are significantly positively associated with board improvements in the 
year following their entry. This provides our first and only evidence in support of the argument 
that institutional investors would improve target governance. Surprisingly, the ordered logistical 
model also implies that HighHHI-LowICR investors are associated with board improvements, 
significant at the 1% level. While the result is surprising, high portfolio concentration may in 
some cases be sufficient to drive governance improvements in target firms, as cautiously implied 
by Brav et al. (2008) for activist hedge funds. We caution drawing inferences from these results, 
given that they are provided by our secondary, less accurate investor grouping and they are not 
present in the results for any other governance-related model. Finally and in line with our 
expectations, we note that relative stock returns are negatively related to board improvements in 
the following year. 
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Table 19 – Regression results for changes in board index 
The table presents the results for the fixed effects panel regression and ordered logistic panel regression models for 
Changes in board governance index. The main explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the 
division by factoring (Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, 
HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as 
follows: Lagged board index level is the one-year lagged board governance index level; Size is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book 
value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-hold return 
for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual growth rate over 
a lagging two year period. 
 
Investor entry Expected
effect Fixed effects Ordered logit Fixed effects Ordered logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Devoted + -0.008 -0.081
(-1.01) (-0.41)
Focused + 0.006 0.229**
(1.53) (2.36)
Diversified ? -0.006 -0.198
(-0.65) (-0.94)
Traders ? -0.001 0.028
(-0.37) (0.39)
TopHHI-TopCR + -0.012 -0.387
(-0.75) (-0.97)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.010 0.249
(1.64) (1.63)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.009 0.291**
(1.61) (2.23)
HighHHI-LowICR ? 0.004 0.260***
(1.11) (2.83)
LowHHI-LowICR ? -0.013** -0.288**
(-2.32) (-2.29)
Lagged board index level - -0.789*** -6.210*** -0.788*** -6.204***
(-40.15) (-22.42) (-40.10) (-22.52)
Size + 0.019* 0.034 0.019* 0.026
(1.68) (1.46) (1.66) (1.12)
Tobin's q - -0.001 -0.023 -0.001 -0.021
(-0.31) (-0.58) (-0.22) (-0.53)
Relative return - 0.000 -0.264** 0.000 -0.248**
(0.04) (-2.20) (0.09) (-2.05)
Two-year average sales growth - -0.020 -0.100 -0.019 -0.069
(-1.13) (-0.36) (-1.07) (-0.25)
Industry fixed effects - Yes - Yes
Legislative region fixed effects - Yes - Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,848 4,848 4,848 4,848
Number of companies 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
R-squared 0.429 0.430
Pseudo R-squared 0.0887 0.0905
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Factoring division Simple division
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5.2.3 Simple changes in the governance indices 
With three possible outcomes and a clear order of superiority, Simple changes in governance 
indices is analysed with an ordered logistic model. We apply the model to both factoring-based 
groups and simple division groups. We first document the results for Overall index simple 
change and then for Board index simple change. The results are exhibited in Table 20.  
Overall, the results for the simple changes are in line with the corresponding results for the 
changes in governance indices. 
5.2.3.1 Overall index simple change 
The results for both the factoring-based and simple division groups are similar to the ordered 
logistics specification for Change in overall governance index, and partly support Hypothesis 1.  
For the factoring-based division, we find a positive, yet weak, relationship between the Focused 
investors and Simple overall index change. For simple division groups, we find that HighHHI–
HighICR and HighHHI-LowICR investors are positively associated with Simple overall index 
change at a 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. Again, we find no results for the 
investors with highest portfolio concentration and longest investment horizon. 
5.2.3.2 Board index simple changes 
Results for the regression on Simple board index changes are mixed. For the factoring-based 
division, we find support for the findings from previous analyses that the entry of Focused 
investors is positively associated with board index changes in the following year and other 
investor groups are not. However, results from our secondary investor division method, the 
simple division, are harder to interpret. The same discrepancy was found and discussed in the 
results for Change in board index. 
106 
 
Table 20 – Regression results for simple changes in the governance indices 
The table presents results for the ordered logistic panel regression models for Simple changes in overall and board 
governance indices. The main explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the division by 
factoring (Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-
HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as follows: Size is 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to 
the book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-
hold return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual 
growth rate over a lagging two year period. 
 
Investor entry Expected
effect Factoring Simple Factoring Simple
Ordered logit Ordered logit Ordered logit Ordered logit
(5) (6) (5) (6)
Devoted + 0.023 -0.039
(0.15) (-0.21)
Focused + 0.143* 0.207**
(1.76) (2.16)
Diversified ? -0.094 -0.188
(-0.53) (-0.90)
Traders ? -0.001 0.016
(-0.02) (0.23)
TopHHI-TopCR + 0.117 -0.373
(0.42) (-1.02)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.265** 0.237
(2.21) (1.58)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.122 0.283**
(1.10) (2.18)
HighHHI-LowICR ? 0.142* 0.258***
(1.87) (2.87)
LowHHI-LowICR ? -0.176 -0.303**
(-1.62) (-2.38)
Lagged index level - -3.856*** -3.863*** -5.638*** -5.638***
(-19.28) (-19.18) (-22.28) (-22.31)
Size + 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.031 0.023
(3.10) (2.94) (1.37) (1.04)
Tobin's q - -0.039 -0.038 -0.027 -0.025
(-1.34) (-1.29) (-0.70) (-0.65)
Relative return - -0.076 -0.064 -0.205* -0.190
(-0.74) (-0.62) (-1.71) (-1.57)
Two-year average sales growth - 0.234 0.246 -0.121 -0.088
(1.10) (1.17) (-0.45) (-0.33)
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legislative region fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,848 4,848 4,848 4,848
Number of companies 1,001 1,001 1,001 1,001
Pseudo R-squared 0.0363 0.0373 0.0923 0.0946
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Board index simple changeOverall index simple change
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5.3 Organisational structure 
This section presents our results for investor effects on organisational improvements, as 
measured through unrelated divestments. Again, we consider the factoring based investor 
division our primary approach, but also present results for the simple division groups. We discuss 
results for our three dependent variables: (1) Occurrence of unrelated divestments, (2) initiation 
of unrelated divestments and (3) magnitude of unrelated divestments as measured by the annual 
sum of transaction values per EV. Occurrence and initiation are measured as binary outcome 
variables, whereas the magnitude of unrelated divestments is measured as a continuous variable 
receiving values between 0 and 0.5.  
5.3.1 Occurrence of unrelated divestments 
In studying the effect of investor entries on the occurrence of unrelated divestments, a binary 
outcome variable, we apply population averaged as well as fixed effects specifications. We note 
that while the fixed effects specification rightly accounts for firm-specific time-invariant effects, 
its use in this case is disputed, given that it reduces our N from 9,471 to 2,083 by disqualifying all 
firms experiencing either no unrelated divestments or unrelated divestments on every measured 
year. Additionally, with T<8 and a high N, the fixed effects estimator is biased due to the 
incidental parameter problem, as discussed in Section 4.5.4. We thus consider the population 
averaged specification model primary and discuss results separately for our factoring groups and 
simple division groups. The results are exhibited in Table 21. 
Overall, our results provide support for Hypothesis 2, which suggests that entries by investors 
with high portfolio concentration and long investment horizon are positively related to 
occurrence of unrelated divestments. Furthermore, we utilise our two separate investor groupings 
and find that the investors with strongest relation to ensuing unrelated divestments reside in the 
cross-section of Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR investors. 
5.3.1.1 Factoring based investor groups 
The results for the population averaged specification are straight forward. In line with Hypothesis 
2, entries by Devoted investors are positively associated with the occurrence of unrelated 
divestments in the following year, significant at the 5% level. While the coefficient for Focused 
investors is clearly positive, it is not significant at the 10% level. Supporting our expectations, 
coefficients for both Diversified investors and Traders are insignificant at the 10% level.  
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For the fixed effects specifications, our results are consistent with the preceding findings for the 
population averaged model. Devoted investors show a positive association significant at the 5% 
level, while the remaining three groups show no significant associations with the occurrence of 
unrelated divestments following their entry. Importantly, the results show a positive, yet 
insignificant, coefficient for Focused investors, and thus provide only partial support for 
Hypothesis 2. 
Further, consistent with our expectations, we find that firm size and leverage are positively, while 
Tobin’s q and relative return are negatively related to the occurrence of unrelated divestments in 
the following year. This implies that in general, large mature firms with high levels of debt and 
poor past stock price performance are most likely to undertake unrelated divestments. 
5.3.1.2 Simple division investor groups 
For the population averaged specification, the results show that HighHHI-HighICR investors are 
positively associated with the occurrence of unrelated divestments in the year following their 
entry, significant at the 1% level. While the finding is in line with Hypothesis 2, it seems initially 
contradictory to our finding for the Devoted investors. A closer scrutiny reveals, however, that 
the investors who are positively associated with the occurrence of unrelated divestments 
following their entry seem to be clustered in the cross-section of Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR 
groups. Specifically, we refer to Table 10, which displays the overlaps between investor groups, 
and indicates that the two groups share 211 investors, constituting 27% of investors in both 
groups. Our conclusion that the investors with strong positive association to occurrence of 
unrelated divestments cluster in the cross-section of Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR groups is 
supported by the clearly positive, yet insignificant, coefficients for Focused and TopHHI-TopICR 
investors. 
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Table 21 – Regression results for the occurrence of unrelated divestments 
The table presents results for the population averaged and fixed effects logistic panel regression models for the 
Occurrence of unrelated divestments. The main explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the 
division by factoring (Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, 
HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as 
follows: Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of 
total capital to the book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the 
yearly buy-and-hold return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the 
compound annual growth rate over a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
 
Investor entry Expected
effect Population 
averaged
Fixed effects
Population 
averaged
Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Devoted + 0.375** 0.534**
(1.96) (2.08)
Focused + 0.172 0.055
(1.42) (0.38)
Diversified ? 0.085 -0.294
(0.52) (-1.29)
Traders ? 0.019 0.213
(0.16) (1.38)
TopHHI-TopCR + 0.243 0.290
(0.82) (0.76)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.444*** 0.397**
(2.96) (2.13)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.135 -0.165
(0.95) (-0.93)
HighHHI-LowICR ? 0.027 -0.093
(0.21) (-0.58)
LowHHI-LowICR ? -0.087 -0.188
(-0.73) (-1.26)
Size + 0.427*** 0.483 0.422*** 0.461
(10.65) (1.60) (10.69) (1.53)
Tobin's q - -0.219*** -0.143 -0.222*** -0.154
(-2.85) (-0.96) (-2.89) (-1.04)
Relative return - -0.475*** -0.417** -0.466*** -0.401**
(-2.71) (-2.19) (-2.66) (-2.10)
Two-year average sales growth - -0.145 0.400 -0.143 0.422
(-0.36) (0.82) (-0.35) (0.87)
Leverage + 1.012*** 1.843** 1.020*** 1.995**
(2.89) (2.20) (2.89) (2.38)
Industry fixed effects Yes - Yes -
Legislative region fixed effects Yes - Yes -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,471 2,083 9,471 2,083
Number of companies 1,656 357 1,656 357
Wald Chi2 195.9 - 201.6 -
df 24 - 25 -
Pseudo R-squared - 0.0359 - 0.0360
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Factoring division Simple division
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Findings from the fixed effects specification reinforce our interpretation that investors residing in 
both Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR are strongly associated with unrelated divestments 
following their entry. Fully consistent with the population averaged specification, entries by 
HighHHI-HighICR investors are significantly positively associated with the occurrence of 
unrelated divestments, while those of TopHHI-TopICR and low portfolio concentration or short 
investment horizon investors are not. As with the factoring division groups, firm size and 
leverage are positively and Tobin’s q and relative stock return are negatively associated with 
unrelated divestments in the following year. 
5.3.2 Initiation of unrelated divestments 
As with the occurrence, the initiation of unrelated divestments is also a binary outcome variable 
for which we apply population averaged and fixed effects specifications. We note, again, that 
while the fixed effects model reduces our N from 9,471 to 2,026 by excluding all firms showing 
no variation in the dependent variable, we consider the population averaged model the primary 
one. We show results separately for our factoring groups and simple division groups and present 
the results in Table 22.  
Overall, the results for investor effects on the initiation of unrelated divestments are strongly in 
line with the results for the occurrence of unrelated divestments, although providing slightly 
weaker evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. The results seem to be driven by a definitive group 
of investors residing in the cross-section of Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR investors. Further, in 
line with our results for governance improvements, entries by investors with very high 
concentration and very long horizon may not be associated with initiation of unrelated 
divestments. 
5.3.2.1 Factoring based investor groups 
For the population averaged specification, our results are consistent with results for the 
occurrence of unrelated divestments. Devoted investors are positively associated with the 
initiation of unrelated divestments the year following their entry, significant at the 10% level. The 
coefficient for Focused investors is again positive, yet insignificant at the 10% level. Consistent 
with our expectations, entries by Diversified and Traders show no significant association to 
initiation of unrelated divestments the year following their entry. 
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The results for the fixed effects specification show a positive association for the entries by 
Devoted investors, significant at the 5% level. While Focused investors again exhibit a positive 
coefficient, it is not significant at the 10% level. While entries by Diversified investors are not 
significantly associated with initiation of unrelated divestments, Traders unexpectedly exhibit a 
weak positive coefficient that is significant at the 10% level. While the result is contrary to 
Hypothesis 2, we note that it results from our secondary model and is not present for any other 
unrelated divestments model. Consequently, we refrain from drawing conclusions regarding the 
weak unexpected outcome. However, in Section 6.1 we examine whether the endogeneity 
explanation gives rise to the finding. 
Overall, and in line with the results for occurrence of unrelated divestments, we find that larger 
and more mature firms with high leverage and poor stock price performance are most likely to 
initiate unrelated divestments. 
5.3.2.2 Simple division investor groups 
For the population averaged specification, our results are closely aligned with findings in the 
occurrence of unrelated divestments. Specifically, HighHHI-HighICR investors are positively 
associated with initiation of unrelated divestments the year following their entry, significant at 
the 5% level. Partly contradicting the predictions of Hypothesis 2, TopHHI-TopICR investors, 
however, are not significantly associated with initiation of unrelated divestments. Consistent with 
results for the occurrence of unrelated divestments, we recognise that the investors strongly 
positively associated with the initiation of unrelated divestments seem to reside in the cross-
section of Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR investors. Investors with low concentration or short 
horizon are not associated with initiation of unrelated divestments, which is consistent with our 
expectations. 
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Table 22 – Regression results for the initiation of unrelated divestments 
The table presents results for the population averaged and fixed effects logistic panel regression models for 
Initiation of unrelated divestments. The main explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the 
division by factoring (Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, 
HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as 
follows: Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of 
total capital to the book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the 
yearly buy-and-hold return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the 
compound annual growth rate over a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. 
  
Investor entry Expected
effect Population 
averaged
Fixed effects
Population 
averaged
Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Devoted + 0.427* 0.604**
(1.93) (2.31)
Focused + 0.195 0.055
(1.43) (0.37)
Diversified ? 0.269 -0.057
(1.31) (-0.23)
Traders ? -0.007 0.314*
(-0.05) (1.93)
TopHHI-TopCR + 0.425 0.393
(1.30) (1.03)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.416** 0.364*
(2.46) (1.85)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.277 -0.014
(1.56) (-0.07)
HighHHI-LowICR ? 0.017 -0.043
(0.12) (-0.25)
LowHHI-LowICR ? -0.111 -0.154
(-0.80) (-0.97)
Size + 0.348*** 0.321 0.341*** 0.273
(9.25) (1.03) (9.45) (0.87)
Tobin's q - -0.181** -0.098 -0.185** -0.107
(-2.47) (-0.63) (-2.50) (-0.69)
Relative return - -0.616*** -0.480** -0.609*** -0.463**
(-2.97) (-2.40) (-2.92) (-2.30)
Two-year average sales growth - -0.395 0.123 -0.397 0.182
(-1.01) (0.24) (-1.01) (0.36)
Leverage + 0.751** 1.421 0.763** 1.591*
(2.13) (1.63) (2.17) (1.82)
Industry fixed effects Yes - Yes -
Legislative region fixed effects Yes - Yes -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,471 2,026 9,471 2,026
Number of companies 1,656 347 1,656 347
Wald Chi2 162.2 - 162.7 -
df 24 - 25 -
Pseudo R-squared - 0.0266 - 0.0239
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Factoring division Simple division
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For the fixed effects specification, the results are again consistent with preceding results and 
show that HighHHI-HighICR investors are positively associated with initiation of unrelated 
divestments in the following year, significant at the 10% level. Inconsistent with Hypothesis 2, 
entries by TopHHI-TopICR investors exhibit a positive coefficient, which persistently remains 
insignificant at the 10% level. All other investor groups exhibit insignificant coefficients, as 
expected. 
In line with previous findings on unrelated divestments, we find that larger mature firms with 
high debt levels and meagre stock price performance are most likely to initiate unrelated 
divestments, as expected. 
5.3.3 Change in magnitude of unrelated divestments 
In addition to the occurrence and initiation of unrelated divestments, we examine investor effects 
on the change in magnitude of unrelated divestments. Change in magnitude of unrelated 
divestments is a continuous variable for which we run a linear panel regression model with fixed 
effects. We run separate models using first factoring based groups and then simple division 
groups and present the results in Table 23. 
Overall, the results provide weak evidence for Hypothesis 2 and are partly inconsistent with the 
results for the occurrence and initiation of unrelated divestments.  
5.3.3.1 Factoring based investor groups 
The results for factoring division investors are mixed. Importantly, we do not find support for 
Hypothesis 2, since Devoted and Focused investors are not significantly associated with changes 
in magnitude of unrelated divestments following their entry. Further, we find a negative 
association between Diversified investors and changes in the magnitude, significant at the 5% 
level. Although not contrary to Hypothesis 2, the result is not in line with our expectations. 
Traders are not associated with changes in the magnitude of unrelated divestments. 
5.3.3.2 Simple division investor groups 
Results for simple division investor groups offer weak support for Hypothesis 2. Specifically, 
entries by HighHHI-HighICR investors are positively associated with change in the magnitude of 
unrelated divestments, significant at the 10% level. Contrary to Hypothesis 2, although consistent 
with our results for investor effects on the occurrence and initiation of unrelated divestments, 
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TopHHI-TopICR investors are not associated with changes in magnitude of unrelated 
divestments. Further, in line with our expectations, coefficients for investors with low portfolio 
concentration or short investment horizon are not significant at the 10% level. 
For both factoring based investor groups and simple division investor groups, we note that larger 
firms with more leverage and poor stock price performance seem to be most likely to increase the 
magnitude on unrelated divestments in the following year. Contrary to our expectation, we also 
note that Tobin’s q seems to be weakly positively associated with increases in magnitude of 
unrelated divestments. While we struggle to find a relevant explanation for this result, it implies 
that more nascent firms are more likely to increase the magnitude of unrelated divestments. 
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Table 23 – Regression results for the change in magnitude of unrelated divestments 
The table presents results for the fixed effects panel regression model for the Change in magnitude of unrelated 
divestments. The main explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the division by factoring 
(Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-
HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as follows: Size is 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to 
the book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-
hold return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual 
growth rate over a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets.  
 
Investor entry Expected Factoring division Simple division
effect (1) (2)
Devoted + 0.000
(0.02)
Focused + 0.001
(0.80)
Diversified ? -0.001**
(-2.13)
Traders ? -0.001
(-1.08)
TopHHI-TopICR + -0.001
(-0.86)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.002*
(1.73)
LowHHI-HighICR ? -0.000
(-0.33)
HighHHI-LowICR ? -0.000
(-0.09)
LowHHI-LowICR ? -0.000
(-0.70)
Size + 0.003** 0.004**
(2.02) (2.06)
Tobin's q - 0.002* 0.002*
(1.73) (1.72)
Relative return - -0.003*** -0.003***
(-3.05) (-3.08)
Two-year average sales growth - 0.002 0.002
(0.91) (0.87)
Leverage + 0.009* 0.009*
(1.90) (1.91)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 9,471 9,471
Number of companies 1,656 1,656
R-squared 0.0050 0.0050
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.4 Payout  
This section presents our results for investor effects on changes in payout, which we measure 
through cash dividends. As with governance changes and organisational improvements, we apply 
our primary, factoring based investor groups as well as the simple division groups. We first 
discuss our results for the Initiation of cash dividends and then for the Change in dividend yield.  
5.4.1 Initiation of cash dividends 
In our analysis on the initiation of cash dividends, a binary variable, we apply the logistic panel 
regression with the population averaged estimator as the primary model and the fixed effects 
estimator as the secondary. In line with the previous discussions, the fixed effects model, 
although in theory the most appropriate, is problematic due to the model specification that drops 
out all observations with no initiation of cash dividends and the incidental parameter problem 
with small T. We present the results in Table 24 separately for factoring based and simple 
division investor groups. 
5.4.1.1 Factoring based investor groups 
The results for the factoring-based groups do not support Hypothesis 3; investors with high 
portfolio concentration and long investment horizon do not, at the 10% significance level, relate 
positively to the initiation of cash dividends. The result holds over the population averaged and 
the fixed effects specifications. However, with the fixed effects specification we find a positive 
association between the entries of investors belonging to the group Diversified and initiation of 
cash dividends. The association is significant at the 1% level. We discuss the possible 
explanations below in the discussion of payout results. Entries by investor groups with low 
concentration or short horizon do not yield significant coefficients. 
In the population averaged specification firm size is negatively associated with the initiation of 
dividends at the 10% level, and in the fixed effects specification, leverage is negatively 
associated and lagged level of cash positively associated, at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Although the above results are in line with our expectations, we unexpectedly find that in the 
population averaged specification, relative return is positively associated with dividend initiation 
at the 5% level. We cautiously propose an intuitive explanation that firms initiating dividend 
payments are likely to be firms with strong performance in the previous year: initiating a cash 
payout might be difficult and disruptive for firms for poor performance in the previous year. 
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5.4.1.2 Simple division investor groups 
The simple division population averaged specification produces results that are partly in line with 
our hypotheses. Specifically, in the population averaged specification entries by HighHHI-
HighICR investors are weakly associated with initiation of dividends, while entries by all other 
investor groups are not. For the fixed effects specification, no investor group yields significant 
coefficients. The results for the control variables are identical to our results for the factoring 
based investor groups. 
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Table 24 – Regression results for the initiation of cash dividends 
The table presents results for the population averaged and fixed effect panel logit regression model for the Change 
in dividend yield. The main explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the division by factoring 
(Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-
HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as follows: Size is 
the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to 
the book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-
hold return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual 
growth rate over a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of total 
cash holdings to total assets.  
 
Investor entry Expected
effect Population 
averaged
Fixed effect
Population 
averaged
Fixed effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Devoted + -0.048 0.008
(-0.13) (0.02)
Focused + 0.311 -0.038
(1.58) (-0.16)
Diversified ? 1.451*** 0.531
(2.62) (0.92)
Traders ? 0.226 0.061
(1.29) (0.26)
TopHHI-TopCR + 0.524 0.447
(1.27) (0.85)
HighHHI-HighICR + 0.434* 0.380
(1.75) (1.23)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.518 -0.042
(1.63) (-0.13)
HighHHI-LowICR ? 0.278 0.023
(1.39) (0.09)
LowHHI-LowICR ? 0.147 -0.429
(0.58) (-1.53)
Size - -0.101* -0.769 -0.100* -0.767
(-1.87) (-1.49) (-1.89) (-1.49)
Tobin's q + 0.060 0.009 0.056 0.017
(0.92) (0.05) (0.87) (0.11)
Relative return - 0.393** 0.246 0.382** 0.279
(2.26) (1.24) (2.21) (1.41)
Two-year average sales growth - -0.282 0.850 -0.300 0.908
(-0.69) (1.12) (-0.73) (1.20)
Leverage - -0.540 -3.273** -0.584 -3.351**
(-1.01) (-2.43) (-1.11) (-2.48)
Cash +/- 0.633 2.730* 0.699 2.784*
(1.30) (1.88) (1.45) (1.92)
Industry fixed effects Yes - Yes -
Legislative region fixed effects Yes - Yes -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,570 977 8,570 977
Number of companies 1,475 166 1,475 166
R-squared - 0.113 - 0.118
Wald Chi2 124.7 - 114.8 -
df 25 - 26 -
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Factoring division Simple division
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Table 25 – Regression results for the change in dividend yield 
The table presents results for the fixed effects panel regression model for the Change in dividend yield. The main 
explanatory variables include the investor group variables for the division by factoring (Devoted, Focused, 
Diversified and Traders) and the division by quartiles (TopHHI-TopCR, HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-
HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR, LowHHI-LowICR). Control variables are as follows: Industry-adjusted dividend 
yield is the yearly dividend yield for a firm less the yearly average dividend yield for the firm’s industry. Size is the 
natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the 
book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-hold 
return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual growth 
rate over a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash is the ratio of total cash 
holdings to total assets.  
 
Investor entry Expected Factoring division Simple division
effect (1) (2)
Devoted + -0.058
(-1.05)
Focused + -0.024
(-0.71)
Diversified ? -0.015
(-0.27)
Traders ? -0.014
(-0.45)
TopHHI-TopCR + -0.088
(-1.13)
HighHHI-HighICR + -0.055
(-1.16)
LowHHI-HighICR ? 0.016
(0.40)
HighHHI-LowICR ? -0.004
(-0.11)
LowHHI-LowICR ? 0.030
(0.92)
Industry-adjusted dividend yield - -0.750*** -0.751***
(-30.78) (-30.83)
Size + 0.160** 0.159**
(2.35) (2.33)
Tobin's q - 0.018 0.018
(0.84) (0.84)
Relative return - 0.031 0.031
(0.90) (0.88)
Two-year average sales growth - 0.072 0.073
(0.79) (0.80)
Leverage - -0.472*** -0.472***
(-2.64) (-2.63)
Cash +/- 0.034 0.037
(0.19) (0.21)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 8,428 8,428
Number of companies 1,475 1,475
R-squared 0.485 0.485
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.4.2 Change in dividend yield 
In our analysis on change in dividend yield, a continuous variable, we apply panel regression 
specification with fixed effects. As with all preceding outcomes, we run the model separately for 
the factoring based and simple division investor groups. 
The results for the Change in dividend yield, presented in Table 25, do not produce significant 
associations at the 10% level between entries of our investor groups and changes in the dividend 
yield. The insignificant associations hold across factoring based and simple division investor 
groupings. 
To assess the appropriateness of our choice of dividend measure we also test two other variables: 
dividends per earnings and dividends per sales (see La Porta et al. 2000). In undocumented 
results, no significant associations for any of our nine investor groups are found.  
Control variables are in line with our expectations. The industry-adjusted dividend yield is 
negatively associated with changes in dividend yield at the 1% level implying that if a company’s 
payout has previously exceeded that of its peers, the firm is not likely to increase it further. 
Moreover, firm size is positively associated with changes in dividend yield at the 5% significance 
level. Finally, leverage is negatively associated with changes in the dividend yield at the 1% 
significance level.  
6 Robustness tests 
While our results support our hypotheses about investors with high portfolio concentration and 
long investment horizon as active corporate improvers, we perform a range of additional tests to 
further validate our results. First, we perform reverse regression to acquire additional reassurance 
that the causality runs from investors to corporate improvements and not the other way around. 
We then measure the joint explanatory power of our investor groups and test whether our results 
are unchanged when running regressions with individual investor groups separately. Next, we 
discuss and cautiously examine potential survivorship bias in our data due to shortcomings in our 
ownership data. We then implement an additional set of measures for investors’ portfolio 
concentration and investment horizon to test the validity and power of our investor groupings. 
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6.1 Endogeneity 
In line with efforts in analogous settings by Aggarwal et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2007), we 
take on to validate the direction of causality in our results. We consider the possibility that 
instead of running from the entry of certain type of investors to corporate improvements, the 
causality runs from corporate improvements to investor entry. The endogeneity concern is raised 
on two accounts: (1) the general understanding that investors may select target companies based 
on the targets’ corporate governance arrangements, organisational features or payout and (2) 
specific findings in recent literature, such as Leuz, Lins and Warnock (2008) who find that US 
investors invest significantly less in foreign firms with poor governance, or Bushee, Carter and 
Gerakos (2010) who locate a “governance sensitive” group of institutions who systematically 
prefer to invest in firms with good governance63.  
We address the potential endogeneity issues in two ways. First, we account for the direction of 
the causality in our research design by choosing to study changes for both independent and 
dependent variables, rather than levels (Aggarwal et al. 2010). We argue that while it certainly 
does not quell all uncertainty on endogeneity, explaining changes in an outcome variable with 
lagged changes in ownership somewhat mitigates the potential problem of investors choosing to 
invest in certain kinds of targets. To test the selection hypothesis further, we follow Aggarwal et 
al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2007) and perform reverse regressions for all our dependent variables. 
Specifically, we use the lagged governance improvements, lagged organisational improvements 
and lagged payout increases as the explanatory variables and entries of our nine investor groups 
as the dependent variables. We report all reverse regression results in the Appendix 9 and include 
an adopted set of control variables as in our primary regressions. In the reverse regressions, we 
report results from the population averaged model. In unreported tests, however, we run the 
reverse regressions with a fixed effects specification (where the narrowing number of 
observations allows) and find the results to correspond with the ones reported. 
Our results in reverse regressions give no implications of reverse causality regarding governance 
improvements. Change in our lagged overall governance index does not statistically significantly 
explain entries of any of our investor groups. Importantly, the coefficients explaining the entries 
                                                 
63   Bushee, Carter and Gerakos (2010) also find evidence implying that “governance sensitive” institutions actively 
  improve governance in firms they target. 
122 
 
of investors belonging to Focused and HighHHI-HighICR are negative and statistically 
insignificant at the 10% level. The results for board improvements are in line with those of the 
overall governance index. We report, however, that change in board index seems to have a weak 
negative association with entry of Diversified investors. While the result is barely significant at 
10% level, the negative sign does not lead us to assume reverse causality even for the Diversified 
investors, for whom we found no evidence of activism regarding governance improvements. We 
thus find no evidence of “governance sensitive” institutional investors, as specified by Bushee, 
Carter and Gerakos (2010).  
The reverse regression results for the occurrence of unrelated divestments do not imply reverse 
causality. Interestingly, however, we report a weak positive coefficient for the lagged occurrence 
of unrelated divestments in explaining the entries of Focused investors, significant at 10% level. 
Results for the lagged initiation of unrelated divestments explaining investor entries do not 
produce statistically significant coefficients. For the magnitude of unrelated divestments, we 
report a weak positive coefficient in explaining entries of HighHHI-LowICR investors.  
For payout increases, the reverse regressions produce interesting results. While we do not find 
evidence that reverse causality drives our results for Diversified investors, the LowHHI-HighICR 
seem to be attracted to firms that start paying dividends. The result is somewhat confounding 
given that we hypothesise Diversified and LowHHI-HighICR investors to be largely similar in 
nature. Also, we find that entries by Focused as well as HighHHI-LowICR investors seem to be 
attracted by initiation of dividends. While we found no evidence of activism from any of our 
investor groups regarding changes in dividend yield, the reverse regressions imply that TopHHI-
TopICR investor are attracted to enter firms based on positive dividend yield changes in the 
previous period. 
Overall, the reverse regressions do not provide evidence that our results are caused by investors 
selecting into target firms. We note, however, that while we do not find evidence of endogeneity 
affecting our results, we cannot rule out the possibility of investors targeting our sample firms in 
anticipation of governance, organisational or payout improvements. In such scenarios first wave 
events, as specified by Shipilov et al. (2009) in the context of governance improvements, 
facilitate ensuing further improvements.  
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Finally, we note that selection hypothesis could be further studied through an IV-treatment, such 
as performed in Aggarwal et al. (2010) and Becker et al. (2009). We argue, however, that an IV-
treatment, equivalent to that of Aggarwal et al. (2010), who use the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International World index participation as an instrument for institutional ownership, or Becker et 
al. (2009), who apply the density of wealthy individuals as an instrument for the presence of 
large individual shareholders, would be difficult to implement for our self-classified investor 
groups. Specifically, it is by definition difficult to find a common factor e.g. for all HighHHI-
HighICR investors so that it would not systematically apply also to investors in other groups. Any 
successful IV-treatment in our research setting would require locating a sub-group of investors 
residing within only one of our self-classified investor groups and constructing an instrument for 
them. Even if such a sub-group and a relevant instrument could be pinpointed, the validity of 
potential results for the entire investor group would be difficult to show. We leave such 
endeavours for further research and content ourselves with our endogeneity checks, thus 
providing no support for the selection hypothesis. 
6.2 Joint significance  
To check the robustness of our results further, we test whether our investor group entries are 
jointly significant in explaining the occurrence of corporate improvements in our target firms. As 
shown in Table 26, the results vary with the method of investor division and the dependent 
variable and, for the majority of the regressions, the investor group entries are jointly 
insignificant at the 10% level. We argue, however, that the result is not surprising. While we 
hypothesise and show in our analysis that investors with high portfolio concentration and long 
investment horizon facilitate corporate improvements, we do not expect the same for all 
investors. Further, given that our a priori hypothesised and later confirmed activists only account 
for a fraction of all measured investors, we are not surprised by the partial insignificance of 
investor group entries as whole in explaining corporate improvements. 
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Table 26 – Joint significance of the investor group entries 
The table shows the joint significance of the investor group entries as independent variables for each of the 
dependent variables. Panel A shows for Corporate governance changes, Panel B for Organisational changes and 
Panel C for Dividend payout changes. The factoring division groups are Devoted, Focused, Diversified and Traders. 
Simple division groups include TopHHI-TopICR, HighHHI-HighICR, LowHHI-HighICR, HighHHI-LowICR and 
LowHHI-LowICR. Regression specifications are shown as with their corresponding STATA abbreviations. The 
models are as follows: xtreg is a linear panel regression model; xtlogit is a logistic panel regression model; ologit is 
an ordered logistic regression model. Estimator specifications are as follows: fe stands for the fixed effects estimator; 
pa stands for the population averaged, or pooled, estimator. For ordered and logistic regressions, the table shows the 
Chi squared statistic, for linear models the F-statistic. Corresponding p-values are in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. 
 
PANEL A - CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Governance variable
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2)
Change in overall index 0.93 4.99 2.02* 13.57**
(1) xtreg, fe; (2) ologit (0.44) (0.29) (0.07) (0.02)
Change in board index 0.92 6.64 2.29** 20.31***
(1) xtreg, fe; (2) ologit (0.45) (0.16) (0.04) (0.00)
Simple change in overall index 3.27 - 11.83** -
(1) ologit (0.51) - (0.04) -
Simple change in board index 5.52 - 19.74*** -
(1) ologit (0.24) - (0.00) -
PANEL B - ORGANISATIONAL
Organisational variable
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2)
Occurrence of unrelated divestments 7.12 7.81* 11.17** 7.93
(1) xtlogit, pa; (2) xtlogit, fe (0.13) (0.10) (0.05) (0.16)
Initiation of unrelated divestments 8.46* 9.2* 10.75* 5.66
(1) xtlogit, pa; (2) xtlogit, fe (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.34)
Magnitude of unrelated divestments 1.44 - 0.8 -
(1) xtreg, fe (0.22) - (0.55) -
PANEL C - DIVIDEND PAYOUT
Payout variable
Specification (1) (2) (1) (2)
Initiation of cash dividend 13.03** 0.94 11.01* 4.29
(1) xtlogit, pa; (2) xtlogit, fe (0.01) (0.92) (0.05) (0.51)
Change in dividend yield 0.49 - 0.69 -
(1) xtreg, fe (0.74) - (0.63) -
Factoring division Simple division
Factoring division Simple division
Factoring division Simple division
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Further, we test whether the results suggesting that the entry by individual investor groups 
explain corporate improvements are reliant on the presence of the other, non-significant investor 
variables. Consequently, we run all regressions with the same model specifications including 
only the investor groups which we found in Section 5, to actively improve the measured 
corporate characteristics. We find, in undocumented results, that the results remain practically 
unchanged, with only fractional differences in coefficients and corresponding p-values. The 
results imply that the positive associations between our investor groups and corporate 
improvements is not caused by the presence of other, perhaps negatively associated, investor 
groups. 
6.3 Survivorship bias 
We note, that since our ownership data does not allow inference of holder information for our 
sample firms that have ceased to exist as of December 31, 2009, a problem of survivorship bias 
may arise. More specifically, we are only able to observe ownership data for firms that were 
listed and included in our two indices as of December 31, 2002 and continued to be listed as the 
same entities as of December 31 2009. Before we discuss how survivorship bias could affect our 
results, we note that the modifications to our firm sample, described in Section 4.3.1.164, are done 
independently and directly to the firm sample, regardless of whether ownership information was 
available for the removed entity or not. Altogether, ownership data is missing for 680 firms out of 
the total of 2,525. Majority of the 680 firms with no ownership data are firms that have ceased to 
exist and a minority are firms for which ownership data was not available through FactSet for 
other reasons. 
While survivorship bias is commonly considered severe especially in performance-measuring 
research settings, as presented by Brown et al. (1992) and Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) for 
mutual funds performance and Brown, Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1999) for hedge funds, we 
recognize that it may affect our results for discrete corporate improvements as well. In general, 
survivorship bias arises from a research setting where only the survived entities, often the best 
performers, are observed whereas failed entities are not. In mutual fund research, as Brown et al. 
(1992) show, observing only the survived funds may cause a significant upward bias in the 
                                                 
64  Specifically, we remove firms due to (1) being acquired, (2) merger, (3) default or (4) de-listing for other reason. 
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observed returns for mutual funds and give rise to a faulty perception of persistence in the 
performance of the survived money managers.  
In our research setting, where we focus on analysing the effects of investor entries on different 
corporate improvements, we anticipate that survivorship bias could affect the results in case 
associations between different investor entries and ensuing corporate improvements would 
behave differently than with the survived firms that we observe. While we have no good reason 
to expect that the entries by our altogether nine investor groups would have opposite associations 
in the ceased-to-exist firm sample, we recognise that the investor effect, in general, may be 
different from the observed sample comprising only the surviving firms. Specifically, we 
hypothesise that our results could be affected at least in the presence of the following two 
circumstances: 
(1) Amongst the ceased-to-exist firms, there were a substantially lower overall number of 
changes 
(2) Amongst the ceased-to-exist firms, the level of the variables, for which we measure 
changes (improvements, deteriorations), were substantially different from the 
observed sample 
In case of (1), by not including the ceased-to-exist firms from our sample, we could exclude the 
firms where association by any investor group to corporate changes is the weakest and thus boost 
our results. For corporate governance, for instance, we would exclude the firms where corporate 
governance improvements do not take place. In case of (2), there would be reason to doubt that 
the improvements would behave differently, since the base level for our outcome variables would 
be significantly different. For unrelated divestments, for instance, we could exclude firms with 
substantially lower scores on average for overall and board indices than amongst our observed 
sample. 
While we have no access to payout data for the ceased-to-exist firms, we cautiously test whether 
our data raises doubts that circumstances (1) or (2) are present in our corporate governance and 
unrelated divestments data. Since they are drawn from different databases, we have equal access 
to data regarding firms that ceased to exist over our observation period and firms that survived.  
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For our corporate governance data, we first calculate the annual mean levels for our overall and 
board indices separately for the ceased-to-exist firms and for firms where ownership data is 
available. We examine whether the two firm samples show large differences regarding the level 
of corporate governance (see (2) above). We then calculate the mean levels of corporate 
governance over our sample period for the two firms samples separately, weighting within-year 
averages by the number of firms present in that year65. Second, we calculate the annual portion of 
firms experiencing a change, improvement or deterioration in overall governance or board index 
for the two firm groups separately. We then, again, calculate weighted means over our sample 
period for both changes in overall and board indices and for cease-to-exist and observed firms 
separately. Overall, we show years 2004 through 2009, since 2004 is the first year in which our 
outcome variables are present in our regressions66. The results, presented in panel A of Table 27, 
show that regarding corporate governance, the ceased-to-exist firm sample is very similar to the 
observed firm sample. While the level of corporate governance is slightly better in the observed 
firm sample regarding both overall index (51% to 50%) and board index (77% to 75%), there are 
slightly more annual changes occurring in the ceased-to-exist firm sample regarding both overall 
index (48% to 47% of all firms on average) and board index (32% to 31% of all firms on 
average). We conclude that regarding corporate governance improvements, we do not observe 
large differences in either the level or the changes between our excluded ceased-to-exist firms 
and the observed firms. Hence, we cautiously anticipate that heterogeneity of governance 
attributes of observed and unobserved firms is unlikely to give rise to significant survivorship 
bias in our results. 
For organisational improvements, we first calculate the annual portion of firms where unrelated 
divestments occur for ceased-to-exist firms and observed firms separately. We then measure the 
weighted mean portion of firms divesting unrelated entities annually over our observation period. 
Results show that within both groups, 6% of firms divest unrelated entities annually on average. 
Second, we calculate the annual potion of firms where unrelated divestments are initiated for 
ceased-to-exist firms and observed firms separately and calculate the weighted mean portion over 
our observation period. Results imply that within both firm groups, 4% of firms annually initiate 
                                                 
65  Annual weights are necessary, since in the ceased-to-exist firm sample, the number of firms drops rapidly after 
 2004. 
66  As discussed in Chapter 4, ownership data is reliably available from 2003. 
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unrelated divestments on average. Third, we calculate the annual average changes in the 
magnitude of unrelated divestments for ceased-to-exist firms and observed firms separately. In 
line with our regression analysis, we measure the magnitude of unrelated divestments with the 
total value of annual unrelated divestments divided by the average parent EV. We then calculate 
the weighted mean for the annual average changes over our observation period. While the annual 
variation for the ceased-to-exist firms seems large due to the small number of firms in the sample 
for the last years, the magnitude of unrelated divestments changes on average just over 0% for 
both groups. Overall, regarding organisational improvements, we find that ceased-to-exist firm 
sample and the observed firm sample are largely similar, and we cautiously anticipate that 
heterogeneity in our firm sample regarding organisational improvements is unlikely to give rise 
to significant survivorship bias in our results. The results are presented in panel B or Table 27. 
Although we find that the firms excluded from our sample due to the lack of ownership data and 
the observed firms are largely similar in terms of governance and unrelated divestments, we 
cannot exclude the possibility that the association between investor entries and corporate 
improvements would behave differently for the two different groups. While we find no reason to 
believe this would be the case given the similar corporate improvement data for the two firm 
samples, we thus recognise that survivorship bias could bias our results for investor effects either 
positively or negatively.  
In calculations for corporate governance and organisation (divestments), for consistency, we 
apply the same pre-2003 sample modifications to the ceased-to-exist firms and observed firms, as 
with the data for our principal regression analyses (modifications discussed in detail in Section 
4.3.1.1). Specifically, we do not include (1) firms being acquired, merged, defaulted or de-listed 
prior to year-end 2002 or (2) firms with more than one class of ordinary shares. 
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6.4 Alternative approaches 
To further test our results and show the need for a novel approach to define the explanatory 
ownership variables in studying investor effects on corporate improvements, we conduct our 
analyses with two alternative approaches used in extant literature. First, we calculate general 
ownership structure figures for portfolio concentration and investment horizon and use them as 
explanatory variables. Second, we test whether the entries of known activist hedge funds are 
associated with corporate improvements. 
6.4.1 General ownership structure 
Our results indicate that engaging in company improvements is owner-specific. In large public 
companies where ownership is dispersed, a single owner with a large stake can make a 
difference. Our approach and findings are rather novel as the vast majority of studies have 
examined the relationship between firms’ general ownership structures and corporate 
improvements, such as governance or performance enhancements.  
For example, Hartzell and Starks (2003) use the proportion of the institutional ownership 
accounted for by the top five institutional investors of a firm, and a company-specific 
institutional ownership concentration figure to explain CEO compensation. Chen, Harford and Li 
(2007) also measure the aggregate ownership of the five largest institutional investors but also 
categorize these holdings by the length of holding (greater or less than one year) to study 
acquisitions and post-merger performance. Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005) calculate the 
ownership-weighted investment horizon of a company’s institutional shareholders and find that 
target firms with short-term shareholders are more likely to receive an acquisition bid but get 
lower premiums. In a similar setting, Qiu (2008) shows that the presence of large public pension 
fund shareholders reduces bad acquisitions although he disagrees with Gaspar, Massa and Matos 
on whether the investment horizon has any effect. 
We argue that these general ownership structure figures are problematic in terms of endogeneity 
and are unlikely to produce meaningful results. To show this with our data, we run our 
regressions with general ownership structure figures for investment horizon, portfolio 
concentration and their interaction.  
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6.4.1.1 Method 
In line with Gaspar, Massa and Matos (2005), we calculate the ownership-weighted investment 
horizon of a company’s shareholders and define the Company inverse churn rate as the 
ownership-weighted inverse churn rate for all the company’s shareholders with more than 1% of 
shares. The calculation is as follows:  
ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ ݅݊ݒ݁ݎݏ݁ ݄ܿݑݎ݊ ݎܽݐ݁୨ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝,௜ܫܥܴ௜ே௜ୀଵ , (15) 
where wj,i is the weight of investor i’s ownership in the total percentage held by shareholders with 
ownership of over 1% in company j and N is the total number of owners in our sample. 
We calculate the Company Herfindahl index as a proxy for the company’s shareholders’ 
ownership-weighted portfolio concentration: 
ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ ܪ݁ݎ݂݄݈݅݊݀ܽ ݅݊݀݁ݔ୨ ൌ ∑ ݓ௝,௜ܪܪܫ௜ே௜ୀଵ , (16) 
where HHIi is the Herfindahl index for company i, wj,i is the weight of investor i’s ownership in 
the total percentage of shares held by shareholders with ownership of over 1% in company j and 
N is the total number of owners in our sample. 
Further, we calculate an interaction term to measure the significance of the interaction of the two 
variables. The interaction term, often calculated as the product of two variables incurs a 
multicollinearity problem among the explanatory variables, which is best dealt with by centring 
the variables (Aiken and West 1991). The variables are centred by subtracting the mean score 
from each data point for each of the variables. The interaction term, Interaction, is then 
calculated as the product of the two centred variables.  
6.4.1.2 Findings 
The results are presented in Table 28, Table 29 and Table 30 for governance, organisational and 
payout changes, respectively. As presumed, the results are either insignificant or meaningless in 
relation to activism. We argue that the mixed results stem from the domination of large 
institutional investors, who are present in our factoring-based group Diversified. The overall 
company figures are to a great extent determined by the large number of Diversified investors and 
their presence in a vast majority of the companies. Moreover, we cautiously suggest that as the 
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general ownership structure figures measure investor presence, the results might not present 
findings for investor influence but merely the preferences of large institutional investors. 
For the changes in the Overall index of corporate governance variables, the only significant 
explanatory variable is the Company inverse churn rate in the simple change specification. The 
relation is significant at the 10% level but negative. The most plausible explanation would hardly 
be that long-term shareholders negatively influence governance changes in their target 
companies, but instead that large institutional investors have a tendency to be invested in 
companies with good governance. The institutional preference for corporate governance is 
studied among others by Ferreira and Matos (2008), who find that all institutional investors seek 
firms with strong governance, as well as Lenz, Lins and Warnock (2008), who show that foreign 
institutional investors invest less in firms with poor governance. In other words, companies with 
good corporate governance have attracted numerous large institutional investors, which is 
reflected as a high Company inverse churn rate67. As the companies have few governance 
improvement opportunities left, the high Inverse churn rate is then associated negatively with the 
amount of governance improvements.  
For the Board index, we find a weak positive relation between the Company Herfindahl index 
and board improvements. Although the relation is in line with our hypothesis that investors with 
high portfolio concentration are willing and able to improve governance, arguing between 
selection and influence is again difficult. Similarly to the findings in the Overall index, if large 
institutional investors with very low Herfindahl index figures dominate the Company Herfindahl 
index and large institutional investors invest in companies with good governance, the selection 
explanation appears reasonable. The better the governance and the less opportunities for 
improvements, the greater the institutional ownership and the lower the Company Herfindahl 
index.  
The regressions for organisational changes do not yield significant results for the overall 
company figures as key independent variables. The absence of results may suggest that 
ownership and corporate diversification are unrelated, which is in line with the findings of Lane, 
Canella and Lubatkin (1998). We argue, however, that the results support our hypothesis of the 
                                                 
67  As shown in Table 12, large institutional investors such as investment advisers are mainly present in the 
 Diversified and LowHHI – HighICR investor groups, which both have very high inverse churn rate figures. 
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importance of capturing the presence of individual large, concentrated and long-term investors 
instead of studying overall ownership structure figures. 
In the results for changes in payout, we find a significant negative relation between Company 
inverse churn rate and the Initiation of cash dividends and a significant positive relation between 
Company inverse churn rate and Change in dividend yield. Again, we argue that the dominance 
of large institutional investors in the overall company ownership structure figures and their 
selection into certain type of stock affect the results. As Gompers and Metrick (2001) show for 
U.S. institutions and Ferreira and Matos (2008) internationally, large institutions68 prefer stocks 
of large companies. In other words, large institutions invest less in smaller companies where the 
likelihood of an initiation of divestments is higher (Michaely, Thaler and Womack 1995). 
Similarly, dividend increases, or positive changes in the Dividend yield, are common to large 
firms that have grown and entered more mature phases in their life cycles (Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan 2002). Furthermore, Grinstein and Michaely (2005) provide evidence that 
institutions prefer dividend-paying firms. As discussed in Section 5.4, the catering explanation 
may also drive the positive relationship between high Inverse churn rate, indicating a large 
number of institutional owners, and changes in dividend yield. 
In conclusion, we argue that the use of overall ownership structure figures is problematic for at 
least three reasons: (1) It is not necessarily the ownership structure as a whole that matters but 
instead the presence of individual investors willing and able to engage in activism, (2) Diversified 
investors dominate the ownership structure figures due to their size and number and (3) 
Determining between selection and influence is especially difficult when using explanatory 
variables that are based on the presence, not entry, of investors as discussed in Section 6.1. These 
problems are reflected in insignificant or meaningless results for overall ownership structure in 
explaining observed corporate improvements in our sample firms. 
                                                 
68  Gompers and Metrick (2001) define large institutions as money managers with at least $100 million under 
 management. 
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Table 30 – Dividend payout changes with general ownership structure 
The table shows regression results for the payout changes: Initiation of cash dividends and Change in dividend 
yield. The main explanatory variables are as follows: Company Herfindahl index (centred) is the mean-centred 
ownership-weighted measure for a company’s shareholders’ portfolio concentration; Company inverse churn rate 
(centred) is the mean-centred ownership-weighted measure for a company’s shareholders’ inverse portfolio 
turnover; Interaction is the product of the Centred Herfindahl index and the Centred inverse churn rate. Controls are 
as follows: Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value 
of total capital to the book value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the 
yearly buy-and-hold return for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the 
compound annual growth rate over a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Cash 
is the ratio of total cash holdings to total assets. 
 
Weighted overall figures Expected Change in dividend yield
effect Population averaged Fixed effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
Company Herfindahl index (centred) + -0.499 0.819 0.077
(-0.86) (0.53) (0.29)
Company inverse churn rate (centred) + -2.998** -0.801 0.714*
(-2.05) (-0.27) (1.75)
Interaction + -3.718 -17.765 -2.807
(-0.85) (-0.87) (-1.54)
Lagged index level - -0.751***
(-30.76)
Size - / + -0.085 -0.760 0.154**
(-1.60) (-1.46) (2.26)
Tobin's q + 0.069 0.009 0.021
(1.08) (0.06) (0.97)
Relative return + 0.368** 0.263 0.033
(2.11) (1.33) (0.96)
Two-year average sales growth + -0.269 0.874 0.084
(-0.67) (1.15) (0.91)
Leverage - -0.607 -3.266** -0.479***
(-1.15) (-2.41) (-2.68)
Cash + 0.667 2.885** 0.043
(1.37) (1.99) (0.24)
Industry fixed effects Yes - -
Legislative region fixed effects Yes - -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,570 977 8,428
Number of companies 1,475 166 1,475
R-squared - - 0.486
Pseudo R-squared - 0.1130 -
Wald Chi2 116.8 - -
df 24 - -
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Initiation of cash dividend
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6.4.2 Activist hedge fund entries 
In line with the extant literature on hedge fund activism, an alternative research design to ours 
would be to study whether the entries of known activist hedge funds are associated with corporate 
improvements in the following year. As argued in Section 4.4.2.4, however, known activist hedge 
funds are a heterogeneous group in terms of investment horizon and portfolio concentration, 
which we anticipate would lead to weak or non-existent results. To examine this, we run the 
regressions applied in Section 5 with the entry of a known activist hedge fund as the key 
explanatory variable. Results are shown in Table 31, Table 32 and Table 33 for governance, 
organisational and payout changes, respectively. 
As the result tables show, Activist hedge fund entries are not significantly associated with any of 
the corporate improvements. The findings are in line with our earlier observation that known 
activist hedge funds are, in fact, very different from each other in terms of the characteristics that 
drive propensity to activism. As pointed out in our practitioner interviews, many of the hedge 
funds that have been labelled as activists are passive frequent traders in most of their holdings, 
but may turn active in a very small portion of target companies.  
The U.S. legislation provides a convenient way to identify activist campaigns through the 13D 
filing that any investor must file in the event of cumulating a 5% ownership stake with the 
intention of being active. Researchers have used the 13D filings data to produce a number of 
recognized papers on abnormal returns around the filing date, target selection criteria and 
changes occurring in the companies after the filings (see e.g. Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; 
Klein and Zur 2009).  
Our research design, however, is by nature different from the 13D –based event-type studies. 
Most importantly, we are able to detect and identify investors that are generally active, instead of 
focusing solely on the nature or consequences of a set of pre-determined activist events. For 
example, our Focused investors, who we show to be generally active, include well known “pure-
play” activist hedge funds69 such as Centaurus Capital (maximum number of quarterly holdings: 
14), Cerberus Capital Management (22), Cevian Capital (4), Governance for Owners (7), Icahn 
                                                 
69  The term “pure play activist” is adapted from the news article “Activists buoyed by shareholder chorus”, 
 Financial News, 29.03.2010, available online on 12.06.2010: 
 http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-03-29/activists-buoyed-by-shareholder-chorus. 
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Associates (33), K Capital Management (7), Oaktree Capital Management (22), Pardus Capital 
Management (7), Parvus Asset Management (9), Relational Investors (23) and The Children’s 
Investment Fund (13). Activist hedge funds that are not likely to be active in all their targets, 
such as Atticus Capital (125), Perry Capital (155), Soros Fund Management (609) and JANA 
Partners (94) fall into our group Traders. Our results are therefore of a more general nature; we 
show which types of investors are normally willing and able to engage in activism. It appears that 
the activist hedge funds labelled in earlier studies, in general, are not. 
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Table 33 – Dividend payout changes with the entries by known activist hedge funds 
The table shows regression results for the payout changes: Initiation of cash dividends and Change in dividend 
yield. The main explanatory variable is the Entry of activist hedge fund. Controls are as follows: Size is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s net sales; Tobin’s q is calculated as the ratio of the market value of total capital to the book 
value of total assets; Relative return is the yearly buy-and-hold return for a firm less the yearly buy-and-hold return 
for the firm’s domestic main stock index; Two-year average sales growth is the compound annual growth rate over 
a lagging two year period; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets; Cash is the ratio of total cash holdings to 
total assets. 
 
Expected Change in dividend yield
effect Population averaged Fixed effects Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
Entry of activist hedge fund + 0.262 0.011 -0.032
(1.49) (0.05) (-1.13)
Lagged index level - -0.750***
(-30.84)
Size - / + -0.103** -0.781 0.161**
(-1.99) (-1.52) (2.37)
Tobin's q + 0.053 0.005 0.018
(0.81) (0.03) (0.82)
Relative return + 0.411** 0.267 0.031
(2.42) (1.35) (0.88)
Two-year average sales growth + -0.252 0.871 0.070
(-0.63) (1.14) (0.76)
Leverage - -0.553 -3.248** -0.472***
(-1.06) (-2.42) (-2.64)
Cash + 0.663 2.793* 0.038
(-5.46) (1.93) 0.038
Industry fixed effects Yes - -
Legislative region fixed effects Yes - -
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,570 977 8,428
Number of companies 1,475 166 1,475
R-squared - - 0.485
Pseudo R-squared - 0.1110 -
Wald Chi2 104.1 - -
df 22 - -
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Initiation of cash dividend
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7 Discussion and conclusions 
In this chapter we discuss our results individually for each area of corporate improvement and 
relate our findings to extant literature. We then conclude our findings and contribution. Finally, 
we lay out avenues for future research on shareholder activism. 
7.1 Discussion on key results 
In this section, we discuss our key results presented in Section 5 and tested in Section 6. We 
focus separately on our three areas of corporate improvements. 
7.1.1 Corporate governance improvements 
Our results for overall corporate governance and board arrangements provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 1. Importantly, entries by investors with high portfolio concentration and long 
horizon are associated with corporate governance improvements in the following year. 
Surprisingly, however, our findings suggest that investors with highest concentration and longest 
horizon are consistently not associated with following-year improvements. As expected, entries 
by other investor groups do not show consistent positive association with governance 
improvements. Further, our results cautiously suggest that no individual legal type is capable of 
capturing the group of governance activists that we identify. 
Our key finding that entries by high concentration and long horizon investors (Focused and 
HighHHI-HighICR investor groups) are generally associated with ensuing overall governance 
and board improvements is fundamentally in line with Jensen (1993) who suggests that there are 
indeed active investors who play an important role in ensuring “well-functioning governance” in 
a world where internal controls often fail. While Jensen, however, implies that banks, pension 
funds, insurers or money managers are natural activists, our results suggest that instead of any 
specific externally labelled type, it is the investor’s concentrated portfolio, comprising large 
stakes and a small number of investments and long investment horizon that make her active. This 
central finding is in line with Barclay and Holderness (1991b) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), 
who suggest that large shareholders may have incentives to undertake value-creative 
improvements in corporate policy since they are partly exempt from the free-rider problem 
(Grossman and Hart 1980): Focused and HighHHI-HighICR investors are indeed large owners, 
holding on average 6.9% and 6.2% of target equity, respectively. Further, the result is consistent 
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with our practitioner interviews suggesting that activism requires a sufficiently small number of 
investments to allow for target-specific efforts: Focused and HighHHI-HighICR investors held, 
on average, only 13 and 16 targets, respectively. Moreover, our finding is also consistent with 
Becht et al. (2008) who state that activist campaigns require substantial firm-specific efforts and 
Black (1998) who suggests that standardised activism has limited reach. Further, our finding that 
Focused and HighHHI-HighICR investors actively improve governance obviously implies that 
activists are largely not regulated in terms of maximum stake or diversification. We thus provide 
indirect support for Brav et al. (2008) and Kahan and Rock (2007) who suggest that high 
performance-based incentives, uncommon at regulated investors such as pension funds while 
typical of unregulated investor organisations such as hedge funds, are an important precondition 
for activism. Further, we provide indirect support for Bethel et al. (1998) and Brav et al. (2008) 
who imply that ability to freely amass large individual stakes to pressure a target is important in 
facilitating improvements. Finally, our key finding in determining governance activists supports 
the suggestion by Clifford (2008) that sufficiently long investment horizon, studied through 
investor-lock-up in his hedge fund context, is an important prerequisite for activism: Focused and 
HighHHI-HighICR investors have an average Churn rate of only 0.14 and 0.16 and on average 
hold as much as 93% and 82% of their holdings for more than 1.5 years, respectively.  
Although high concentration and long horizon investors are associated with governance 
improvements, we find that investors with highest concentration and longest horizon (groups 
Devoted and TopHHI-TopICR) are not. The result is contrary to Hypothesis 1 and consistent over 
fixed effects and ordered specifications for both factoring and simple divisions. Closer 
examination reveals that Devoted and TopHHI-TopICR investors differ from other investors in 
two important characteristics. First, as shown in Table 10, individuals form the vast majority of 
investors in both groups (67% of Devoted and 70% of TopHHI-TopICR). Second, their average 
stake sizes are larger (7.5% for Devoted and 6.5% for TopHHI-TopICR) than for other investors. 
Thus, we cautiously interpret our results in line with Barclay and Holderness (1989) and Rock 
(1994) and suggest that investors with highest concentration and longest horizon may not be 
incentivised to improve governance in their target firms, since they are in a position to extract 
private benefits in status quo. Barclay and Holderness (1989) find in the U.S. that during 1978-
1982, block trades involving more than 5% of common stock were traded at a substantial 
premium to post-announcement exchange prices and suggest that their findings signal the 
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presence of private benefits of control to investors holding large blocks in publicly quoted firms. 
Importantly, they suggest that the evident block premiums imply the presence of private benefits 
to holders of large blocks, not shared benefits of control available to all shareholders. Also, later 
studies find evidence on the presence of premiums in large block trades, as shown by Mikkelson 
and Regassa (1991) for U.S. and Nicodano and Sembenelli (2004) for Italy. Consistent with this, 
we suggest that Devoted and TopHHI-TopICR investors may infer pecuniary benefits, such as 
excess salary for executive blockholders (see e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976), or non-pecuniary 
benefits, such as preferential access to sports events or country clubs, “psychic” rewards from the 
controlling ownership of, for instance, a sports team or a newspaper (see e.g. Holderness 2003; 
Dyck and Zingales 2004) or the benefit of diversification of personal wealth (see e.g. Amihud 
and Lev 1981). These private benefits available only to the large blockholder may outweigh the 
benefits from any increase in the firm value achievable through governance improvements. 
Moreover, while the overall governance or board improvements we measure would enhance the 
position of shareholders collectively, extraction of private benefits may be dependent on poor 
governance arrangements allowing a single shareholder to exercise control through representation 
in the management or board (see e.g. Holderness and Sheehan 1988, who find that large 
blockholders almost always have their representatives serve in target board or management). 
Consequently, investors with highest concentration and longest horizon may not have incentives 
to improve overall governance or board arrangements.  
Also, in line with our expectations, all investors with either low concentration or short horizon do 
not show consistent association with governance improvements observed the year following their 
entry. We note that the vast majority of diversified institutional investors, including pension 
funds, insurance companies, mutual funds and investment advisers, reside amongst these 
investors, depicted by Diversified and Traders for factoring division and LowHHI-HighICR, 
HighHHI-LowICR and LowHHI-LowICR for simple division. Consequently, our results are 
consistent with Black (1998), who finds that U.S. institutional activism yields little governance 
improvements in target firms and do not improve target performance discernibly. Our finding, 
however, contradicts Smith (1996), who finds that CalPERS70 is relatively effective is pushing 
                                                 
70  The California Public Employees' Retirement System, one of the largest U.S. public pension funds. 
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through governance changes71, Wahal (1996), who suggests that U.S. public pension funds are 
reasonably successful in driving corporate governance changes72, and Del Quercio and Hawkins 
(1999), who imply that U.S. institutions institutional activists are at least somewhat successful in 
promoting changes in target firms.  
Importantly, our results also cast a shadow on the assumption that hedge funds would be natural 
activists simply due to their freedom from regulation and high performance incentives. 
Specifically, as shown in Table 12, the vast majority of hedge funds are clustered in factoring 
division to Traders (72% of all hedge funds) and in simple division to LowHHI-HighICR and 
LowHHI-LowICR investors (61% of all hedge funds), none of which are consistently associated 
with governance improvements. In other words, most hedge funds seem to have a relatively short 
investment horizon or a relatively diversified portfolio. We thus suggest that hedge funds, 
similarly with all other investors, are not associated with governance improvements following 
their entry, unless they possess a concentrated portfolio and a long investment horizon. Our 
suggestion is supported by Clifford (2008), who shows that propensity to hedge fund activism 
increases in investor lock-up, which he uses as a proxy for investment horizon. We further 
suggest that even defining activists as 13D-filers or otherwise “known” activist hedge funds 
might be misleading since most hedge funds seem to be active only in a small portion of their 
investments while retaining passive short-term investing as their primary strategy. We test and 
discuss the effect of entries by known activist hedge funds on corporate characteristics separately 
in Section 6.4. 
Overall, our findings on investor effects on governance improvements imply that concentrated 
long-term investors are associated with governance improvements. Interestingly and contrary to 
our hypothesis, however, we find that very concentrated and very long-term investors are not 
associated with governance improvements, and suggest a private benefit explanation for the 
finding. Perhaps most importantly, our results suggest that the investors associated with 
governance improvements cannot be identified through any individual externally labelled group, 
including hedge funds. 
                                                 
71   Smith (1996) shows that in 1987–1993, 50% of the proxy proposals filed by CalPERS to increase the number of 
  independent directors were partly or wholly adopted by target firms. 
72   For U.S. pension funds in 1987-1993, Wahal (1996) shows that 56% of all proposals were corporate governance 
  related and that 71 out of 199 proposals were subsequently adopted. 
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7.1.2 Organisational improvements 
Our results for the effect of investor entries on unrelated divestments are largely supportive of 
Hypothesis 2, which implies that investors with high portfolio concentration and long investment 
horizon facilitate organisational improvements in target firms. Importantly, results for the 
investor effects on the occurrence and initiation of dividends are consistent with one another and 
imply that a specific group of investors with high concentration and long horizon, residing in the 
cross-section of Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR, are strongly associated with the occurrence and 
initiation of unrelated divestments. Other investors do not exhibit consistent association to either 
outcome variable. The results for investor effects on changes in the magnitude of unrelated 
divestments are mixed and provide only weak and partial support for Hypothesis 2. Further, our 
results persistently support the suggestion that investor with very high concentration and very 
long horizon do not facilitate improvements in target firms. 
Our key finding that entries by high concentration and long horizon investors residing in the 
cross-section of our investor groups are significantly positively associated with unrelated 
divestments is fundamentally in line with Bethel et al. (1998) who show that block share 
purchases by activist investors are followed by increases in asset divestitures. The investors we 
find to have a strong association to unrelated divestments certainly hold large stakes: the average 
holdings for Devoted and HighHHI-HighICR investors are 7.5% and 6.2%, respectively. Thus, 
our findings are also in line with the general proposition of Shleifer and Vishny (1986) that large 
shareholders may have incentives to undertake value-creative improvements since their large 
stakes render them partly free of the free-rider problem.  
Overall, we cautiously suggest that our results imply that high concentration and long horizon 
investors are able to repair organisational damage caused by prevailing agency costs and 
misaligned managerial actions. As Jensen (1986) Shleifer and Vishny (1989) and Morck, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1990) suggest, firms where agency problems prevail tend to exhibit management-
driven growth and diversification beyond the optimum. Such excess diversification or growth 
leads to value losses (see e.g. Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 1995; Denis, Denis and 
Sarin 1997a), which are reversed when firms reduce diversification through spinoffs or unrelated 
divestments (see Ahn and Denis 2004). Largely in line with Bethel et al. (1998), we suggest that 
investors with a high portfolio concentration and a long investment horizon may facilitate such 
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unrelated divestments to reduce value losses to shareholders. Our findings are also supported by 
Haynes, Thompson and Wright (2003) who show with U.K. data that divestment activity is 
reduced when governance is enhanced, which we find is also brought about by high concentration 
and long horizon investors, as discussed regarding results for corporate governance 
improvements in Section 5.2.  
Further, our results for investors improving target organisation by reducing diversification are 
also largely in line with extant studies exploring the objectives of activist hedge funds in their 
target firms. Perhaps most importantly, Becht et al. (2008) find that the U.K. activist Hermes UK 
Focus Funds (HUKFF) sought to refocus its target firms by selling noncore divisions in a large 
portion of their engagements and enjoyed a success rate of above 50%73. Also, Brav et al. (2008) 
mention that blocking diversification is generally considered an important reason for activism.  
In addition to our key finding that a specific group of high concentration and long horizon 
investors are associated with organisational improvements in targets, we notice that the behaviour 
of very concentrated and very long horizon investors is in line with the preceding results for 
governance improvements. Specifically, while we find that the positive association between the 
occurrence and initiation of unrelated divestments and Devoted investors seems to be driven by 
investors also included in HighHHI-HighICR, we anticipate that the Devoted investors with 
highest concentration and longest horizon do not exhibit significant positive association with 
unrelated divestments. This suggestion is supported by the consistent insignificance of TopHHI-
TopICR investors, 76% of which are also included in Devoted. In line with our discussion on 
governance improvements, we cautiously suspect that private benefits of control (see e.g. Barclay 
and Holderness 1989; Holderness 2003; Dyck and Zingales 2004) are to blame. Regarding the 
potential private benefits from diversification, we suspect that the fundamental proposition by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) that owner-managers who have all their wealth invested in a single 
firm tend to diversify is relevant in our setting. We cautiously suggest that blockholders with very 
large stakes, as with the most of investors in Devoted and TopHHI-TopICR, may consider firm 
diversification preferable since it lowers their personal risk. Consequently, such investors may 
not strive to promote unrelated divestments, regardless of their potentially positive effect on firm 
                                                 
73  Becht et al. (2008) show that out of 28 attempts by HUKFF, in 15.5 an outcome was achieved (for partially 
 achieved outcomes, the authors allot 0.5). 
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value (see Ahn and Denis 2004). In their seminal paper on managerial tendency to diversify, 
Amihud and Lev (1981) mention that large outside blockholders may also find firm 
diversification preferable, but state that managerial incentive to do so is more powerful (for 
discussion on managerial tendency to diversify, see also May 1995 and Aggarwal and Samwick 
2003) 
Overall, our results imply that investors with high concentration and long horizon facilitate 
organisational improvements by overturning agency-inflicted value-destroying diversification. 
7.1.3 Payout improvements 
Overall, our results for changes in payout are weak and show little support for Hypothesis 3. 
Contrary to our findings for governance and organisational improvements, where clear results are 
observed, the results imply that either (1) our approach of grouping investors based on portfolio 
concentration and investment horizon does not capture investor characteristics relevant to payout 
activism or (2) payout is simply not on activist agendas. While we cannot exclude the first 
alternative as a reason for our weak results, we discuss the second alternative below and reflect it 
against our findings for both the initiations of dividends and the changes in dividend yield. 
While the literature generally suggests that payout is elemental in curbing agency costs of free 
cash flow (Jensen 1986), some also suggest that ordinary payout has shortfalls in fulfilling that 
task. Perhaps most importantly, Jensen himself subtly indicates that the announcement of an 
increase in dividends still leaves managers in control over the use of future free cash flows. In 
other words, the promise to payout excess cash flows through dividends (or any other form of 
ordinary payout) is weak because dividends can be relatively easily reversed in the future. 
Further, in his study on U.S. hedge fund activism, Clifford (2008) finds only weak evidence of 
activist blockholders increasing the dividend yield of their targets in the year following the 13D 
filing. He further notes that hedge fund activists actually target companies with lower levels of 
cash relative to peers, which makes it unlikely that the funds’ objective would be to increase 
payout.  
In contrast with the above suggestions, Klein and Zur (2009) find that hedge funds activists 
frequently demand an initiation of dividends, but other entrepreneurial activists do not. Similarly, 
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firms targeted by hedge fund activists experience significant increases in dividends per share, 
whereas firms targeted by other entrepreneurial activists74 do not.  
Regarding our results on investor effects on changes in dividend yield, suggestions by Jensen 
(1986) and Clifford (2008) imply that increasing dividends may not be high on activist agendas. 
Findings of Klein and Zur (2009), however, provide support for the other option, namely that our 
investor characterisation may not be well-suited to capture propensity to payout activism. 
Specifically, they find that while hedge funds consistently increase dividends, other activists, 
who in our data are relatively concentrated and long-term, do not. Our findings support the views 
of some of our practitioner interviewees who do not regard increasing cash dividends as an 
important objective for long-term activists. Instead they consider dividend demands typical of 
speculative publicity seeking campaigns often launched by short-term investors such as hedge 
funds. 
Regarding our results on the Initiation of cash dividends that suggest the Diversified investors to 
be positively related to dividend initiation, we propose three alternative explanations. 
First, Diversified investors may invest in companies where they anticipate an initiation of cash 
dividends to occur. We test this selection hypothesis with reverse regressions in Section 6.1 
discussing the potential endogeneity issues related to all our outcome variables. The reverse 
regressions do not support a direct selection explanation for the positive association between 
Diversified investors and dividend initiations. We note, however, that for LowHHI-HighICR 
investors, who have a 90% overlap with Diversified investors (see Table 10), the reverse 
regressions support the suggestion that the investors select into firms that initiate dividend 
payments in the following year. 
Second, the results may support the view that Diversified investors successfully engage in 
standardised activism to initiate dividends. As described by Smith (1996) and Black (1992b) for 
U.S. institutional fund activism, standardised activism seeks to influence firm decision making 
through letter-sending or proxy-proposals. Since requests for payout increases do not necessarily 
require significant firm-specific efforts, diversified investors, who seek economies of scale 
                                                 
74  Klein and Zur (2009) include individuals, private equity funds, venture capital firms and asset managers in their 
group of other entrepreneurial activists. 
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(Black 1998) in managing activist campaigns, may be willing and able to pursue payout 
increases. 
Thirdly, and in our view perhaps most probably, the decision to pay dividends is driven by 
investor demand for dividends, i.e. the catering explanation (Baker and Wurgler 2004). Evidence 
of the institutional preference for dividends has been also presented by Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005). Interestingly, they show that institutions prefer dividend-paying firms to non-paying but 
do not show any preference for firms that pay high dividends, which might explain why no 
relationship between Diversified investors and the Change in dividend yield is observed. 
Similarly, in a survey of 384 financial executives and 23 in-depth interviews, Brav et al. (2005) 
find that managers of non-payers initiate dividend payments for two dominant reasons: a 
sustainable increase in earnings and the demand by institutional investors. 
Overall, we recognise that the evidence provides no support for our Hypothesis 3 regarding 
investor effects on initiation of cash dividends. We cautiously suggest, however, that our results 
for initiation of cash dividends may be a result of the fact that dividend initiation is not on activist 
agendas. While we find some support for a potential selection explanation, the literature seems to 
agree on the presence of catering where firms choose to pay dividends when they anticipate 
investors to prefer them. 
7.2 Conclusions 
We deploy a novel approach to identify activist shareholders and find that investors with 
concentrated portfolios and long investment horizons improve their target companies. We depart 
from the extant activist literature and produce two alternative investor groupings based on 
portfolio concentration and investment horizon to predict investor propensity to activism. We 
examine corporate improvements occurring in a sample of large publicly traded corporations in 
U.S. and 17 European markets and focus on (1) corporate governance, (2) organisational and (3) 
payout improvements. 
Our results for investor effects on corporate governance and organisational improvements show 
that investors with few large equity stakes and long holding periods are consistently associated 
with improvements in their target firms. Specifically, concentrated long-term investors relate to 
better overall governance and board arrangements as well as corporate diversification reductions. 
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We find no evidence of a selection explanation for our results and therefore cautiously suggest 
that concentrated long-term investors improve their target companies. Equally importantly, we 
discover that investors with very high portfolio concentration and very long investment horizon 
exhibit no association to governance or organisational improvements. We propose a private 
benefit explanation and suggest that investors with very large and concentrated equity stakes do 
not pursue corporate improvements, but rather exploit their position to extract benefits potentially 
not available to other shareholders.  
Our findings contribute to the present-day perception of who activist investors are and how they 
improve the companies they invest in. We show that no externally labelled investor group, 
including activist hedge funds, adequately defines the investors that are actively improving 
governance or organisation in the companies they hold. Furthermore, we test the association 
between general ownership structure and corporate improvements and find insignificant results. 
We thus provide additional support for our anticipation that investor activism relies primarily on 
individual investors with distinct characteristics rather than the overall ownership structure. 
Our results for investor effects on increasing or initiating dividends are mixed. Specifically, we 
find no evidence for concentrated long-term investors as dividend activists. We explore potential 
explanations for our weak results and cautiously suggest that increasing cash dividends may not 
be high on activists’ agenda. 
We recognise that alternative explanations, specifically survivorship bias and endogeneity may 
influence our results. Our concern regarding survivorship bias arises from the exclusion of 
ceased-to-exist firms in our sample. While we find no specific reason to assume the problem is 
severe, we cannot exclude it. The endogeneity concern arises from the possibility that 
concentrated long-term investors select into companies in which they anticipate improvements 
will occur. While our efforts to counter this concern do not provide evidence supporting the 
selection explanation, we recognise that it may influence our results materially. 
7.3 Avenues for future research 
While we consider our findings an encouraging opening in determining the nature and role of 
activist investors, we acknowledge that our results could be further improved in many respects. In 
particular, we see improvement potential in three individual areas. 
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First, we anticipate that a research design adapted to explicitly account for investors’ 
performance incentives could further clarify our findings. Numerous studies have suggested that 
tying fund manager compensation to fund performance facilitates investors’ active monitoring of 
target companies (see e.g. Brav et al. 2008; Clifford 2008; Kahan and Rock 2007; Klein and Zur 
2009; Woidtke 2002). Accounting for the performance incentives is, however, problematic. 
Importantly, it is often difficult to determine whose incentives should be monitored in an investor 
organization. Further, incentives are not easily quantifiable for all investors and it may be 
difficult to compare incentives between different investors. For example, comparing the easily 
quantifiable performance fee of a hedge fund manager to the incentives of a private individual or 
a government investment vehicle is not straight forward. Finally, the availability of incentive and 
compensation data is limited; data for fund manager compensation or investor fee structures are 
rarely disclosed publicly. 
Second, further efforts to find new ways to account for the endogeneity in the activism context 
could be value-adding. A number of papers study the role of shareholders and ownership 
structures in firm performance and corporate policies but we have not found a fully satisfying 
way to separate investor effects from selection. Primarily, future research should attempt to find 
instrumental variables for activist investors in the context of our research design. Analogous 
examples of instrumental variables for ownership include the density of wealthy individuals near 
a firm’s headquarters used by Becker, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2009) for blockholder 
ownership and Morgan Stanley Capital International World index membership used by Aggarwal 
et al. (2010) for institutional ownership.  
Third, we recognise that studying the interplay between individual investors could extend and 
strengthen our results significantly. Determining whether activists’ success in facilitating 
corporate improvements is conditional on the presence of other investors, such as large 
diversified institutions, could provide valuable insights for both the investing entities and target 
companies. 
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ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ria
bl
es
 a
re
 th
e 
en
tri
es
 o
f t
he
 fo
ur
 in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 fa
ct
or
in
g 
(D
ev
ot
ed
, F
oc
us
ed
, D
iv
er
sif
ie
d 
an
d 
Tr
ad
er
s)
 a
nd
 th
e 
fiv
e 
in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s 
de
riv
ed
 fr
om
 
th
e 
si
m
pl
e 
di
vi
si
on
 (
To
pH
H
I-
To
pC
R
, H
ig
hH
H
I-
H
ig
hI
C
R
, L
ow
H
H
I-
H
ig
hI
C
R
, H
ig
hH
H
I-
Lo
w
IC
R
, L
ow
H
H
I-
Lo
w
IC
R
). 
C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 
Si
ze
 is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f a
 fi
rm
’s
 n
et
 sa
le
s;
 T
ob
in
’s
 q
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 c
ap
ita
l t
o 
th
e 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s;
 R
el
at
iv
e 
re
tu
rn
 i
s 
th
e 
ye
ar
ly
 b
uy
-a
nd
-h
ol
d 
re
tu
rn
 f
or
 a
 f
irm
 l
es
s 
th
e 
ye
ar
ly
 b
uy
-a
nd
-h
ol
d 
re
tu
rn
 f
or
 t
he
 f
irm
’s
 d
om
es
tic
 m
ai
n 
st
oc
k 
in
de
x;
 T
w
o-
ye
ar
 a
ve
ra
ge
 s
al
es
 
gr
ow
th
 is
 th
e 
co
m
po
un
d 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 r
at
e 
ov
er
 a
 la
gg
in
g 
tw
o 
ye
ar
 p
er
io
d;
 L
ev
er
ag
e 
is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f 
to
ta
l d
eb
t t
o 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
C
as
h 
is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f 
to
ta
l c
as
h 
ho
ld
in
gs
 to
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
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pl
an
at
or
y 
va
ria
bl
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H
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Y
es
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ea
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 e
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Y
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Y
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O
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34
4
8,
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34
4
8,
34
4
8,
34
4
8,
34
4
8,
34
4
8,
34
4
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4
N
um
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r o
f c
om
pa
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es
1,
46
8
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46
8
1,
46
8
1,
46
8
1,
46
8
1,
46
8
1,
46
8
1,
46
8
1,
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8
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2
13
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6
13
5.
6
68
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9
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2
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6
16
8.
4
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30
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11
43
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22
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22
22
22
22
22
22
22
R
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t z
-s
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in
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es
**
* 
p<
0.
01
, *
* 
p<
0.
05
, *
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<0
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Fa
ct
or
in
g 
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on
Si
m
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e 
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vi
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on
C
ha
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 m
ag
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 o
f u
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at
ed
 d
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T
ab
le
 3
9 
– 
R
ev
er
se
 r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 w
ith
 in
iti
at
io
n 
of
 c
as
h 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s 
re
ve
rs
e 
re
gr
es
si
on
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
en
try
 o
f 
di
ff
er
en
t 
in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s. 
In
iti
at
io
n 
of
 c
as
h 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
is
 t
he
 k
ey
 e
xp
la
na
to
ry
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
in
di
ca
tin
g 
th
e 
in
iti
at
io
n 
of
 c
as
h 
di
vi
de
nd
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 a
fte
r t
w
o 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
ye
ar
s w
ith
 n
o 
ca
sh
 d
iv
id
en
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
 a
nd
 is
 la
gg
ed
 b
y 
on
e 
ye
ar
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 th
e 
en
tri
es
 
of
 th
e 
fo
ur
 in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 f
ac
to
rin
g 
(D
ev
ot
ed
, F
oc
us
ed
, D
iv
er
sif
ie
d 
an
d 
Tr
ad
er
s)
 a
nd
 th
e 
fiv
e 
in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s 
de
riv
ed
 f
ro
m
 t
he
 s
im
pl
e 
di
vi
si
on
 
(T
op
H
H
I-
To
pC
R
, H
ig
hH
H
I-
H
ig
hI
C
R
, L
ow
H
H
I-
H
ig
hI
C
R
, H
ig
hH
H
I-
Lo
w
IC
R
, L
ow
H
H
I-
Lo
w
IC
R
). 
C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 S
iz
e 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l 
lo
ga
rit
hm
 o
f a
 fi
rm
’s
 n
et
 s
al
es
; T
ob
in
’s
 q
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 c
ap
ita
l t
o 
th
e 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s;
 R
el
at
iv
e 
re
tu
rn
 is
 th
e 
ye
ar
ly
 b
uy
-a
nd
-h
ol
d 
re
tu
rn
 f
or
 a
 f
irm
 l
es
s 
th
e 
ye
ar
ly
 b
uy
-a
nd
-h
ol
d 
re
tu
rn
 f
or
 t
he
 f
irm
’s
 d
om
es
tic
 m
ai
n 
st
oc
k 
in
de
x;
 T
w
o-
ye
ar
 a
ve
ra
ge
 s
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 is
 th
e 
co
m
po
un
d 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 o
ve
r a
 la
gg
in
g 
tw
o 
ye
ar
 p
er
io
d;
 L
ev
er
ag
e 
is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
ot
al
 d
eb
t t
o 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
C
as
h 
is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
ot
al
 c
as
h 
ho
ld
in
gs
 to
 to
ta
l 
as
se
ts
. 
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pl
an
at
or
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va
ria
bl
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0
9,
72
0
9,
72
0
9,
72
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um
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r o
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4
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4
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4
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4
1,
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4
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4
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W
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C
hi
2
10
0.
3
11
0.
9
14
3.
4
35
2.
6
85
.4
2
48
.0
8
14
2.
5
27
2.
1
27
9.
8
df
19
19
19
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R
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or
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m
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T
ab
le
 4
0 
– 
R
ev
er
se
 r
eg
re
ss
io
ns
 w
ith
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 d
iv
id
en
d 
yi
el
d 
Th
e 
ta
bl
e 
sh
ow
s r
ev
er
se
 re
gr
es
si
on
s f
or
 th
e 
en
try
 o
f d
iff
er
en
t i
nv
es
to
r g
ro
up
s. 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 d
iv
id
en
d 
yi
el
d 
is
 th
e 
ke
y 
ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
va
ria
bl
e 
m
ea
su
rin
g 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in
 d
iv
id
en
d 
yi
el
ds
 o
f 
tw
o 
co
ns
ec
ut
iv
e 
ye
ar
s 
an
d 
is
 la
gg
ed
 b
y 
on
e 
ye
ar
. T
he
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 th
e 
en
tri
es
 o
f 
th
e 
fo
ur
 in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 f
ac
to
rin
g 
(D
ev
ot
ed
, F
oc
us
ed
, D
iv
er
si
fie
d 
an
d 
Tr
ad
er
s)
 a
nd
 th
e 
fiv
e 
in
ve
st
or
 g
ro
up
s d
er
iv
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
si
m
pl
e 
di
vi
si
on
 (T
op
H
H
I-
To
pC
R
, H
ig
hH
H
I-
H
ig
hI
C
R
, L
ow
H
H
I-
H
ig
hI
C
R
, H
ig
hH
H
I-
Lo
w
IC
R
, L
ow
H
H
I-
Lo
w
IC
R
). 
C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 a
re
 a
s 
fo
llo
w
s:
 S
iz
e 
is
 th
e 
na
tu
ra
l l
og
ar
ith
m
 o
f a
 fi
rm
’s
 n
et
 s
al
es
; T
ob
in
’s
 q
 is
 c
al
cu
la
te
d 
as
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
t v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 c
ap
ita
l t
o 
th
e 
bo
ok
 v
al
ue
 o
f t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s;
 R
el
at
iv
e 
re
tu
rn
 is
 th
e 
ye
ar
ly
 b
uy
-a
nd
-h
ol
d 
re
tu
rn
 fo
r a
 fi
rm
 le
ss
 th
e 
ye
ar
ly
 b
uy
-
an
d-
ho
ld
 re
tu
rn
 fo
r t
he
 fi
rm
’s
 d
om
es
tic
 m
ai
n 
st
oc
k 
in
de
x;
 T
w
o-
ye
ar
 a
ve
ra
ge
 s
al
es
 g
ro
w
th
 is
 th
e 
co
m
po
un
d 
an
nu
al
 g
ro
w
th
 ra
te
 o
ve
r a
 la
gg
in
g 
tw
o 
ye
ar
 p
er
io
d;
 
Le
ve
ra
ge
 is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
ot
al
 d
eb
t t
o 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
C
as
h 
is
 th
e 
ra
tio
 o
f t
ot
al
 c
as
h 
ho
ld
in
gs
 to
 to
ta
l a
ss
et
s. 
 
 E
xp
la
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 v
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